Comments on Anton Korinek's Capital Controls and Currency Wars'


Helen Popper Santa Clara University


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A capital control that internalizes an externality is good.


A capital control that internalizes an externality is good.

Sans the externality, it's not good.






Laissez Faire Equilibrium



World **Interest Rate** (Inverse) **Bond Supply (j)** (Inverse) **Bond Demand (i)** Internalizing (inverse) **Bond Demand (i)**

Bonds



Equilibrium with National Planner




Figure 1




Figure 1




Figure 1

J complains.




Figure 1

J complains. Too bad.

Each country internalizes its own externality

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Pareto Efficiency

Antecedent

Eichengreen & Sachs, 1985


Journal of Economic History

Recent Manifestation



Brazil Complains About Monetary Policy

Brazil's President Dilma Rousseff participates in a ceremony of announcement for new measures of the Plan "Brasil Maior" and the installation of Sector Councils for competitiveness in Brazil April 3, 2012.





Generalizations

- Reserve accumulation
- Uncertain states of nature
- Real investment

Externalities

- Learning by exporting
- Learning through employment
- Zero lower bound

...but wait, there's more

- Small economy
- Large economy
- Commitment problems
- Distortive controls
- Imperfect controls

1. Benchmark

Savers forever savers.
Borrowers forever borrowers.

Might transversality conditions be appropriate?

2. Relatedly

Additional cases with dynamics would allow for fleshing out Michael Klein's "Walls vs. Gates."

3. 'Currency Wars'

$$P_{T} = 1.$$

The exchange rate is P_{Ni} .

The `currency war' is masked.

3. 'Currency Wars'

More explicit:

Monopolistic competition in traded goods: $P_{Ti} \neq P_{Ti}$