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Employee Satisfaction, Labor Market Flexibility, and Stock Returns Around The World

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


Employee satisfaction

- Compensation: pay and benefits
- Workers' Union: representations of employees in the decision making process
- Workplace culture: trust, communication, responsibility, flexible working hours, etc.

Firm performance

- Market valuation: MtB ratio, Tobin's Q
- Shareholder's value: stock returns
- Accounting performance: profitability, earnings, operating performance, etc.



Negative or insignificant

- Abowd (1989AER): announcements of **pay** rises reduce shareholder's value \$-for-\$
- Gorton and Schmid (2004): high **codetermination** in German firms reduces their market valuation
- Cronqvist et al. (2009): entrenched managers **pay** their workers more

Positive

- (Very many) studies document a positive correlation, but not necessarily causal
 - Edmans (2011JFE, 2012AMP): likely causal effect of employee satisfaction in the U.S
 - But, need not extend to other countries

This Paper's Contribution

- Study the link between employee satisfaction and firm value in 14 countries
- Employee satisfaction is associated with
 - Higher long-run returns
 - Higher current valuation ratios
 - Higher future profitability
 - Higher future earnings surprises
- But only in countries with flexible labor markets

Benefits of Employee Satisfaction

• Superior retention and recruitment

 Satisfaction may be valued more by employees than cash (Maslow (1943), Hertzberg (1959))

Superior motivation

- Extrinsic motivators less effective in the modern firm
- Efficiency wage channels
 - * Akerlof (1982) gift exchange model
 - Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984): employees work hard to avoid being fired from a satisfying job
- Tolerance for failure and reputation for providing job security spurs innovation

Why Might Employee Satisfaction Subtract Value?

- Managers may over-spend due to an agency problem
 - More pleasant worker relationship (Jensen and Meckling (1976))
 - Employee benefits as a takeover defense (Pagano and Volpin (2005))
 - Employment protection increases labor costs and reduces profitability (Simintzi, Vig, and Volpin (2015))
 - ▶ High worker pay linked to entrenchment (Cronqvist et al. (2009))

Flexible Labor Markets

- Recruitment benefits are higher since firms engage in more hiring
 - Hiring is easier (due to fewer restrictions on the contracts firms can offer)
 - Firing underperformers is easier, creating more vacancies
- Retention benefits are higher since rate of departures is higher
 - Rivals face fewer constraints on hiring away workers
 - ► Greater firing risk encourages workers to invest in general rather than firm-specific skills (Thelen (2001)), increasing their ability to be recruited elsewhere

Flexible Labor Markets (cont'd)

• Motivation benefits are higher

- ES seen more as a gift since they are not mandatory by law
- Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) effect is stronger if firing more likely
- Cost of autonomy (an element of ES) is that workers may abuse by slacking; alleviated by firing ability
- Weak dismissal laws deter innovation as firm may punish short-run failures or hold-up workers if innovation is successful (Acharya, Baghai, and Subrahmanian (2013))
- Weak collective bargaining give individuals the ability to voluntarily take value-creating actions



Rigid Labor Markets

- All of above lead to a downward shift in MB curve in rigid labor markets
 - Harder hiring and firing leads to lower recruitment, retention, and motivation benefits of ES
- Expenditure on ES likely exhibits **diminishing returns**, leading to **downward movement** along the MB curve
 - When regulations already ensure a minimum level of worker welfare, companies with high satisfaction relative to their peers may be exceeding the optimal level

Rigid Labor Markets

• High ES may result from labor control

- If workers (partly) determine HR policies, ES can be excessive from shareholders' perspective
- Gorton and Schmid (2004): one-half supervisory board representation leads to 31% discount
- Faleye, Mehrotra, and Morck (2006): labor-controlled U.S. firms deviate more from value maximization and exhibit lower labor TFP
- Chen, Kacperczyk, and Ortiz-Molina (2011): unions increase a firm's operating leverage and cost of equity
- Atanassov and Kim (2009), Lee and Mas (2012): unions protect underperforming managers and reduce firm value

	Theoretical Motivation 000000●		
Hypoth	nesis		

BCs generate positive abnormal returns in countries with high labor market flexibility, and that the returns to list inclusion decrease with labor market rigidity.

Note that

• This hypothesis does not require all of the channels through which employee satisfaction affects firm value to depend on labor market flexibility, only that a sufficient proportion do.

The Best Companies Survey

- \bullet Great Place to Work Institute ${}^{\textcircled{R}}$ creates "Best Companies to Work For"
 - Arguably the most respected and prestigious measure of ES
 - Available in 45 countries worldwide
- 2/3 of score comes from confidential employee responses to a 57-question survey, 1/3 from Institute's own evaluation of firm policies
- Companies are scored in four areas:
 - Credibility (communication to employees)
 - Respect (opportunities and benefits)
 - Fairness (compensation and diversity)
 - Pride/Camaraderie (teamwork, philanthropy, and celebrations)

Employee Satisfaction

- Countries with 5 years' history of BC listing
 - Include only firms headquartered and primarily listed in that country
 - Need at least 10 BCs
 - 14 countries meet these criteria
- Earliest start year for a non-US country is 1997 (Brazil), so we study September 1997-December 2013

Labor Market Flexibility: EPL

- OECD's Employment Protection Legislation index, used in Blanchard and Portugal (2000), Messina and Vallanti (2007), Pagano and Volpin (2005b), and Simintzi, Vig, and Volpin (2015)
 - Individual dismissal of workers with regular contracts
 - 2 Additional costs for collective dismissals
 - 8 Regulation of temporary contracts
- 1, 2 constrain hiring; 3 constrains firing

Labor Market Flexibility: EFW

- LMF categories of Fraser Institute's Economic Freedom of the World index, used in Bernal-Verdugo, Furceri, and Guillaume (2012a, 2012b), Freeman, Kruse, and Blasi (2008), and Haltiwanger, Scarpetta, and Schweiger (2008)
 - Hiring regulations and minimum wage (WEF)
 - 2 Hiring and firing regulations (WEF)
 - Sentralized collective bargaining (WEF)
 - 4 Hours regulations (World Bank)
 - Mandated cost of worker dismissal (World Bank)
 - Onscription
- 1, 2, 4 measure ease of hiring, 5 the ease of firing, 3 the power of labor unions, 6 the supply side


Country-Level Methodology

 $R_{ct} = \alpha + \beta_{MKT}MKT_{ct} + \beta_{HML}HML_{ct} + \beta_{SMB}SMB_{ct} + \beta_{MOM}MOM_{ct} + \varepsilon_{ct}$

- Calculate the returns to a (EW or VW) Best Company portfolio from one month after list publication
- Control for risk using Carhart's (1997) four factors
 - Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation using Newey-West's(1987) estimator with four lags
 - Results based Fama and French (2015) five factors plus momentum are very similar


	Results	
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Equal-Weighted Country Alphas and EPL



	Results 00●00000	

Value-Weighted Country Alphas and EPL



Firm-Level Methodology

- $\begin{aligned} R_{cit} &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 B C_{cit} + \beta_2 \mathbf{BC}_{cit} \times \mathbf{LMF}_{ct} + \beta_3 B C_{cit} \times CountryControls_{ct} \\ &+ \beta_1 LMF_{ct} + \beta_2 CountryControls_{ct} + \beta_3 FirmControls_{cit} + \varepsilon_{cit} \end{aligned}$
 - *R_{cit}* is raw, market-adjusted, or industry-adjusted using FF48
 - *CountryControls*: rule of law, GDP growth, individualism (Chui, Titman, and Wei (2010)), price informativeness, GDP per capita, stock market capitalization over GDP
 - *FirmControls* from Brennan, Chordia, and Subrahmanyam (1998): *SIZE*, *BM*, *YLD*, *RET*2 – 3, *RET*4 – 6, *RET*7 – 12, *VOL*, *PRC*
 - Double fixed effects: country and year-month
 - Double cluster standard errors: country and year-month

Stock Returns across Countries

	EPL			EFW		
Raw						
BC	0.743***	-4.059**	-4.888***	0.608**	-0.516*	1.478
$BC \times LMF$		0.569**	0.941***		0.145**	0.309***
Ctry Ctrls	N	N	Y	N	N	Y
Market-adjuste	d					
BC	0.770***	-4.332**	-5.243***	0.636**	-0.571	1.855
$BC \times LMF$		0.596**	0.938***		0.155**	0.330***
Ctry Ctrls	N	N	Y	N	N	Y
Industry-adjusted						
BC	0.734***	-4.358**	-4.960***	0.600***	-0.361	3.015
$BC \times LMF$		0.600**	1.094***		0.123**	0.313***
Ctry Ctrls	Ν	Ν	Y	Ν	N	Υ

Potential Explanations

- A: ES has particularly high value in flexible labor markets, but market does not immediately incorporate this value
- B: ES allows firms to pass SRI screens
- C: Abnormal returns result from risk
 - Hard to reconcile with magnitudes, and negative returns in some countries
- D: ES is irrelevant, but the market think it's wasteful
 - Hard to reconcile with negative returns in some countries
- C and D: in flexible (regulated) labor markets trade at an initial discount (premium)
 - ► Q regression: BC is significant; when *BC* × *LMF* is included, it's significant but *BC* becomes insignificant

Tobin's Q across Countries

$\begin{array}{lll} Q_{cit} &=& \beta_0 + \beta_1 B C_{cit} + \beta_2 \mathbf{BC}_{cit} \times \mathbf{LMF}_{ct} + \beta_3 B C_{cit} \times \textit{CountryControls}_{ct} \\ &+& \beta_1 L M F_{ct} + \beta_2 \textit{CountryControls}_{ct} + \beta_3 \textit{FirmControls}_{cit} + \varepsilon_{cit} \end{array}$

	EPL			EFW		
Tobin's Q						
BC	0.839***	-3.356**	-0.993***	0.684**	-0.063	0.080
$BC \times LMF$		0.490**	0.157***		0.095**	0.113***
Ctry Ctrls	N	N	Y	N	N	Υ

Further Evidence on A (ES has +/- Value)

- Accounting profitability:
 - ▶ 1-year and 2-year ahead industry-adjusted NPM and ROA regressions: BC is significant; when BC × LMF is included, it's significant but BC becomes insignificant
- Earnings surprises:
 - Hard test to pass: Core, Guay, and Rusticus (2006) overturn Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003)
 - ▶ 1-year and 2-year ahead earnings surprises: BC × EPL is significant, BC × EFW is positive but insignificant

		The Dependent Variable ●○	

Causality

- Prior studies have correlated ES with accounting profits, valuation ratios, employee turnover, customer satisfaction etc.
 - Omitted variables and reverse causality cloud interpretation
- This paper (and Edmans (2011, 2012)) studies future stock returns
 - If ES were the result of high profits, these profits would be in the stock price today, since they are tangible
 - Capture all potential channels through which ES may matter
 - Takes into account the cost of ES
 - Allows for controls for risk
- Reverse causality if employees can forecast stock returns:
 - ▶ Benartzi (2001), Bergman and Jenter (2007) suggest they cannot
 - Jenter, Lewellen, and Warner (2011): even CEOs can't forecast past 100 days
 - \star Survey time lag is 7 months in the US
- Joint test of the value of ES and market efficiency

		The Dependent Variable ○●	

Selection Issues

- Firms apply to be considered for the list
 - To cause bias, selection decision must be correlated with either independent variable (satisfaction) or outcome variable (future returns)
- Correlation with satisfaction
 - Low-satisfaction firms choose not to apply because they expect not to make the list (increases accuracy)
 - High-satisfaction firms choose not to apply because they don't need certification (attenuates)
- Correlation with stock returns
 - If decision to apply is correlated with current profitability or past stock returns, should already be in current price
 - If decision to apply is correlated with expected future stock returns, likely to be over next 100 days

		Conclusion •

Conclusions

- Results of Edmans (2011, 2012) are not anomalous in a global context
 - But do not automatically extend either
 - BC is associated with superior returns, valuation, accounting profits, and earnings surprises only in countries with high LMF
- Importance of institutional context for
 - Managers. Investing in ES doesn't always pay off
 - Investors. An ES strategy doesn't always pay off
 - ★ Implications for investment strategies more generally, particularly given most studies focus on US
 - Particularly for strategies that depend on institutional environment, such as SRI (e.g. gender diversity, animal rights, ethical industries)