Annual Conference				
			
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					Corporate Finance
									
			
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					May 2015				
			
			 
	
		
						Capital Gains Lock-In and Governance Choices 					
	
	
	
		
			Differences in accrued gains and investors’ tax-sensitivity induce variation in a capital gains lock-in effect across mutual funds even for the same stock at the same time. Exploiting this variation, we show this effect influences funds’ governance decisions: higher capital gains decrease the likelihood a fund exits prior to contentious votes and increase the likelihood a fund votes against management. Consistent with tax motivation, these findings are concentrated among funds with tax-sensitive investors. Further, high aggregate capital gains across funds holding a stock predict a higher likelihood management loses a vote and a lower likelihood a contentious vote is proposed.		
		
						
			Keywords: 
																																									Mutual fund, Proxy voting, Corporate governance, Capital-gains tax, Lock-in effect