The Geoeconomics of Imports: Evidence from UN Security Council Elections

This paper examines how the United States utilizes imports as a tool of geoeconomic statecraft and how firms participate in it. Exploiting elections to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), we show that U.S. publicly listed firms increase imports from a country by 16 percent when it rotates onto the Council. This increase is unique to the U.S. relative to comparable developed countries without permanent UNSC membership and is concentrated in products where elected countries lack comparative advantage, reflecting strategic reallocation of U.S. imports rather than improvements in exporter economies. Consistent with geopolitical motivations, the effect is concentrated among swing countries and is more pronounced when the elected country holds greater agenda-setting power. We identify two channels of import politicization: policy concessions and rent-seeking by firms. First, imports from newly elected countries face lower duty rates despite unchanged trade costs and prices, and federal procurement shifts toward their contractors and products. Second, the increase is disproportionately driven by firms whose top lobbying issues are overseen by senators who serve concurrently on the Foreign Relations Committee, with the effect increasing in senator seniority. These firms exhibit lower operational efficiency but higher subsequent valuations. Finally, countries with larger import increases during their UNSC terms exhibit greater voting and rhetoric alignment, especially at meetings of high U.S. relevance.