# THE FINANCING OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN CHINA: STIMULUS LOAN WANES AND SHADOW BANKING WAXES

### ZHIGUO HE (何治国)

### UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO, BOOTH SCHOOL OF BUSINESS; AND NBER


JOINT WITH ZHUO CHEN (TSINGHUA PBCSF) AND CHUN LIU (TSINGHUA SEM)



The University of Chicago Booth School of Business

# MOTIVATION

Trust/Entrusted loans:信托和委托贷款;WMP:理财产品



New Entrusted/Trust Loans and Increase in WMP

Data source: PBOC and China Banking Wealth Management Registration System

# **SUMMARY**

### \*CHINA'S LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCING SHIFTS FROM MAINLY BANK LOANS IN 2009 TO A SIGNIFICANT FRACTION OF NON-BANK DEBT STARTING 2012

### **WHY DO SHADOW BANKING ACTIVITIES IN CHINA START RAMPANT GROWTH AROUND** 2012-13?

- Hangover effect of 2009 stimulus
- ✤ Time series and cross-section evidence on local government financing and municipal corporate bonds (城投债)
- An angle that helps understand the marketization process of Chinese financial system starting 2012

## FOUR-TRILLION STIMULUS PLAN AND ITS FINANCING

### ◆FOUR-TRILLION STIMULUS PLAN (四万 亿刺激计划)


- Following 2007/08 global crisis, Premier Wen announced the 4T RMB stimulus plan on Nov 2008
- Domestic investment (mainly infrastructure) to boost GDP growth

# **\*HOW WAS IT IMPLEMENTED AND FINANCED?**

- Mostly through local governments (Bai, Hsieh and Song, 2016, Brookings)
- ✤ Approximately 1 trillion comes from the central government, and the rest through LGFV (Local Government Financing Vehicles, 政 府融资平台)


Mostly in the form of bank loans

### **NEW BANK LOAN AND GDP GROWTH**



Data source: PBOC and National Bureau of Statistics

## **MOSTLY NON-RESIDENTIAL LOANS**



Data source: PBOC and National Bureau of Statistics

## SHIFTING OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCING (1) \*BAI, HSIEH, AND SONG (2016):

After 2010 financing was shifted from bank loans to non-bank sources

### **\*BECAUSE IN 2010 CHINA REVERTED BACK TO ITS NORMAL CREDIT POLICY**

- But long-term infrastructure projects need continuing investment
- Or, need to rollover/refinance their three- to five-year bank loans (which are maturing around 2012 to 2014)
- Both forces are relevant with similar implications

### **\*WHAT ARE THESE NON-BANK SOURCES?**

## SHIFTING OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCING (2)

### \* FOCUS ON TOTAL DEBT LIABILITY AND ITS FOUR MAJOR SOURCES

- Bank Loans
- ✤ Municipal Bonds (地方政府债: pre-2015, issued directly by MoF for qualified local government; post-2015, issued by local government at the province level)
- ✤ Municipal Corporate Bonds (城投债): Our focus
- ✤ Trust and Entrusted Loans (信托贷款和委托贷款)

# **\*** OTHER THREE ARE DEBT AS WELL; OFTEN WITH IMPLICIT BAIL-OUT EXPECTATION


We call them non-bank debt

### \* NATIONAL AUDIT OFFICE REPORTS ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT, ON DEC 2010 AND JUNE 2013

We worked hard to fill out the time series of the above four sources


Show composition change between bank and non-bank debt

## **COMPOSITION CHANGE OF BANK AND NON-BANK DEBT FINANCING**



# MUNICIPAL CORPORATE BOND (MCB, 城投债)

Panel A: Newly Issued Municipal Corporate Bonds (MCB)



Data source: PBOC and Wind

## **CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSES: EVIDENCE FROM MCB (1)**

- \* WE TURN TO CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSIS FOR MORE CONVINCING EVIDENCE
- CORE IDEA: AREAS/PROVINCES WITH MORE BANK-LOAN-FUELED STIMULUS IN 2009 SHOULD HAVE MORE SHADOW BANKING IN 2012-2015
  - Matters little whether firm (demand) or bank (supply) driven in 2009

### **\*** WE FOCUS ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATE BONDS

- Issuance date, amount, and many of them even the purpose (repaying bank loan, investment, or others)
- It is more than data availability issue

### **\*** FOR MCB, WE KNOW WHERE THE FUNDS GO TO

For instance, WIND has data for individual trust products---but it only tells us where the source of fund comes from (not its use)

## **CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSIS: EVIDENCE FROM MCB (2)**

### **\* WHAT DO WE DO?**


- Construct abnormal 2009 Bank loan over GDP at the province level
  - ✤ For each province, (BL/GDP at 2009) (Average BL/GDP 2004~08)
- For years 2012-2015, construct abnormal 201X MCB over GDP at the province level
  - For each province, (MCB/GDP at 201X) (Average MCB/GDP 2004~08)
- Prediction: the province with larger abnormal 201X MCB/GDP is the one with higher abnormal 2009 BL/GDP

### \* REGRESSION WITH VARIOUS RELEVANT CONTROLS AT PROVINCIAL LEVEL AT 201X

GDP growth; (abnormal) fiscal deficit over GDP; (abnormal) fixed asset investment over GDP at 201X; abnormal) land sale over fiscal revenue at 201X; Corruption index at provincial level (Ang, Bai, and Zhou (2016))


# **REGIONAL EVIDENCE**

#### 2009 Bank Loan v.s. 2014 MCB: Regional Level




# **PROVINCIAL EVIDENCE**

2009 Bank Loan v.s. 2014 MCB: Provincial Level





2009 Abnormal New Bank Loan/GDP

# PROVINCIAL EVIDENCE FOR EACH YEAR, 2012-2015



0.08 Tianjin 0.06 Gansu 📣 Chongqing 2014 MCB/GDP Yunnan 0.04 Guiahesu Anhui Shena në 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 -0.02 2009 New Bank Loan/GDP





# **REGRESSION RESULTS BY YEAR, REGIONAL AND PROVINCIAL**

2012-2015 abnormal **MCB/GDP** on 2009 abnormal **BL/GDP**, year-by-year regression

Regional	2012	2013	2014	2015
2009 BL/GDP	0.11***	0.13**	0.22***	0.24**
	(2.66)	(2.24)	(3.29)	(2.52)
Adj. R2	0.42	0.35	0.44	0.46
Obs.	7	7	7	7
Provincial	2012	2013	2014	2015
2009 BL/GDP	0.11	0.13***	0.20***	0.15**
	(1.55)	(2.61)	(3.45)	(2.05)
Adj. R²	0.10	0.31	0.34	0.17
Obs.	30	30	30	30

# **REGRESSION RESULTS BY YEAR, PLACEBO TESTS**


Year-by-year provincial regression

	2012	2013	2014	2015
2008 Q1-Q3 BL/GDP	0.07	-0.00	-0.01	-0.06
	(0.74)	(-0.01)	(-0.09)	(-0.36)
Adj. R2	-0.02	-0.04	-0.04	-0.03
Obs	30	30	30	30
	2012	2013	2014	2015
2009 BL/GDP	0.11*	0.15***	0.23***	0.18**
	(1.68)	(2.73)	(4.72)	(2.74)
2008 Q1-Q3 BL/GDP	0.01	-0.09	-0.15	-0.16
	(0.12)	(-0.98)	(-1.61)	(-1.50)
F-test $\beta^{09} = \beta^{08Q1-Q3}$	2.94*	3.20*	11.69***	6.08**
<i>p</i> -value	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.00)	(0.02)
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.10	0.31	0.34	0.17
Obs	30	30	30	30

# DIRECT EVIDENCE ON MCB ISSUANCE PURPOSES

- ✤ 81% of MCB prospectus reveal its purpose.... Perfect for us
- Still, not sure about disclosure quality

Panel B: Newly Issued Municipal Corporate Bonds (MCB) by Purpose



## **HOW ABOUT MCB PRICES?**


- Does relative quantity matter?
- Integrated interbank market, homogeneous investors, only bond risk matters

MCB Issuing Spread over China Development Bank Bond Yield Controls omitted

	Spread	Spread	$Spread_{2012}$	Spread <sub>2013</sub>	Spread <sub>2014</sub>	Spread <sub>2015</sub>
2009 BL/GDP		-0.02	-0.03	-0.50	-0.33	0.80
		(-0.04)	(-0.05)	(-1.44)	(-0.82)	(1.32)
Rating	0.47***	0.47***	0.46***	0.41***	0.46***	0.47***
	(38.60)	(35.44)	(9.73)	(14.15)	(14.08)	(17.28)
Maturity	-0.01	-0.01	0.02	0.02	0.00	-0.04**
	(-0.73)	(-0.72)	(0.87)	(1.17)	(0.10)	(-2.31)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
Bond type FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adj. R²	0.59	0.59	0.54	0.57	0.64	0.57
Obs.	4788	4788	660	687	1677	1764

# LINK TO SHADOW BANKING: TIME-SERIES

#### Local Government Non-Bank Debt over Shadow Banking



## LINK TO SHADOW BANKING: ENTRUSTED LOAN GROWTH


2013-2015 abnormal **entrusted loan/GDP** on 2009 abnormal BL/GDP, year-by-year and panel regressions

	2013	2014	2015	Panel	Panel
2009 BL/GDP	0.20**	0.23**	0.14	0.19**	0.20***
	(2.00)	(2.08)	(1.37)	(2.35)	(2.54)
FD/GDP					-0.04
					(-0.48)
FAI/GDP					-0.05*
					(-1.79)
LS/FR revenue					0.01
					(0.26)
GDP growth					0.10
					(0.68)
Year fixed effects					Yes
Adj. R²	0.13	0.14	0.04	0.14	0.27
Obs.	30	30	30	90	90

BL: bank loan; FD: fiscal deficit; FAI: fixed asset investment; LS/FR: land sale/fiscal revenue

## LINK TO SHADOW BANKING: WEALTH MANAGEMENT PRODUCT

WMP Investment in MCB



Based on annual official reports on WMP; likely underestimate as unclear whether including certain financial innovation funded through WMP

# **CONCLUDING REMARKS (1)**

#### \* A MECHANISM THAT PUTS TOGETHER RECENT VARIOUS ASPECTS OF CHINA'S FINANCIAL MARKET

Local government debt; shadow banking; interest rate liberalization

#### SHADOW BANKING AS ONE OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF FOUR-TRILLION STIMULUS PLAN

Good? bad?

Popular view: hidden risk and leverage, so bad

### \* BUT IT FOSTERS THE MODERNIZATION OF CHINA'S FINANCIAL MARKETS

- "Let market be decisive;" interest rate liberalization and deposit insurance
- Rocket-speed of the growth of interbank market in China; less reliance on commercial banks; richer set of investment products
- Households get the return they ought to get (not just house price appreciation)

# **CONCLUDING REMARKS (2)**

- \* MARKET FORCES BEHIND REGULATION CHANGES AROUND 2014
- JUNE 2010, STATE COUNCIL, NO. 19 DOCUMENT ON LGFVS, TIGHTENING
  - The market responded by lower issuance of MCB in 2010 and 2011

#### SEPT 2014, STATE COUNCIL, NO. 43 DOCUMENT ON LGFVS, TIGHTENING

- Banned Local governments providing guarantee to LGFVs' bond offerings
- Prohibited local governments from raising debt via LGFVs
- Restructure and substitute existing debt with more Munibonds

#### \* BUT IN 2015 BEIJING ISSUED OTHER "CONFLICTING" REGULATION CHANGES THAT AIMED TO FACILITATE LGFVS TO BORROW VIA MCB. WHY?

- Budget of 2015 Munibonds were preapproved at the end of 2014, which was tight
- In early 2015 it became apparent that the preapproved amount was not enough to absorb all the refinancing needs by LGFVs
- It is costly to change the budget....well, open the back door again