



Discussion of
“... Financial Vulnerability in Asia ...”
by Hyun Shin et al.
&
A Global Safe Asset from & for Emerging Economies

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Lessons learned from AFC & GFC

- **BIS statistics** as useful real-time monitor for global crisis
 - Early warning indicator
 - Trigger of a crisis -- differs from crisis to crisis
 - Amplifier -- repeated patterns (it rhymes)

 - **AFC: Korea**
 - Banks had *short-term* \$-claims on local corporate borrowers
 - Corporates had *long-term* \$-claims (export receivables)

 - **GFC: Spain**
 - No currency mismatch (within € area)
 - Spanish borrowed *long-term* €

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- **Financing Structure:**
 - From **Bank debt** financing to **capital market borrowing**
 - Hold-out problem \Rightarrow CAC

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- **Lenders:**
 - Latin America: US banks
 - AFC: Japanese banks for Thailand and Indonesia
 - GFC: European banks dominant in cross-border financing
- **Borrowers:**
 - AFC: Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand
 - GFC: Emerging market generally moves together
- **Maturity Structure:**
 - Past: hot money
 - Now: longer maturity, but more interest rate sensitivity
- **Currency Decomposition:**
 - Externally financing mostly in dollar (Euro)


Academic literature after AFC & GFC

- Early 1990: domestic pull vs. external push factors
- 2000s: FDI, equity vs. debt capital flows
- 2008: from net flows to gross flows
 - Gross-flows are highly procyclical
 - Driven by
 - Global risk aversion: VIX (worked for a while)
 - US monetary policy: (not clear cut)
 - Banking flow are hit hardest

Lessons learned for AFC

- Build up an (official) **BUFFER** to lean against sudden (flight to safety) capital outflows


1. Official Reserves



Lessons learned for AFC

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1. Official Reserves



2. IMF credit/liquidity lines

3. Central Bank SWAP LINE arrangements

Problems with Buffer Approach



1. Negative carry
2. Distorts exchange rate
3. Subsidizes “off-setting” private carry trades
 - Subject to carry trade risk
 - “Up the stairs down the elevator”

Problems with Buffer Approach

1. Negative carry
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■ Private carry trades

- EME corporate sector \$-borrowing
 - Bruno & Shin 2016
- Hungarian/Polish household €-borrowing
 - Verner 2017




(b) Housing debt in domestic and foreign currency

International: Flight to Safety

- Risk-on, Risk-off Flight-to-**safe asset**
- Problem: Safe asset is *asymmetrically supplied* by AE
Flight-to-safety ➔ **cross-border** capital flows


Extra Slide: Safe assets

- “Good friend analogy” - like reserve assets
 - Safe/available at **any** horizon - “when it counts”
 - Precautionary buffer
 - held in addition to more risky assets
 - Risk↑ ⇒ demand for safe assets ↑
- “Safe asset tautology”
 - Safe because it is “perceived to be safe”
 - Safe independent of fundamentals
 - US Treasuries downgrade by S&P in 2011 ⇒ yield ↓
 - German CDS spread ↑ ⇒ yield ↓ during Euro crisis
 - Multiple equilibria
 - Bubble



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Flight-to-safety ➔ **cross-border** capital flows
- At times of global crisis, issuance of new debt
 - For AE at inflated prices eases conditions
 - For EME at depressed prices worsens conditions
- Question: **Who insures whom?** “*Poor insure rich Paradox*”
 - Correct insurance only if
buffer is large and debt long-term enough
so that no new debt issuance needed &
sell safe asset/reserves instead

Alternative “Rechanneling”

- Address root cause: Safe asset is supplied asymmetrically
- Build a “safe haven” inside!
- Analogy

“Rechanneling Analogy”

- Address root cause: Safe asset is supplied asymmetrically

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- Two lines of defense
 - Stronger inner circle (keep)



“Rechanneling Analogy”

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
- Analogy

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How to build safe haven in finance?


- (national) tranching
- Address root cause: Safe asset is supplied asymmetrically



*A Global Safe Asset for & from
Emerging Market Economies
Brunnermeier & Huang*

“Rechanneling”

- Address root cause: Safe asset is supplied asymmetrically



Rechannel:

Instead of cross-border
Across asset classes


- Expand ESBies idea for euro area to EME:
“SBBS (Sovereign-Bond Backed Securities) for the world”
Euro-nomics group 2011, 2016, 2017

International: Flight to Safety

▪ Risk-on, Risk-off Flight to **safe asset**

▪ Channels back some of flight-to-safety capital flows

➔ fewer **cross-border** capital flows




Pooling & Tranching

- Pooling: like **Asian Bond Fund (ABF)**
 - EMEAP, the Executives' Meeting of East Asia-Pacific Central Banks <http://www.emeap.org>
- *Pooling*
 - generates diversification benefits
 - but also spillover dangers!!!

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- Pooling and Tranching



- ***Pooling***
 - generates diversification benefits
- ***Tranching***
 - contains spillover effects

Conclusion

- Paper provides nice overview and new insights of
 - AFC & GFC
 - Usefulness of BIS banking data – trigger vs. amplifier

- Global Financial Architecture
 - Buffer approach interventionistic
 - Reserve holding costly due to cost of carry & distortionary
 - IMF support very limited
 - Swap lines Limited (not all IMF member countries)
 - Rechanneling approach self-stabilizing (autonomous)

- Tranching completes the market
 - Allows catering to investors groups with different risk attitudes
 - Makes EME less crisis prone

- International pooling and tranching
 - Pooling like Asian Bond Fund (ABF)
 - SBBS/ESBies for the world