Changing of the Guards: Does Succession Planning Matter?

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Succession Planning (SP)

- 2010 Survey on CEO Succession Planning by Heidrick & Struggles and Stanford's Rock Center for Corporate Governance:
 - *Half of respondents* could not name a successor to current CEO.
 - 39% of respondents had "zero" viable internal candidates.
 - Average board spends only 2 hours per year on succession planning.
- Even largest companies are taken by surprise when their CEOs leave unexpectedly:
 - Bank of America, Hewlett Packard, Disney...
- "Companies forced into successions have lost about \$1.8bn per company more than if the successions had been planned." ~FT, Strategy&

SEC's Position

"One of the **board's key functions** is to provide succession planning [...]. Recent events have underscored the importance of this function to the governance of the corporation. [...] CEO succession planning raises **a significant policy issue** [...] that transcends the day-to-day business matter of managing the workforce."


~ SEC Staff Bulletin No. 14E, October 27, 2009

- Guidance aimed at *increasing disclosure* about succession planning, including board's leadership and role in risk oversight.
- ② Firms can no longer exclude *shareholder proposals* related to succession planning from their annual proxy statements.

SP & CEO Turnover (1993-2010)

<u>CEO Turnover Data</u>: Dirk Jenter & Luke Taylor.

SP Data: Hand-collected from 8K reports and proxy statements.



SP Data Example 1: Sysco Corp.

"On an ongoing basis, the board plans for succession to the position of CEO and other key management positions, and the corporate governance and nominating committee oversees this management development and succession planning process. To assist the board, the CEO periodically provides the board with an assessment of senior executives and their potential to succeed to the position of CEO, as well as perspective on potential candidates from outside the company. In addition, the CEO periodically provides the board with an assessment of potential successors to other key positions."

~ Sysco Corp. DEF-14A /Oct. 8, 2009

SP Data Example 2: Hershey Co.

"The board shall review management succession plans annually. This shall include review of organization strength and management development and succession plans for each member of the company's executive team. If the president, CEO, and/or chairman of the board is unable to perform for any reason, then: (1) if the company is without a chairman of the board, the vice chairman of the board, if any, shall serve as chairman until a replacement is elected, and in the absence of a vice chairman of the board, the chair of the governance committee or, the chair of the compensation and executive organization committee; (2) if the company is without a president and CEO, the interim president and CEO shall be the officer of the company; (3) in the case of incapacity of the president, CEO and/or chairman, the board shall determine whether to search for a replacement; and (4) the chair of the compensation and executive organization committee shall lead any search for a replacement."

~ Hershey Co. DEF-14A /Mar. 10, 2008

Our Contribution

• We study the impact of formal succession planning on the

(1) nature of management turnovers(2) efficiency of turnover decisions

in terms of:

- **turnover-performance sensitivity** (Weisbach, 1998; Huson, Parrino & Starks, 2001; Goyal & Park, 2002; Hillier, Fee & Hadlock, 2004; Linn & McColgan, 2005)

- learning about CEO ability (Taylor, 2010; Pan, Wang, Weisbach, 2015)

- **basing turnover decisions on firm-specific (vs. industry) factors** (Gibbons & Murphy, 1990; Barro & Barro, 1990; Jenter & Kanaan, 2015)

Preview of findings

Succession Planning

- 1. Ensures leadership continuity
 - 1 voluntary and permanent successions
- Is associated with lower firm uncertainty and faster learning about CEO ability
- 3. Improves efficiency of transitions
 - 1 turnover-performance sensitivity
 - \downarrow attribution of firing decision to factors beyond the CEO's control

Literature

- Naveen (2006) studies a firm's propensity for a "relay succession", i.e., grooming of an internal candidate, as a function of its operational complexity, firm-specific human capital, and other firm attributes.
 - Defines a firm that has a president or a chief operating officer as a firm with a succession plan.
- Kale, Reis, and Venkateswaran, 2009; Kini and Williams, 2012 follow Naveen (2006)'s approach, but their focus is not on succession planning.
- Bennedsen, Nielsen, Perez-Gonzalez and Wolfenzon (2007) demonstrate that family successions are costly in terms of family firm operating performance and argue that professional CEOs provide valuable services to family firms.

Data

- CEO turnover data: Lucian Taylor and DirkJenter
 - 3300 turnovers, including 900 forced ones
 - Turnovers due to mergers or spin-offs are excluded
- SP data: hand-collected
 - For each turnover, manually examine regulatory lings (&K, DEF-14A) to identify whether the firm has a SP prior to the CEO turnover event
 - Create 3 indicator variables of (i) SP, (ii) SP discusses current CEO transition, and (iii) CEO remains during transition
- Stock return data: CRSP
- Firm data: Compustat
- CEO data: Execucomp
- Institutional ownership data: Thomson Reuters

Summary statistics

	SP firms		Non-SP firms			
Variables	N	Mean	Ν	Mean	Difference in means	t-stat
CEO turnover sample						
SP	403	0.95	2436	0.00	0.95	
Forced CEO succession	402	0.19	2432	0.28	-0.09***	-4.10
Insider successor	403	0.83	2436	0.79	0.04*	1.94
Interim successor	403	0.19	2436	0.29	-0.10***	-4.66
CAR	392	0.04	2392	0.05	-0.01**	-2.51
CRSP-Compustat firm sample						
Stock returns	391	-0.09	2308	-0.16	0.07**	2.43
ROA	403	0.04	2413	0.01	0.03***	5.04
Log(total assets)	403	8.21	2436	7.31	0.90***	9.39
Firm age	403	27.61	2436	22.24	5.37***	6.18
Leverage	401	0.28	2402	0.25	0.03**	2.53
Dividend payer	403	0.68	2429	0.57	0.11***	4.31
Volatility of profitability (ROE)	403	0.56	2436	0.55	0.01***	6.20
ROE	403	0.09	2413	0.01	0.08***	3.66
% institutional ownership	311	0.72	1741	0.65	0.07***	6.09
# block owners	312	2.28	1742	2.15	0.13	1.27
CEO of retirement age	403	0.26	2436	0.15	0.11***	4.76
Log(CEO tenure)	403	1.88	2436	1.59	0.29***	10.15

SP & Leadership Stability

Succession planning ensures leadership continuity:

forced and

interim successions

OLS Estimation	Forced succession		Insider s	uccessor	Interim successor		
SP	-0.0903***	-0.0772***	0.0601	0.0652	-0.0971***	-0.0864***	
	(-4.13)	(-3.88)	(1.44)	(1.53)	(-3.26)	(-3.14)	
Log(total assets)	-0.0228***	-0.0180***	-0.0039	-0.0007	-0.0286***	-0.0199***	
	(-3.76)	(-2.90)	(-0.57)	(-0.12)	(-5.55)	(-3.68)	
ROA	-0.4886***	-0.4429***	0.1510***	0.1740***	-0.2238***	-0.1877**	
	(-4.73)	(-4.55)	(2.72)	(2.94)	(-3.33)	(-2.23)	
MTB	-0.0007	-0.0061***	0.0205***	0.0166***	0.0074	0.0030	
	(-0.29)	(-3.91)	(4.04)	(4.68)	(1.47)	(0.61)	
SP discusses current CEO transition	-0.1251***	-0.1209***	0.0362	0.0400	-0.1036***	-0.0948***	
	(-3.60)	(-3.83)	(0.97)	(1.06)	(-3.68)	(-3.25)	
CEO remains during transition	-0.2783***	-0.2796***	0.0525***	0.0534***	-0.0727***	-0.0738***	
	(-7.55)	(-7.39)	(3.47)	(3.53)	(-4.11)	(-4.24)	
% institutional ownership	0.0312	0.0178	0.0183	0.0018	0.0618	0.0192	
	(0.45)	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.03)	(0.71)	(0.27)	
# block owners	0.0032	0.0050	-0.0057	-0.0041	0.0052	0.0077	
	(0.72)	(1.25)	(-1.16)	(-0.86)	(0.52)	(0.77)	
Industry FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Observations	1,975	1,975	1,978	1,978	1,978	1,978	
Adjusted R ²	0.186	0.198	0.0210	0.0240	0.0360	0.0454	

Endogenous SP

- Concern:
 - There may be firm- or industry-specific characteristics driving our results.
- Solution:
 - IV based on the recent work in the IO literature (Hoberg and Phillips, 2010, 2016).
 - Use similarity between a firm's products and those of its rivals to infer similarity in the human capital of the two firms' CEOs.
 - The closer the competition between two firms in the product space, the more similar the skills required of their CEOs.
 - Instrument (firm-level) SP using the percentage of the 20 *most closely related* firms having an SP.

Endogenous SP (2)

- Closely related firms: use a version of text-based network industry classifications (TNIC) calibrated as granular as three-digit SIC codes by Hoberg and Phillips (2010, 2016):
 - TNIC classifications are based on firm pairwise similarity scores from text analysis of firm 10-K product descriptions.
 - Product descriptions must be accurate: Item 101 of Regulation S-K.
 - 10-Ks are updated on annual basis, the network of similarity scores is time-varying.
- The higher the fraction of firms among its 20 closest rivals has a disclosed succession plan, the more likely the firm is to generate a succession plan as well.
 - It is time-varying → alleviates the concern of a time-invariant firm-specific variable (e.g., governance or management entrenchment) driving our results.
 - TNIC industry definitions are intransitive, i.e., each firm has its own distinct competitors. In contrast to SIC industry definitions → alleviates the concern that firms in the same (transitive) industry may follow similar turnover practices in response to common industry shocks.

SP & Leadership Stability (IV)

Succession planning ensures leadership continuity: forced and interim successions

IV estimates	First stage	Forced succession	Insider successor	Interim successor
% rival firms with SP	0.0168***			
	(4.86)			
SP-I		-1.8422**	-1.0565	-1.3662**
		(-2.31)	(-1.02)	(-2.00)
Log(total assets)	0.0203**	0.0175	0.0238	0.0002
	(3.19)	(0.88)	(1.07)	(0.02)
ROA	0.0058	-0.4937***	0.1115**	-0.1873*
	(0.11)	(-3.76)	(2.23)	(-1.75)
MTB	0.0006	-0.0020	0.0200***	0.0071*
	(0.22)	(-0.34)	(3.07)	(1.91)
SP discusses current CEO transition	-0.7337***	-1.4092**	-0.7733	-1.0234**
	(-17.40)	(-2.31)	(-1.06)	(-2.09)
CEO remains during transition	0.0658***	-0.1728***	0.1321*	-0.0003
	(5.92)	(-3.20)	(1.81)	(-0.01)
% institutional ownership	-0.0203	0.0011	0.0189	0.0251
	(-0.39)	(0.01)	(0.26)	(0.30)
# block owners	0.0047	0.0075	-0.0000	0.0102
	(0.69)	(0.76)	(-0.01)	(1.35)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,799	1,796	1,799	1,799
R ²	0.367	-1.162	-0.455	-0.669
Shea's partial R ²	0.0023			
First-stage F-statistic (p-value)	23.61 (0.0009)			

SP & Performance Metrics

- New *CD&A disclosures*, effective December 15, 2006:
 - Detailed performance metrics/targets for executive cash & equity compensation
 - Lower investor uncertainty about compensation incentives & reporting objectives (Ferri, Zheng & Zou, 2017)
- Goal of new disclosures *Improve quality and precision* of performance measurement for evaluating management.
- Do firms with SP benefit as much as firms without SP?

SP & Performance Metrics (cont'd)

	SP-I firms	Non-SP-I firms	SP-I firms	Non-SP-I firms	SP-I firms	Non-SP-I firms	SP-I firms	Non-SP-I firms	
		Performance	= Stock return	I		Performan	$ce = \Delta ROA$		
Performance adjusted by	Market pe	rformance	Industry pe	erformance	Market pe	rformance	Industry pe	erformance	
Post	0.0328	0.0056	0.0316	0.0042	0.0301	0.0016	0.0307	0.0015	
	(1.01)	(0.17)	(0.97)	(0.13)	(0.92)	(0.05)	(0.94)	(0.04)	
Performance	-0.0299**	-0.0123	-0.0321**	-0.0141*	-0.2206**	-0.0459	-0.2104**	-0.0389	
	(-1.98)	(-1.49)	(-2.05)	(-1.65)	(-2.19)	(-1.17)	(-2.36)	(-1.01)	
Post x Performance	0.0039	-0.0473***	0.0098	-0.0476***	0.1970	-0.1518**	0.1872	-0.1662**	
	(0.18)	(-3.33)	(0.43)	(-3.36)	(1.51)	(-2.16)	(1.48)	(-2.36)	
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Observations	4,338	5,511	4,338	5,511	4,284	5,438	4,284	5,438	
Within R ²	0.123	0.102	0.122	0.102	0.123	0.103	0.123	0.103	

Dependent variable = CEO succession

Abnormal returns and volatility

Firms with SP experience lower ST volatility surrounding CEO successions

	All	Voluntary	Forced	All	Voluntary	Forced
	successions	successions	successions	successions	successions	successions
		CAR		Log of CAR squared		
SP-I	0.1040	-0.0093	2.4191	-0.0633***	-0.0833***	1.0537
	(1.16)	(-0.09)	(0.44)	(-2.98)	(-5.50)	(0.30)
Log(total assets)	-0.0026	-0.0017	-0.0246	0.0014*	0.0022**	-0.0139
	(-0.80)	(-0.42)	(-0.31)	(1.84)	(2.34)	(-0.29)
ROA	-0.0302*	0.0019	-0.1151	-0.0168**	-0.0205	-0.0336
	(-1.65)	(0.07)	(-1.38)	(-2.13)	(-1.40)	(-0.64)
МТВ	-0.0008	-0.0012	-0.0124	0.0002	0.0003	-0.0051
	(-1.30)	(-1.02)	(-0.46)	(0.97)	(1.45)	(-0.31)
SP discusses current CEO transition	0.0765	-0.0110	2.3069	-0.0494***	-0.0559***	0.9926
	(1.19)	(-0.15)	(0.44)	(-2.83)	(-4.78)	(0.30)
CEO remains during transition	0.0080	0.0087	-0.1044	0.0013	0.0022	-0.0610
	(0.88)	(1.25)	(-0.32)	(0.53)	(1.07)	(-0.29)
% institutional ownership	0.0006	0.0062	-0.0819	-0.0081**	-0.0121***	-0.0306
	(0.05)	(0.51)	(-0.39)	(-2.29)	(-4.08)	(-0.23)
# block owners	-0.0020	-0.0010	-0.0002	0.0004	0.0010*	0.0004
	(-1.32)	(-0.66)	(-0.02)	(1.01)	(1.73)	(0.06)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,768	1,317	448	1,768	1,317	448

Long-term uncertainty

- Firms with SP experience lower LT volatility surrounding CEO successions
 - Clayton, Hartzell, and Rosenberg (2005)

	All	Voluntary	Forced	All	Voluntary	Forced
	successions	successions	successions	successions	successions	successions
	Realiz	zed return vol	atility	Idiosyncratic return volatility		
SP-I	-2.3955***	-1.7150***	-29.7381	-2.0286***	-1.4423***	-16.9928
	(-3.86)	(-4.39)	(-0.22)	(-4.44)	(-3.18)	(-0.34)
Market beta	0.1882***	0.1847***	0.0217			
	(4.26)	(4.20)	(0.03)			
SMB beta	0.0549	0.0646*	-0.0278			
	(1.04)	(1.86)	(-0.08)			
HML beta	0.0115	0.0024	0.0785			
	(0.43)	(0.11)	(0.19)			
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,766	1,315	448	1,769	1,317	449

SP & Learning about CEO Ability

	Reali	Realized return volatility				Idiosyncratic return volatility			
	All firms	Non-SP-I firms	SP-I firms		All firms	Non-SP-I firms	SP-I firms		
CEO tenure (year 1)	-1.3007***	-1.4958***	-0.5708**		-1.4299***	-1.6142***	-0.6171**		
	(-6.82)	(-5.39)	(-2.30)		(-7.34)	(-5.72)	(-2.42)		
CEO tenure (year 2)	-0.2834**	-0.3123*	0.3140		-0.3918***	-0.3881**	0.2945		
	(-1.96)	(-1.65)	(1.39)		(-2.68)	(-2.00)	(1.23)		
CEO tenure (year 3)	-0.4027***	-0.4594***	0.1452		-0.4960***	-0.5029***	0.0956		
	(-3.08)	(-2.74)	(0.65)		(-3.67)	(-2.98)	(0.42)		
Firm-CEO FE	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes		
Calendar year-month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes		
Observations	49,839	28,760	21,079		49,850	28,760	21,090		
Within R ²	0.377	0.361	0.421		0.353	0.340	0.388		
CEO tenure	-1.5447***	-1.7772***	-0.7834**		-1.7038***	-1.9636***	-0.8803**		
	(-5.56)	(-4.43)	(-2.12)		(-6.34)	(-5.06)	(-2.42)		
CEO tenure ²	0.4897***	0.5714**	0.4312		0.4848***	0.6006**	0.3762		
	(2.65)	(2.22)	(1.64)		(2.67)	(2.38)	(1.44)		
CEO tenure ³	-0.0663	-0.0784	-0.0627		-0.0610	-0.0774	-0.0481		
	(-1.55)	(-1.35)	(-0.98)		(-1.44)	(-1.36)	(-0.75)		
Firm-CEO FE	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes		
Calendar year-month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes		
Observations	49,839	28,760	21,079		49,837	28,759	21,078		
Within R ²	0.377	0.360	0.421		0.253	0.245	0.278		

SP & Firm-specific vs. Industry Factors

	Dependent variable = Forced CEO succession								
		Industry return - EW	,	Industr	Industry return - VW				
	All firms	Non-SP-I firms	SP-I firms	All firms	Non-SP-I firms	SP-I firms			
Idiosyncratic return _{t-1}	-0.1412***	-0.1249***	-0.1528***	-0.1386***	-0.1236***	-0.1468***			
	(-8.26)	(-5.44)	(-5.26)	(-8.13)	(-5.38)	(-5.16)			
Industry-induced return t-1	-0.0974**	-0.1520**	-0.0521	-0.1294***	-0.1825***	-0.1017			
	(-1.97)	(-2.32)	(-0.61)	(-2.64)	(-2.76)	(-1.24)			
Idiosyncratic return _{t-2}	-0.0579***	-0.0649***	-0.0976***	-0.0573***	-0.0626***	-0.1009***			
	(-3.43)	(-3.07)	(-3.03)	(-3.40)	(-2.97)	(-3.10)			
Industry-induced return t-2	-0.0009	0.0109	-0.0650	-0.0091	-0.0268	-0.0330			
	(-0.02)	(0.15)	(-0.77)	(-0.18)	(-0.39)	(-0.40)			
CEO of retirement age	-0.2073***	-0.2521***	-0.1790***	-0.2070***	-0.2520***	-0.1785***			
	(-15.95)	(-12.29)	(-8.38)	(-15.96)	(-12.34)	(-8.37)			
CEO tenure	-0.0248***	-0.0238***	-0.0238***	-0.0247***	-0.0235***	-0.0238***			
	(-9.53)	(-6.55)	(-5.86)	(-9.47)	(-6.45)	(-5.83)			
Industry FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes			
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes			
Observations	3,037	1,462	1,170	3,033	1,460	1,168			
Pseudo R ²	0.138	0.134	0.131	0.137	0.132	0.130			

SP & Firm-specific vs. Industry Factors

First stage regressions

	Firm return _{t-1}	Firm return _{t-1}	Firm return _{t-2}	Firm return _{t-2}
EW industry return _{t-1}	0.6759***			
	(24.32)			
VW industry return _{t-1}		0.7577***		
		(22.96)		
EW industry return t-2			0.7019***	
			(24.81)	
VW industry return _{t-2}				0.7700***
				(22.08)
Observations	47,733	47,653	46,576	46,482
Adjusted R ²	0.144	0.127	0.142	0.130

Conclusion

- Large-scale evidence on the role of formal SP on the nature and efficiency of turnover decisions:
 - Leadership continuity fewer forced turnovers and less likely short term solutions
 - Marginal adjustment in turnover-performance sensitivity following the 2006 CD&A disclosure change
 - Less learning about CEO ability post-turnover
 - Less reliance on peer (industry) performance in turnover decisions