# FinTech Platforms and Mutual Fund Distribution

Claire Yurong Hong, Xiaomeng Lu, Jun Pan Shanghai Advanced Institute of Finance

September 24, 2020


Joint work with Xiaomeng Lu and Jun Pan, both from SAIF, SJTU

Specialty Conference

Fintech to Enable Development, Investment, Financial Inclusion, and Sustainability

## The Rise of Platform Economy

Amazon, Taobao, Uber, Airbnb, Google, Instagram, Facebook...



- Everyday life: learning, shopping, entertainment, transportation, investment
- China experienced a rapid increase in FinTech
- Financial products: Yue bao, mutual Fund, P2P, wealth products, insurance...
- This paper: What happens when platforms are allowed to intermediate financial products?

#### Traditional Channels vs. FinTech Platforms

#### Traditional Channels:

- In 2010 China: Fund families (31%); Bank (60%); Broker (9%)
- Limited number of funds, Segmented market, Conflict of interest ...


#### FinTech Channel:


- Created by tech-driven firms
- Large scale and broader coverage
- Technological efficiency easy access, search and trade via mobile app
- Information structure simple user interface

## Example of A FinTech Platform










## The Rise of Platform Economy



- By 2018, each of the top four platforms covered over 90% of all funds
- In 2012, the CSRC issued licenses for FinTech platforms for the first time.
  - Largest two platforms: Tiantian and Ant Financial
  - Tiantian in 2018: active users of 1.4 million, spending 22.3 minutes per day;
- In 2018, a total # of 106 platforms; account for around 30% of the fund market share

# Main Findings

#### On Investors:

- A striking increase in flow sensitivity to performance associated
- Net flow to top 10% performing funds more than triples their pre-platform level (Winner Take All)


#### Potential Channels:

- Platform features: Technological efficiency + Information structure ( $\sqrt{}$ )
- Investors self-select to enter platforms (×)
- Funds self-select to enter platforms (×)

#### On fund mangers and fund families:


- Managers increase risk taking to enhance the probability of becoming top performers.
- Families are less incentivized to groom star managers.

# Performance Chasing: Before vs. After



- Quarterly flow to top-decile equity funds increases from 1.88% before (2008-2012) to 19.65% after (2013-2017).
- Drastic increase in flow-performance relation happens only on and after 2013.

# Performance Chasing: Before and After



Flow-performance relation remains stable at around 6%, both before and after

## Performance Chasing: Staggered Entrance


- Utilize the exact dates on which funds sign up to platforms
- Panel Regression using Staggered Fund Entrance onto platforms

 $\mathsf{Flow}_t^i = a + b\,\mathsf{Decile}10^i_{t-1} + c\,\mathsf{Decile}10^i_{t-1} \times \mathsf{Platform}_t^i + d\,\mathsf{Platform}_t^i + \mathsf{Controls} + \epsilon^i_t$  $\mathsf{Platform}_t^i = 1 \text{ if fund } i \text{ is covered by both Ant Financial and Tiantian in quarter } t.$ 

	Equity	Mixed	Bond	All
Decile10	6.985***	6.127***	14.383***	8.132***
	(6.03)	(4.71)	(4.79)	(8.32)
${\sf Decile 10}{\times}{\sf Platform}$	16.964***	11.399***	-5.101	7.966***
	(3.75)	(5.34)	(-1.26)	(4.72)
Platform	-3.097	1.759	1.432	-0.702
	(-1.07)	(1.29)	(0.67)	(-0.63)
Controls, Time FE	Υ	Υ	Υ	Υ
Observations	6,705	12,941	6,766	26,412
R-squared	0.079	0.065	0.123	0.066


#### Performance Chasing: Evidence from Howbuy

- Before (2008-2012) vs. After (2015-2018) vs. Howbuy (2015-2018)
- Purchase fraction is the purchase amount for that decile divided by the aggregate purchase amount



### Performance Chasing: Evidence from Howbuy


Time-Series Variation



#### Channels – Information Structure


- Front-Page Funds => Salience
- Front page normally displays 6-10 funds
  - TOP 1-2, ..., Top 19-20
  - Top 20-50, Bottom 100, Others
  - Extra flows to each group on and off platforms





# On Managers: Change in Risk Taking

- Flow-performance relation is more convex after the emergence of platforms.
- Stronger convexity => incentive to get into top rank increases
- => Option-like payoff for fund managers (e.g. Brown, Harlow, and Starks, 1996; Chevalier and Ellison, 1997)



## On Managers: Change in Risk Taking

- Prior to 2013, fund managers rely on their abilities in stock selections
- Post 2013, the risk taking behavior increases also in the systematic component.

Idiosyncratic Volatility								
	k = -3	k = -2	k = -1	k = 0	k = 1	k = 2	k = 3	
Decile 10×After  Decile 10	0.037** (2.18) 0.040*** (3.45)	0.046** (2.51) 0.051*** (4.26)	0.036* (1.84) 0.058*** (4.95)	0.019 (1.00) 0.050*** (4.37)	0.001 (0.09) 0.040*** (4.56)	-0.015 (-0.79) 0.037** (2.48)	-0.006 (-0.34) 0.025 (1.52)	
		Syste	matic Vola	ility				
	k = -3	k = -2	k = -1	k = 0	k = 1	k = 2	k = 3	
Decile 10×After Decile 10	0.049 (1.43) -0.023 (-0.88)	0.067** (2.12) -0.044 (-1.61)	0.077** (2.30) -0.043* (-1.71)	0.057* (1.82) -0.007 (-0.33)	0.01 (0.59) 0.004 (0.38)	-0.006 (-0.24) 0.01 (0.57)	-0.014 (-0.70) 0.012 (0.72)	

 Fund managers have already reached the limit of their own skills and are using leverage to get ahead.

#### On Families: Inter- and Intra-Family Competition

- Before platforms, large fund families serve as mini-platforms
- Post platforms, large fund families as organizations lose their cohesiveness.

FamilyRank	1.583*** (6.86)		1.122*** (4.60)
${\sf FamilyRank} {\times} {\sf Platform}$	-0.277 (-0.70)		-1.033** (-2.54)
Decile10		7.784*** (7.01)	5.992*** (5.10)
Decile10×Platform		8.213*** (4.30)	9.853*** (4.93)
Platform	-0.697 (-0.44)	-1.905 (-1.46)	-0.086 (-0.05)
Controls	Υ	Υ	Υ
Time, Family, and Style FE	Υ	Y	Υ
Observations R-Squared	22,268 0.067	22,268 0.074	22,268 0.074

- Strong sensitivity of flow to within-family ranking before the introduction of platforms
- Dominate by universal performance ranking after platform introduction.


#### Other Tests and Robustness

- Determinants of entrance time
  - Early entrants have the characteristics: Non-bank affiliated, small, less retail holdings
- Limited ability of flows in predicting future fund return
- No change in advertising expenses
- No change in the distribution of fund return skewness or kurtosis
- Robustness
  - Change in market condition
  - Change in Morningstar rating
  - Constant fund sample
  - Control for broker and bank distribution channels
  - Value-Weighted results
  - Using performance rank
  - Using the number of platforms
  - Alternative performance horizons


#### Conclusion

- Empirical evidences on the economic impact of platform intermediation of financial products:
- Distributional efficiency ≠ Allocational efficiency
  - ✓ Investors are not using the technological efficiency to build more efficient portfolios.
  - ✓ In the absence of guidance from banks and brokers, investors pay more attention to the prominent features of platform apps, e.g., performance ranking lists.
- How to design policies to alleviate the unintended consequences while maintaining the technological advantages of FinTech platforms presents a challenge


# Appendix 1: Mutual Fund Industry Size




# Appendix 2: Advertising Expenses



# Appendix 3: Retail Ratio



# Appendix 4: Family Market Share



# Appendix 5: Determinants of Entrance

	Fu	nds	Family		
	D(Enter≤2013Q1)	Log(Enter months)	$D(Enter \leq 2013Q1)$	Log(Enter months)	
	Logit	OLS	Logit	OLS	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
Bank-affiliated	-1.773***	0.574***	-2.073	0.586*	
	(-4.78)	(6.48)	(-1.51)	(1.72)	
Broker-affiliated	-0.028	0.089	0.867	-0.04	
	(-0.13)	(1.51)	(0.92)	(-0.24)	
RetailRatio	-0.021***	0.005***	-0.127***	0.019**	
	(-3.80)	(3.44)	(-3.06)	(2.52)	
Log(Size)	-0.261***	0.107***	-1.381**	0.200*	
	(-2.87)	(4.55)	(-2.49)	(1.88)	
Log(Age)	0.745**	-0.210***	5.369*	-0.334	
_, _ ,	(2.57)	(-2.76)	(1.95)	(-0.81)	
$Flow_{t-1}$	0.788*	-0.187***	0.414	-0.4	
	(1.91)	(-3.07)	(0.17)	(-0.94)	
$MRet_{t-1,t-4}$	0.187	-0.044	3.05*	-0.25	
	(0.85)	(-0.70)	(1.94)	(-1.31)	
$Std_{Mret,t-1,t-8}$	-10.981	-1.279	94.222	-15.971	
, ,	(-0.73)	(-0.31)	(0.92)	(-0.80)	
Management Fee	-1.024	0.091	9.616*	-1.174	
	(-0.62)	(0.24)	(1.80)	(-1.05)	
Subscription Fee	-0.388	0.03	-3.281	0.503	
-	(-0.70)	(0.21)	(-0.78)	(0.67)	
Redemption Fee	0.453	-0.172	4.302	-1.193**	
•	(0.92)	(-1.35)	(1.23)	(-2.06)	
Style FE	Y	Y	N	N	
Observations	457	457	60	60	
$R^2$	0.115	0.18	0.396	0.358	

# Appendix 7: Largest Ten Families

B. Largest Ten Fund Families								
	Before (2008–2012)				After (2013–2017)			
Largest 10	Fund name	TNA (\$B)	#Funds	Share	Fund name	TNA (\$B)	#Funds	Share
1	China Asset Management	105.32	13.25	8.01%	China Asset Management	92.92	21.45	5.92%
2	Bosera Asset Management	76.54	10.8	5.82%	E Fund Management	84.35	26.70	5.37%
3	Gf Fund Management	69.17	7.3	5.26%	Harvest Fund Management	69.45	27.50	4.42%
4	Harvest Fund Management	59.07	11.35	4.49%	China Southern Asset Management	60.61	25.75	3.86%
5	China Southern Asset Management	58.51	11.85	4.45%	Bosera Asset Management	57.89	28.15	3.69%
6	E Fund Management	56.75	10.55	4.32%	Gf Fund Management	57.34	22.95	3.65%
7	Dacheng Fund Management	53.33	9.6	4.06%	ICBC Credit Suisse Asset Management	55.12	25.80	3.51%
8	Hua An Fund Management	40.83	7.85	3.11%	China Universal Asset Management	53.86	20.85	3.43%
9	Invesco Great Wall Fund Management	40.44	8.25	3.08%	Fullgoal Fund Management	48.86	25.45	3.119
10	Fullgoal Fund Management	39.95	9.6	3.04%	Bank Of China Investment Management	42.10	21.20	2.68%
	The Largest Ten Fund Families	59.99	10.0	45.63%	The Largest Ten Fund Families	62.25	24.6	39.659
	The Rest Fund Families (N=50)	14.29	4.6	54.37%	The Rest Fund Families (N=92)	10.30	8.84	60.359