

Discussion on: Mandatory Data Breach Disclosure and Insider Trading

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"Most of the servants would like to know why you cashed out of the company stock."



- Well Written Paper

- Easy to understand what is done in the paper
- Central Idea: Mandatory notification laws about data breaches caused insiders to obtain higher trading profits

Role of Discussant

- Hold Hands and praise the paper or
- Critical Analysis
 - Identify and Explain main points in the paper
 - Provide One's Own argument about the analysis
- Analysis Well Done I'll mostly discuss conceptual idea and emphasis
- I'll try to provide some minor suggestions

Findings in Paper



- Results
 - States that implement data breach notification laws earlier
 - More insider trading profits than those that implement later
 - States with stronger breach notification laws more insider trading profits
 - Multivariate Results
 - Breach notification rule related to insider trading profits
 - Reported cyber investments increase in states with stricter breach notification laws
 - Firms without reported cyber investments stronger results
- Interpretation in the paper
 - Breach notification laws unintended consequence is greater insider trading profits
 - Weak legal designs exacerbate insider trading profits

How Increase Insider Trading Profits?




- Papers Central Idea: Mandatory notification law increased insider trading profits
- How does this work? My interpretation
 - Scenario 1: Treated State Firm has a breach and now must notify affected parties
 - 1: Insiders sell their shares before public announcement make profits
 - Scenario 2: Treated State Firm has no data breaches
 - 2: Unclear how notification law increases insider trading profits
 - Scenario 3: : Untreated State Firm has a data breach and does not notify
 - 3A: Insiders assume no harm to firm and do not sell their shares
 - 3B: Insiders assume there is harm to firm and sell their shares
 - Scenario 4: Untreated State Firm has a data breach but voluntarily notifies
 - 4: Insider sells their shares before public announcement
 - Scenario 5: Untreated State Firms has no data breaches
 - 5: No insider trading profits from data breaches
- Motivation for greater insider trading profits
 - Arguments and Test: Compare scenarios 1+2 versus 3+4+5
 - Why expect increase in insider trading profits scenario 2?
 - Unclear why 5 is part of appropriate non-treatment group
 - My assumption: Results driven by groups 2 and 5 since they are largest
 - Suggestion: Formal hypotheses would help why increase in scenario 2?
- Conceptually: Seems like it should be scenario 1 versus 3A/3B
- Alternative Approach: Specific insiders trading profits before breach notifications

State Passage of Laws



- Ideal Natural Experiment
 - Groups A and B: Observable characteristics similar except the one of interest
 - Shock: See how effects firms in group and A and B
 - Which State Comparisons Drive the results?
- State Changes in Notification Laws
 - Red states lag blue by 30%
 - Not random adoption dates
 - Causal inference not viable (Athey and Imbens, 2021)
 - Heterogenous Treatment Effects
 - Strict and Weak Notifications Laws
 - Treatment effect heterogeneity in DiD creates biased estimates (Baker, Larker, and Wang, 2021)

	Years till Passed Regulation											
States	0	2	3	4	5	6	8	9	11	14	15	Grand Total
Blue	1	4	11	5	2			1		1		25
Red		4	6	3	3	4	1		2		2	25
Grand Total	1	8	17	8	5	4	1	1	2	1	2	50



Where Insider Trading Opportunities?



- Relevance Analysis (Table 4): ID firms more impacted by notification laws
 - Current: Firms with IT Officer listed in top management team in Execucomp
 - To me this seems to measure whether they are a tech firm
 - Alternative Interpretation:
 - Insider trading in tech firms is changing during this time period
 - High tech firms affected by this law earlier (CA, Wash, NY early adopters)
 - Firm-fixed-effects don't solve
 - Could you use firms with and without data breaches?
- Corporate Executives
 - Lots of Private Information and negative disclosures
 - Idea: Notification law increases managers ability to profit from insider trading
 - How much? Conceptually small or large increase in expected insider trading?
 - My prior: Small increase expected insider trading profits because data breaches rare
- Materiality: If data breaches material/prevalent, lots of voluntary disclosures
 - Does the law increase the number of data breach disclosures?
 - Could this be a paper about mandatory vs voluntary disclosure? Scenario 1 vs 4
 - Suggestion:
 - Treated States: How many data breaches? Pre and Post
 - Untreated States: How many data breaches? Pre and Post
 - Graph showing pre-and post-breach numbers for treated and untreated states

Additional Results in Paper



- Strict Post vs Weak Post
 - How states decide between strict and weak notification laws? High tech states?
 - Why is R&D negatively related to announcements about investments in cyber security? This is a surprising and fascinating result.
- Breach Risk Analysis in the paper
 - 1^{st} Step: ID firms that have been breached
 - 2nd Step: Classify their competitors as having higher breach risk in future
 - Counterintuitive to me
 - Expect less breach risk in competitors after their peer is breached
 - Breach becomes more salient
 - Do breaches by competitor predicts breach in peer or vice versa?
 - Do peer breaches lead to announcements about investments in cyber security?
 - Do peer breaches change materiality of cyber investments?

Nuances



- Is notification to affected parties the same as disclosure to investors?
 - Implicit assumption: For consumer data breaches this seems reasonable
 - How does this work for business-to-business breaches (supplier breaches)?
- If I understand correctly
 - Breach occurs must notify affected parties
 - Source firm could make public disclosure about the breach
 - Affected parties could make the disclosure public
 - Do all notifications lead to public disclosures?
 - Potential Test: B-to-C vs B-to-B firms
- Table 6 Laws increase reported cyber investments
 - Cool results: Recommend expanding this part of the paper
 - More cyber investments or more reports: Did law change materiality decision?
 - How does reliance on voluntary disclosure impact the interpretation?
 - Which specific people have insider trading profits from data breach notifications?
- Intended Consequences
 - Invest in data security (Table 6)
 - Reduce costs of data breaches to outside parties (?)
 - Both issues seem quite important Suggestion: impact on cost to outside parties

Overall



- Very Interesting Paper
- Data Breach Notifications and Insider Trading
- Tests Well Explained
- Fascinating evidence that call for more research
- Paper might benefit from focusing on specific instances of insider trading profits from mandatory breach notifications
- Thanks For Opportunity to Discuss