CORPORATE LOAN SPREADS AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

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- $\rightarrow\,$ This paper: Novel dataset to explore the ability of corporate *loan* spreads to forecast economic developments



Panel A. Industrial Production and Loan Spread over 2019

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 - Key result: A 1 SD ↑ loan spread predicts a 0.41 SD ↓ industrial production. Twice the economic magnitude of the bond spread. Even when included jointly.
 - Robust to:
 - Other economic aggregates; different time horizons; other benchmark measures; other countries; OOS

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 - We show the joint role of borrower and intermediary balance sheet constraints
 - 2/3 of the predictive power of the loan spread is coming from deterioration of borrower balance sheets.
 - We can link this to borrower financial frictions (size, age, private, rating).
 - See e.g. Bernanke and Gertler (1989); Kiyotaki and Moore (1997); Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010)

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 - We document substantial cross-industry heterogeneity as to the predictive power of credit spreads.
 - We show that forecasts can be improved when incorporating alternative aggregation methods.

DATA

- Daily secondary market prices (mid quotes) of loans from the Loan Syndication and Trading Association (LSTA)
 - 1999 to Q1 2020 period, U.S. non-financial firms, TL, >300,000 loan-month observations (\sim 1,200 loans outstanding per month)
- LPC Dealscan matched to LSTA using LIN
 - Loan amount/spread > cash flows + contract terms
- Bond information
 - Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012), TRACE and Mergent FISD
- Macro variables: FRED, Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), Bureau of Labour Statistics

▶ Loan Market - Volume 🚺 ▶ Loan Market - Liquidity

CONSTRUCTING THE AGGREGATE LOAN SPREAD

- "Bottom-up" spread (Gilchrist and Zakrajšek, 2012)
 - Qrt. cash flows: coupon using 3m forward LIBOR + AISD \rightarrow yield-to-maturity $y_{it}[k]$
 - Synthetic risk-free loan w/ same cash-flow profile \rightarrow yield-to-maturity $y_{it}^{f}[k]$
 - DCF using cont. comp. zero-coupon Treasury yields (Gürkaynak, Sack, and Wright, 2007)
 - \rightarrow Loan spread (for each loan): $S_{it}[k] = y_{it}[k] y_{it}^{f}[k]$
 - \rightarrow Aggregate loan spread: $S_t^{Loan} = \frac{1}{N_t} \sum_i \sum_k S_{it}[k]$

AGGREGATE CREDIT SPREADS (1999-2020)



- Aggregate loan and bond spreads.
- ρ=0.76 [ρ=0.65 ex '08-'09 financial crisis]
- Loan spreads are more volatile than bond spreads (σ=2.28% vs. σ=1.04%)
- Loan spreads an order of magnitude larger than bond spreads (different borrower types)

• Borrower Rating • Borrower Size/Age

FORECASTING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS

$$\Delta y_{t+h} = \alpha + \sum_{i=1}^{p} \beta_i \Delta y_{t-i} + \gamma_1 \Delta S_t + \lambda_2 T S_t + \lambda_3 RFF_t + \epsilon_{t+h},$$

- Δy is the log growth rate of industrial production (in this talk; various other macro variables in the paper)
- *S_t* is a credit spread {*Loan*, *Bond*}
- TS_t is the term spread and RFF_t real effective fed fund rate
- Estimated with OLS, *p* based on AIC, Newey-West/H-H s.e., coefficients are standardized

	Industrial Production; Forecast horizon: 3 months		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
ΔS_t^{Loan}	-0.410 (-5.727)		-0.396 (-3.831)
ΔS_t^{Bond}	× /	-0.198 (-2.257)	-0.030 (-0.267)
Adjusted R ²	0.313	0.198	0.311
Incremental R ²	+0.150	+0.035	+0.148
Observations	241	241	241

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- $R^2 \uparrow 15$ pp relative to benchmark

► Hansen Hodrick SE ► Out of sample

DYNAMICS - LOCAL PROJECTIONS



	Industrial Production; Forecast horizon: 3 months		
	Coefficient	Incremental R ²	
Alt. bond spreads			
Δ Baa-Aaa spread	-0.277 (-3.918)	+0.077	
(-3.918) ∆ HY-Aaa spread -0.248 (-4.013)		+0.062	
Equity market			
S&P500 return	0.216 (2.921)	+0.041	
Adj. for contract terms			
Residual ΔS_t^{Loan}	-0.405 (-5.646)	+0.120	
Ex. financial crisis			
ΔS_t^{Loan}	-0.207 (-3.047)	+0.034	
ΔS_t^{Bond}	-0.058 (-0.720)	+0.001	

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• Europe 🔶 Industry level 🔶 A

MECHANISM I: INTERMEDIARY BALANCE SHEETS

- Loan market borrowers may have limited funding alternatives and hence are particularly sensitive to shocks to the balance sheets of financial intermediaries
- Reduced capacity and/or willingness of intermediaries to provide credit to the economy which is reflected in credit spreads
 - A deterioration in the health of intermediaries (e.g. Holmström and Tirole, 1997)
 - Frictions in raising new capital (e.g. He and Krishnamurthy, 2013; Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2010)
 - Fluctuations in collateral value (e.g. Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997)

CREDIT CONDITIONS AND BANK HEALTH

	SLOSS (1)	SLOSS (2)	SLOSS (3)	Commit (4)	Commit (5)	Commit (6)
ΔS_t^{Loan}	0.430^{***} (3.810)		0.418^{***} (5.176)	-0.351^{**} (-2.435)		-0.287^{**} (-2.166)
ΔS^{Bond}_t	(0.010)	0.290^{*} (1.879)	0.019 (0.118)	(1100)	-0.306^{*} (-1.922)	(-0.223) (-1.512)
Adjusted R ² Observations	$0.174 \\ 81$	$0.073 \\ 81$	$\substack{0.164\\81}$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.112\\ 81 \end{array}$	$0.082 \\ 81$	$\begin{array}{c} 0.148\\ 81 \end{array}$

- Loan spread associated with tightening of lending standards and a reduction of credit lines (bonds do not)
- Consistent with a reduction in the supply of credit

Bank Health
CREDIT SPREAD DECOMPOSITION

	Forecast horizon: $h = 3$ months		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A. Industrial Production			
$\Delta \hat{S}_{i}^{Loan}$	-0.376^{***}		-0.401^{***}
	(-5.084)		(-3.143)
ΔELP_t	-0.268***		-0.276***
	(-4.720)		(-4.149)
$\Delta \hat{S}^{Bond}_{t}$. ,	-0.191^{**}	0.038
t		(-2.027)	(0.320)
ΔEBP_t		-0.182**	0.043
		(-2.116)	(0.303)
Adjusted R^2	0.332	0.196	0.328
Incremental R ²	+0.169	+0.030	0.165
Contribution from ΔS_t	0.67	0.69	
Observations	241	241	241

- Excess loan premium (ELP) has some predictive power (intermediary balance sheets frictions)
- Predicted spread has economically larger effect (borrower balance sheet frictions)

Decomposition

MECHANISMS II: BORROWER BALANCE SHEETS

- Loan market borrowers may be particularly sensitive to financial frictions that emanate from their own balance sheet
- Wedge between the cost of external funds and the opportunity cost of internal funds, labelled the "external finance premium" (e.g. Bernanke and Gertler, 1989)
- A deterioration in the health of borrower balance sheets is further amplified via a "financial accelerator" effect (e.g. Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist, 1999), which is subsequently reflected in the borrower's cost of credit

BORROWER SIZE AND AGE



- Loan borrowers younger (29% <= 5yrs) and smaller (67% <= 2bill)
- Loan spread capturing borrower balance sheet frictions

Industrial Production; Forecast horizon: 3 months				
(1)	(2)	(3)		
-0.391 (-4.479)				
	-0.212 (-1.762)			
		-0.429 (-5.465)		
0.306	0.204	0.320		
+0.143 241	+0.041 241	+0.157 241		
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	Industrial Production; Forecast horizon: 3 months				
	(1)	(2)	(3)		
ΔS_t^{Loan} [Small & young firms]	-0.391 (-4.479)				
ΔS_t^{Loan} [Large & old firms]		-0.212 (-1.762)			
ΔS_t^{Loan} [Private firms]		, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	-0.429 (-5.465)		
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 Consistent with smaller, private firms being more sensitive to changes in economic conditions (Cloyne, Ferreira, Froemel, and Surico, 2020; Begenau and Salomao, 2019; Asker, Farre-Mensa, and Ljungqvist, 2015; Davis, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda, 2006; Pflueger, Siriwardane, and Sunderam, 2020)

Size sort Age sort Small-Large Spread

BORROWER RATING



 Half of loan market borrowers are private/unrated firms. Limited overlap between bond and loan borrowers.

BORROWER RATING

	Forecast horizon: $h = 3$ months				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
Panel A. Industrial Production					
$\Delta S_t^{Loan}[\text{BBB}]$	-0.105 (-1.557)				
$\Delta S_t^{Loan}[{\rm BB}]$	· · · ·	-0.260^{***} (-3.538)			
$\Delta S_t^{Loan}[{\rm B} ~{\rm and} ~{\rm below}]$		· · /	-0.425^{***} (-5.425)		
ΔS_t^{Loan} [Not Available]				-0.415^{***} (-4.040)	
Adjusted R ²	0.170	0.226	0.322	0.315	
Incremental R ²	+0.007	+0.063	+0.159	+0.152	
Observations	241	241	241	241	

• Repricing of risk by banks may be better reflected in loan spread

SUMMARY OF MECHANISMS

- Evidence consistent with the *joint* role of borrower and intermediary constraints (Rampini and Viswanathan (2019)).
- 2/3 of the predictive power of the loan spread is coming from deterioration of borrower balance sheets.
- Next.... We explore alternative aggregation methods.

Uncertainty Sentiment

INDUSTRY LOAN SPREADS



Industry prediction

INDUSTRY HETEROGENEITY

_	Forecast horizon: $h = 3$ months				
	(1)	(2)	(3)		
S_{bt}^{Loan} x Top 5 EFD	-0.311^{***} (-4.527)				
S^{Loan}_{bt} x Continuous EFD	. ,	-0.319***			
$S_{bt}^{Loan} \ge {\rm Top}$ 3 EFD		(-2.698)	-0.519***		
$S_{bt}^{Loan} \ge {\rm Middle}\; 4 \ {\rm EFD}$			(-5.408) -0.269***		
S_{bt}^{Loan} x Bottom 4 EFD			(-2.754) -0.139 (-1.606)		
Industry fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Adjusted R ²	0.271	0.268	0.269		
Observations	803	803	803		

• Industries with firms that are more dependent on external finance (Rajan and Zingales (1998)) account for most of the predictive power of the loan spread.

ALTERNATIVE WEIGHTING SCHEMES

	Forecast horizon: $h = 3$ months					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	
ΔS_t^{Loan} [Base]	-0.410^{***} (-5.727)					
ΔS_t^{Loan} [GDP]	()	-0.396^{***} (-5.006)				
$\Delta S_t^{Loan}~[{\rm Industry}]$		(,	-0.445^{***} (-6.236)			
ΔS_t^{Loan} [EFD]			(,	-0.443^{***} (-4.805)		
ΔS_t^{Loan} [Elastic Net]				(1000)	-0.449^{***} (-5.162)	
Adjusted R ²	0.313	0.305	0.343	0.337	0.339	
Incremental R ²	+0.150	+0.142	+0.180	+0.174	+0.176	
OOS RMSE	0.0132	0.0118	0.0115	0.0117	0.0115	
Observations	241	241	241	241	241	

• Thinking about how to aggregate measures from microdata can help improve business cycle forecast.

CONCLUSION

- Introduce a novel measure of credit spreads using secondary loan market prices. Loan spreads contain information about the future business cycle above and beyond other credit spread indicators
- Differential predictive power is (in part) driven by compositional differences btw loan and bond markets (borrower and bank frictions)
- Useful? Most firms don't have access to bond markets; countries with less developed capital markets; Goodhart's law

Thanks!

SECONDARY LOAN MARKET TRADING VOLUME



Back

SECONDARY LOAN MARKET LIQUIDITY



- Pre-GFC bid-ask-spread: 68bps (vs. 34bps in the bond market)
- Secondary loan market is highly liquid.

Rating distribution - bond vs loan market



Back

Age/Size distribution - bond vs loan market



• Back

HANSEN HODRICK SE

	Industrial Production; Forecast horizon: 3 months				
	(1)	(2)	(3)		
ΔS_t^{Loan}	-0.410 (-7.027)		-0.396 (-4.519)		
ΔS_t^{Bond}		-0.198 (-3.842)	-0.030 (-0.353)		
Adjusted R ²	0.313	0.198	0.311		
Incremental R ²	+0.150	+0.035	+0.148		
Observations	241	241	241		

• Results remain highly significant with Hansen-Hodrick standard errors.

▶ Back

OUT OF SAMPLE

	(1) (Baseline)	$^{(2)}_{(\Delta S^{Loan}_t)}$	(3) (ΔS_t^{Bond})	(4) (Both)
Panel A. Industrial Production				
RMSE DM Test p-value (Col(2) = Col(3))	0.0132	0.0118	0.0131 (0.03)	0.0118
Observations	91	91	91	91

 Training set on 150 observations. Expanding rolling window RMSE

• Loan spread significantly better at OOS forecasting

► Back

EVIDENCE FROM EUROPE

_	Manufacturing Index; Forecast horizon: $h = 3$ months				
	Germany (1)	France (2)	Spain (3)		
ΔS_{t}^{Loan}	-0.360	-0.340	-0.200		
	(-2.300)	(-2.100)	(-1.900)		
ΔS_t^{Bond}	-0.048	-0.009	-0.130		
	(-0.690)	(-0.100)	(-1.000)		
Adjusted R ²	0.260	0.190	0.190		
Incremental R ²	+0.111	+0.071	+0.058		
% Contribution from ΔS_t^{Loan}	0.86	0.91	0.62		
Observations	227	188	186		



EVIDENCE FROM EUROPE





2000 2005 2010 2015 2020



INDUSTRY FORECASTING RESULTS

	Industry employment; Forecast horizon: 3 months			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	
SLoan St	-0.130 (-3.491) -0.239 (-3.818)	-0.171 (-3.534)	-0.292 (-4.609)	
Year × quarter fixed effects Industry fixed effects Adjusted R ² Incremental R ² Observations	No No 0.452 + 0.086 803	Yes No 0.558 +0.192 803	Yes Yes 0.590 +0.224 803	



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FROM SPREAD TO PREMIA

DECOMPOSING THE LOAN SPREAD

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
DD _{bt}	-0.357	-0.434	-0.435	-0.417	
	(-35.251)	(-51.707)	(-52.299)	(-51.264)	
\overline{DD}_{bt}^2	0.022	0.028	0.028	0.027	
	(26.631)	(41.476)	(41.888)	(39.779)	
σDD_{bt}	0.023	0.010	0.010	0.010	
	(6.965)	(3.648)	(3.582)	(4.734)	
Ln(AISD)		0.735	0.732	0.642	0.685
		(38.270)	(34.482)	(29.518)	(32.143)
Ln(Age)		0.075	0.075	0.067	0.040
· - /		(31.564)	(31.618)	(30.144)	(13.797)
Ln(Amount)		-0.078	-0.078	-0.061	-0.093
		(-12.127)	(-11.963)	(-9.842)	(-13.592)
Secured(0/1)			-0.018	0.012	0.086
			(-0.760)	(0.499)	(3.284)
Covenants(0/1)			-0.011	0.011	0.035
			(-0.826)	(0.870)	(2.611)
Senior(0/1)			0.018	0.089	0.025
			(0.404)	(1.006)	(0.464)
Loan type fixed effects	No	No	No	Yes	No
Industry fixed effects	No	No	No	Yes	No
Rating fixed effects	No	No	No	Yes	No
Adjusted R ²	0.087	0.407	0.407	0.456	0.315
Observations	287,811	287,811	287,811	287,811	287,811

• Use decomposition in (4): $ELP = S_t^{Loan} - \hat{S}_t^{Loan}$

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ALTERNATIVE WEIGHTING SCHEMES

		Industrial Production; Forecast horizon: 3 months			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
ΔS_t^{Loan} [Base]	-0.410 (-5.727)				
ΔS_t^{Loan} [Industry]		-0.445 (-6.236)			
ΔS_t^{Loan} [EFD]		. ,	-0.443 (-4.805)		
ΔS_t^{Loan} [ML]				-0.449 (-5.162)	
Adjusted R ² Incremental R ²	0.313 +0.150	0.343 +0.180	0.337 +0.174	0.339 +0.176	
Observations	241	241	241	241	

• Use insight to improve aggregate level forecasting?

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LOAN SPREAD - SMALL V LARGE FIRMS



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EFFECT BY FIRM SIZE

	Industrial Production; Forecast horizon: 3 months		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
ΔS_t^{Loan} [Small firms]	-0.377 (-4.177)		
ΔS_t^{Loan} [Large firms]	× ,	-0.263 (-3.411)	
ΔS_t^{Loan} [Private firms]			-0.429 (-5.465)
Adjusted R ²	0.296 +0.133	0.227	0.320
Observations	241	241	241

- Size based on total assets
- Private = issuer cannot be matched to Compustat

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EFFECT BY FIRM AGE

	Industrial Production; Forecast horizon: 3 months		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
ΔS_t^{Loan} [Young firms]	-0.340 (-4.525)		
ΔS_t^{Loan} [Old firms]	(),	-0.290 (-2.795)	
ΔS_t^{Loan} [Private firms]			-0.429 (-5.465)
Adjusted R ² Incremental R ² Observations	0.270 +0.107 241	0.255 +0.078 241	0.320 +0.157 241



CREDIT CONDITIONS – EUROPE

	Credit conditions based on loan officer surveys		
	(1)	(2)	
Germany			
ΔS_t^{Loan}	0.376 (3.748)		
ΔS_t^{Bond}		0.159 (1.182)	
Adjusted R ²	0.128	0.011	
Observations	70	70	
France			
ΔS_{t}^{Loan}	0.480		
	(3.545)		
ΔS_t^{Bond}		0.329 (1.436)	
Adjusted R ²	0.218	0.094	
Observations	64	64	
Spain			
ΔS_{t}^{Loan}	0.370		
	(2.018)		
ΔS_t^{Bond}		0.176 (1.008)	
Adjusted R ²	0.122	0.015	
Observations	63	63	



CREDIT CONDITIONS AND BANK HEALTH II

	ROA (7)	ROA (8)	ROA (9)	LLP (10)	LLP (11)	LLP (12)
ΔS_t^{Loan} ΔS_t^{Bond}	-0.430^{**} (-2.163)	-0.282 (-1.234)	-0.492^{**} (-2.118) 0.084 (0.286)	0.465^{**} (2.203)	0.442 (1.604)	0.304^{**} (2.454) 0.216 (0.613)
Adjusted R ² Observations	$\begin{array}{c} 0.174\\ 81 \end{array}$	0.068 81	0.167 81	$\begin{array}{c} 0.206\\ 81 \end{array}$	0.185 81	0.217 81

- Bank profitability and LLP/Loans more strongly correlated with loan spreads
- Loan spread appears to better reflect balance sheet frictions of intermediaries, which reduce the supply of credit

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ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION I: UNCERTAINTY

-	Forecast horizon: 3 months					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ΔS_t^{Loan}	-0.410^{***}	-0.261***	-0.442^{***}	-0.389***	-0.325***	-0.243^{***}
VIX	(-0.121)	(-4.403) -0.367^{***} (-3.329)	(-4.303)	(-0.400)	(-0.271)	(-3.001)
PVS Index		. ,	0.267^{**} (2.404)			
EPU Index			. ,	-0.109 (-1.633)		
FU Index				. ,	-0.399^{***} (-3.311)	
'Recession' Index						-0.514^{***} (-4.408)
Adjusted R ²	0.313	0.393	0.386	0.320	0.432	0.518
Incremental R ² Observations	$^{+0.150}_{-241}$	$^{+0.230}_{-241}$	+0.223 76	$^{+0.157}_{-241}$	$^{+0.269}_{-241}$	$^{+0.355}_{211}$

- Uncertainty proxies contain predictive power for future economic conditions
- Uncertainty can, however, not explain the incremental predictive power of the loan spread

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ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION II: SENTIMENT

- Investor sentiment appears important to understand credit spreads:
 - Credit spreads are too narrow during booms and proceed economic downturns (Greenwood and Hanson (2013)), López-Salido, Stein, and Zakrajšek (2017))
 - Investors under-price risk in good times, creating a credit boom. During downturns spreads overract in the opposite direction (Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer (2018)).
- Our focus in on the *relative* predictive power vis-a-vis bond spreads
- Borrower fundamentals drive relative predictive power of the loan spread (not excess loan premium, which would capture sentiment)



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