

Human Frictions in the Transmission of Economic Policy*

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Abstract

Many consumers below the top of the distribution of a representative population by cognitive abilities barely react to monetary and fiscal policies that aim to stimulate consumption and borrowing, even when they are financially unconstrained and despite substantial debt capacity. Differences in income, formal education levels, economic expectations, and a large set of registry-based demographics do not explain these facts. Heterogeneous cognitive abilities thus act as *human frictions* in the transmission of economic policies that operate through the household sector and might imply redistribution from low- to high-cognitive-ability agents. We conclude by discussing how our findings inform the microfoundation of behavioral macroeconomic theory.

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I Introduction

Studying the frictions that limit the transmission of fiscal and monetary policy to the real economy has interested economics research for decades. So far, researchers have mainly studied the role of financial frictions, such as intermediaries’ incomplete pass-through of changes in policy-rates and financial and liquidity constraints.¹

In this paper, we document a complementary friction that originates in the household sector, which we label *human friction*. We argue that heterogeneous cognitive abilities (IQ) among consumers limit the effectiveness of fiscal and monetary policy interventions that target households.² In particular, we show that agents who have the capacity and incentive to change their debt levels or move forward their durable purchases to take advantage of subsidies (e.g., *cash for clunkers* programs) barely do so if they are in the bottom half of the population distribution by cognitive abilities, possibly because they are not aware of the policy changes or do not understand how policy measures affect economic incentives (Agarwal and Mazumder (2013); Agarwal et al. (2017); Agarwal et al. (2020); Roth and Wohlfart (2020); Andre et al. (2019)). We document a differential sensitivity by IQ to fiscal and monetary policy measures only in the subsample of likely unconstrained individuals and we do not find a differential propensity to purchase cars that were not subsidized ruling out several alternative channels that we discuss in more detail below. Human frictions thus limit the effectiveness of policies that aim to stimulate consumption of all financially-unconstrained households in the economy—an implication we share with recent macroeconomic theories featuring agents with limited cognitive abilities.³ The next step in this literature is to do what the HANK model (Kaplan et al., 2018) did for the New Keynesian model and allow for models in which individuals differ in their cognitive abilities when forming expectations and making choices.

We propose a setting in which we can disentangle the role of innate cognitive abilities from that of formal educational attainment as well as other determinants of income, consumption, and wealth (Agarwal et al. (2009)). Our aim is to capture a proxy for

¹For instance, see Di Maggio et al. (2017), Drechsler et al. (2017), Wang et al. (2018), Wang (2019), Hubbard and Judd (1986), Parker (1999), Kaplan et al. (2018), Aguiar et al. (2020).

²In the paper, for simplicity we use the label “IQ” as a synonym of cognitive abilities.

³See, e.g., Woodford (2019), Farhi and Werning (2017), Gabaix (2020), and Ilut and Valchev (2021).

agents’ ability to use information about macroeconomic variables and macroeconomic policies they might obtain from the media or other sources as well as logic to make predictions and optimize their economic choices even if they do not have formal education in economics. In earlier research, D’Acunto, Hoang, Paloviita, and Weber (2021) found that cognitive abilities relate to how agents form and update inflation expectations in survey data. In this paper, instead, we exploit novel and substantially richer registry-based administrative data to study the relationship between cognitive abilities and the reaction of agents’ consumption and borrowing to macroeconomic policies.

We match at the individual level—to the best of our knowledge for the first time—administrative data on cognitive abilities and several demographics, such as formal education levels, debt levels, the amount of interest paid on debt, and durables ownership and purchases, with survey-based data on consumption and borrowing plans for a large representative sample of Finnish men.⁴ Observing individual plans as well as actual choices is crucial in that it allows us to disentangle supply- and demand-side drivers of individuals’ reactions to macroeconomic policies.⁵

We first consider the transmission of a traditional measure of fiscal policy—a “cash-for-clunker” car scrappage scheme (Mian and Sufi (2012); Green et al. (2020)). In Finland, this type of program, called *ROPA*, consists of a government subsidy of EUR 1,500 (approximately \$1,750) provided to consumers who trade in their existing eligible clunker to purchase an eligible car. The program aims to stimulate aggregate demand in times of low economic growth by incentivizing households to bring forward their durable spending. Being aware of the program and understanding its functioning, which requires collecting several pieces of information from different sources and complying with a set of bureaucratic steps on the part of households, might vary systematically based on agents’ cognitive abilities.

And, indeed, conditional on owning an eligible clunker, agents at the top of the distribution by cognitive abilities are twice as likely to take advantage of the scrappage

⁴As we discuss below, the sample only includes men because the individual-level administrative data on cognitive abilities comes from the records of mandatory military service, which was only compulsory for men over our sample period.

⁵Incidentally, observing the plans and actual ex-post choices for the same agents also allows us to validate survey-based economic plans, which typically are not elicited in an incentivized manner.

scheme relative to others, in both the raw data (see Panel A of Figure 1 below) and after controlling for income, education, registry-based wealth and financial liquidity, and a broad set of other demographics as well as personal and macroeconomic expectations that might drive agents' willingness to substitute their durable spending intertemporally. The results are similar also within residential areas that are served by the same car dealers.

This differential program take-up by cognitive abilities arises only among agents who are likely unconstrained and hence who could react to this policy measure if they wanted. Instead, we detect no differences in take-up among financially-constrained agents, who likely lack the means to purchase a new car even if they wanted, irrespective of the subsidy or their cognitive abilities. Green et al. (2020) show that liquidity is a crucial determinant for the participation in cash for clunkers programs to finance the down payment for a new car. We instead document a large heterogeneity in take up even within the subsample with ample liquidity by cognitive abilities.


Moreover, we find that during the program period, purchases of non-car vehicles and purchases of cars that did not qualify for the government program (see Panel B of Figure 1) did not differ by cognitive abilities. These falsification results minimize the possibility that cognitive abilities capture a residual driver of financial constraints above and beyond the rich registry-based information on income and debt capacity we observe.⁶

But then why do many agents below the top of the IQ distribution not take advantage of the cash-for-clunker subsidy? A relevant role of supply-side forces such as exposure to different car dealers or households' differential ability to obtain financing from banks can be dismissed by our baseline results. To investigate the scope for a demand-side channel, we exploit survey-based data on plans and hypothetical assessments of whether it is a good time for a representative consumer in Finland to purchase cars, which were elicited both before and after the announcement of the program. We find that, after the announcement, plans and assessments barely change for agents below the top of the IQ distribution. By contrast, high-IQ men change their assessments and plans and

⁶We do not argue that the optimal reaction to policy should be the same for all households, but that even after controlling directly for a rich set of determinants of consumption, saving, and borrowing choices—which should drive the optimal policy reaction—heterogeneous cognitive abilities play an important role in explaining heterogeneous reactions to policies.

Figure 1: Car Purchases by Clunker Owners based on Cognitive Abilities

A. Eligible Car Purchases (Owns Clunker) B. Non-eligible Car Purchases (Owns Clunker)



Panel A plots the number of cars eligible for the cash-for-clunker scheme purchased over time (normalized by the number of purchases in the first observed month—March 2013) for Finnish men with IQ scores between 6 and 9 (High IQ) and between 1 and 5 (Low IQ). The sample only includes Finnish men who owned a clunker at the announcement of the program (end of December 2014). Panel B plots the number of non-eligible cars purchased by men in the same conditions. The first vertical line represent the announcement of the program (December 2014) and the second vertical line the end of the program (December 2015). We use the universe of car registrations in Finland to calculate these statistics and define clunkers based on the program criteria on age and emissions. To address seasonality in car sales, we plot a trailing three-months moving average. We measure normalized IQ using data from the official military entrance exam in Finland. IQ is the standardized test score from the military entrance exam test for all men in Finland. IQ obtains integer values between 1 and 9 with 9 being the highest score. The sample period is from January 2013 to December 2017.

hence display awareness and understanding of how the policy affects consumers’ economic incentives. Thus, irrespective of financial or liquidity constraints, many households do not react to the policy because they do not develop an intention to react, perhaps because they are unaware of the policy and/or do not fully understand its functioning.

In the second part of the paper, we study the transmission of a conventional measure of monetary policy—changes in policy rates. Central banks commonly lower nominal rates to stimulate consumption through household borrowing and increase rates to avoid overheating and reduce borrowing (e.g., see Di Maggio et al. (2017)). Our sample period includes (endogenous) changes in policy rates in both directions: The ECB cut the policy rate around the stock-market turmoils of 2001. It kept rates low until 2005 and then increased them until the onset of the 2008-2009 Financial Crisis. Effective transmission of these monetary-policy interventions implies that households borrow more when rates drop and borrow less when rates increase, after controlling for aggregate shocks and individuals’ income levels, debt capacity, subjective expectations, and other dimensions that might

affect the sensitivity of borrowing to changes in interest rates.

We find that high-IQ men behave more in line with this conventional monetary policy transmission mechanism by adjusting their total outstanding debt balances significantly more to changes in interest rates relative to others. High-IQ men are also more likely to take out new loans when policy rates drop and to pay down existing loans when interest rates increase.

Even for the case of conventional monetary policy, either supply- or demand-side channels could drive agents' heterogeneous reactions by cognitive abilities. On the supply side, for instance, financial intermediaries might pass through changes in policy rates differently to agents with different levels of cognitive abilities. We can assess this channel directly, because our registry data include the interest rates individuals pay on outstanding debt. We show that, in our setting, pass through of policy rates is virtually identical across the IQ distribution. Household leverage ratios are also rather flat across the IQ distribution,⁷ which dismisses the possibility that high-IQ agents have a higher scope to react to changes in policy rates or that low-IQ men are shut off financial markets and for this reason do not react.

To assess the scope of a demand-side channel, we analyze survey-based data on individuals' borrowing propensities. High-IQ individuals are more likely to state that it is a good time to borrow for a representative consumer when policy rates fall and the opposite when rates rise. By contrast, others' assessment of the viability of borrowing barely varies around changes in policy rates, irrespective of their direction. Therefore, even for the transmission of conventional monetary policy, the reaction of individuals below the top of the IQ distribution is limited due to their own intentions rather than the inability to translate their intention to react into actual choices.

Systematic variation in economic preferences by cognitive abilities could in principle motivate a demand channel above and beyond agents' awareness and understanding of economic policies. For instance, Dohmen et al. (2010); Falk et al. (2018) show that agents with higher cognitive abilities are more risk tolerant and patient.⁸ We argue that

⁷We define household leverage ratios as outstanding household debt over income.

⁸See also Falk, Kosse, Pinger, Schildberg-Hoerisch, and Deckers (Falk et al.) on the relation between socioeconomic status, children's IQ and economic preferences.

preference heterogeneity is unlikely to fully explain our findings for a set of reasons. First, higher impatience should predict a higher likelihood to purchase a new car, all else equal. Moreover, we find similar results for both policy-rate increases and decreases, whereas risk aversion should matter more for the take up of new debt relative to the repayment of existing debt unless it is paired with a precautionary-savings motive. And, we find the same patterns in actual choices as well as survey-based assessments that ask respondents to think in terms of a representative consumer rather than based on own preferences and beliefs.

In terms of economic relevance, because individuals below the top of the IQ distribution earn about one half of aggregate household income in our sample, their limited reaction to policies is likely to have sizable aggregate implications. This group's muted response to economic policies can be an important human friction to explain the limited effectiveness of interventions implemented under the assumption that most financially-unconstrained households would react.

We conclude the paper by assessing qualitatively the implications of our micro-level empirical results for macroeconomic theory and especially recent behavioral macroeconomic models that feature agents with limited cognition and agents with information frictions. In particular, we consider models with sticky and noisy information, bounded rationality, and consumption commitments.

Our results also stress a potential unintended redistributive role of monetary and fiscal policy. Because agents below the top of the IQ distribution barely react to beneficial policies, such policies might determine a redistribution from individuals with lower cognitive abilities to individuals with high cognitive abilities. For instance, Agarwal et al. (2017), Keys et al. (2016), and Andersen et al. (2020) show that vulnerable demographic groups had surprisingly low take-up rates of mortgage refinancing programs during the Great Recession. These potential redistributive effects call for the design of simple macroeconomic policies and more targeted communication strategies that can reach all agents in the economy and clarify the intended effects of policies on consumers' incentives and choices (e.g., see D'Acunto, Hoang, and Weber (2021); D'Acunto, Hoang, Paloviita, and Weber (2020); D'Acunto, Fuster, and Weber (2021)). D'Acunto, Hoang,

and Weber (2021) in fact show that simple policies such as pre-announced increases in consumption taxes result in homogeneous responses across the overall population.

II Data

In this section, we describe the data sources that allow us to assess the relationship between cognitive abilities and the reaction to several macroeconomic policy measures at the individual level.

A. Data on Cognitive Abilities

We access individual-level information on cognitive abilities for the quasi-universe of Finnish men through the Finnish Defence Forces (FDF). Finland has general conscription for men—all men between the ages of 18 and 60 are liable for military or non-military service.⁹ Within the first weeks of military service, Finnish men participate in a series of tests, including cognitive-ability tests, whose results the FDF uses to select candidates for officer training. Ranking high in these tests provides access to high-quality training and to elite social networks, which is an incentive to perform as well as possible (Grinblatt et al. (2011)). We have test results for all participants from January 1, 1982 until September 30, 2015.

The cognitive-ability section consists of 120 questions that assess three areas—mathematical, verbal, and visuospatial cognitive skills. The questions assess respondents' ability to use information and inputs provided externally and logic to solve problems across each of the three areas. This assessment fits into the scope of our empirical exercise, which aims to isolate a proxy for agents' ability to use information about macroeconomic variables and macroeconomic policies they might obtain from the media and other sources as well as logic to make predictions and optimize their economic choices even if they do not have formal education in economics.

To construct an individual-level measure, for each section of the test, the FDF creates

⁹The share of men who do non-military service is only about 3% of all men who start military service. Please see <https://puolustusvoimat.fi/en/conscription> for these and additional details.

a score based on the number of correct answers. The FDF then aggregates the scores into a composite measure of cognitive abilities, which, for simplicity, we label “IQ.” In a last step, to ensure comparability of the IQ measure across cohorts and avoid the so-called “Flynn effect”—the trend of increasing fluid and crystallized intelligence test scores detected over the last few decades across several populations around the world—the FDF standardizes IQ within cohorts. Specifically, it standardizes IQ to follow a stanine distribution within each cohort. Stanine (STANDARD NINE) is a method of scaling test scores on a 9-point standard scale with a mean of 5 and a standard deviation of 2. The respondents in the lowest 4% of test scores are at least 1.75 standard deviations from the mean and are assigned a standardized IQ of 1 and the 4% with the highest test scores are assigned a standardized IQ of 9. The final measure of IQ we access thus can take values from 1 to 9 and the middle values are attributed to a larger portion of the population than the extreme values.

As earlier research shows (e.g., Grinblatt et al. (2011)), in Finland IQ is unlikely to proxy for differences in cultural or environmental factors that individuals can manipulate, because the country is ethnically and culturally homogeneous. Moreover, because longer education is likely to impact cognitive abilities (e.g., see Ritchie and Tucker-Drob (2018) for a recent meta-analysis), settings in which education is costly and hence parental wealth affects offsprings’ education levels would confound the role of these demographics and IQ. In Finland, all levels of education, including college education, are virtually free to access and students receive government subsidies to defray the costs of living during college. Paired with the rich set of individual-level demographic information from registry-based administrative data we can observe in this setting, and hence which we can keep constant in all our multivariate analyses, Finland thus constitutes a desirable laboratory to isolate the role of cognitive abilities in economic decision-making from other demographic characteristics.

Although the number of years of formal education might increase cognitive abilities, substantial variation in IQ exists even among agents who have the *same* levels of education—IQ and formal education levels do capture different sources of variation in the data. This feature should not appear surprising. For instance, even in a cohort

of Economics majors who graduate from the same school the distribution of grades and abilities typically varies substantially. Cognitive abilities among individuals who obtained degrees from more or less selective college institutions are also likely to vary substantially, even if all such individuals are recorded in the data as having the same level of education. Moreover, IQ captures abilities that in some cases might be higher for agents who have lower levels of formal education, for instance because they dropped out college to start their own business.

Regarding the relationship between IQ and income in the Finnish setting, D’Acunto et al. (2021) show that the correlation between IQ and individual income is positive but not high—0.15, which suggests that access to high-paying jobs is not restricted to the top of the distribution by IQ in Finland.

In all our analyses, we keep formal levels of education and individual income levels constant to ensure that our individual-level IQ measure captures variation in cognitive abilities above and beyond the effects of exposure to formal education and other unobserved innate characteristics that might predict agents’ earnings over time.

B. Administrative Data on Income, Debt, and Interest

For the quasi-universe of Finnish men for whom we have data on cognitive abilities, we have also obtained access to administrative registry data on income, asset holdings, debt levels, and interest paid on outstanding debt at the end of each calendar year. These data are collected for tax purposes by the Finnish national statistical agency (Statistics Finland) from underlying sources across various agencies, which include, the Finnish Tax Administration (Vero), the National Institute for Health and Welfare (THL), the Social Insurance Institution of Finland (Kela) as well as other administrative registers maintained by Statistics Finland.

These administrative data contain information on individuals’ labor and business incomes, received and paid income transfers, as well as overall household liabilities, which are split by types: mortgage debt, student-loan debt, and total debt. For each category of debt, we observe the total amount outstanding at the end of the year as well as the total amount of interest paid throughout the year.

C. Administrative Data on Ownership and New Car Purchases

In terms of data on durable spending, we focus on vehicle ownership and purchases to assess the effects of the Finnish cash for clunkers program. We access administrative data on car purchases at the monthly level and the stock of cars owned by Finnish residents at the end of each fiscal year from the Vehicle Traffic Register managed by the Transport and Communications Agency (Traficom). We match these data to individuals' cognitive ability scores and the other administrative data discussed above through anonymised identifiers.

The vehicle data contains individual-level ownership registries covering car purchases and the stock of all outstanding cars in Finland as well as car characteristics, such as the date of first registration, the vehicle category, and the level of CO2 emission. These data allow us to identify eligible new cars purchased and clunkers at the individual level and hence to assess which agents in our sample could participate in the scrappage program. For the period of the ROPA program, we also observe whether car purchasers received the scrappage bonus, that is, whether they took part in the program conditional on purchasing an eligible car.

D. Borrowing and Spending Plans and Economic Outlook

Our fourth source of data provides information on borrowing and consumption plans as well as a large set of personal and macroeconomic expectations from the confidential micro data underlying the Consumer Climate Survey of Statistics Finland. Statistics Finland conducts the survey on behalf of the Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs of the European Commission (EC) as part of the EC's harmonized consumer survey program. We obtained access to the micro data underlying the survey for the period starting in January 2001 and ending in March 2015.

Every month, Statistics Finland asks a representative repeated cross section of approximately 1,500 Finns questions about general and personal economic conditions, macroeconomic expectations, plans to save and borrow, and their willingness to purchase

different types of consumption goods.¹⁰

We use the answers to the following question to study individuals' views about taking out loans around changes in nominal interest rates:

Question 22 *In view of the general economic situation in Finland, do you think that at the moment ...*

Respondents can answer, "It is a very bad time for people to borrow," "It is a pretty bad time for people to borrow," "It is a pretty good time for people to borrow," or "It is a very good time for people to borrow."¹¹

To study the association between cognitive abilities and the reaction to the scrappage program, we use the answer to the following question:

Question 10 *In view of the general economic situation in Finland, do you think that now it is the right moment for people to purchase a car?*

Respondents can answer, "It is neither the right moment nor the wrong moment," "No, it is not the right moment now," or "Yes, it is the right moment now."

We use similar questions for non-car vehicles and for other durable goods for falsification tests to corroborate that only spending plans on cars, which are covered by the scrappage program, do change.

In addition, we use questions regarding expectations about personal and aggregate economic outlook, and a rich set of socio-demographics from the Statistics Finland survey, which include gender, age, marital status, household size, income, employment status, number of children, region of residence, and education levels.

***E.* Descriptive Statistics**

We provide descriptive statistics for the samples based on registry and on survey data in Table 1. The median annual income is EUR 21,000 and the median respondent is 30

¹⁰The samples are drawn from the total population of 4.4 million individuals and 2.6 million households residing in Finland. The survey is run through phone interviews. In advance of the phone interview, Statistics Finland notifies all target individuals with a letter that contains information about the contents and logistics of the survey.

¹¹The question is not part of the harmonized EC survey.

years old. 61% of respondents are single, 6% are unemployed, 78% have children, 34% have a college degree, about a third live in urban areas and in particular 28% live in Helsinki—the capital region. On average, 51% of respondents think it is a good time to buy durables, 20% think it is a bad time, and the other respondents think it is neither a good nor a bad time.

We then describe the characteristics of the sample of car purchasers during the Finnish car scrappage program period (*ROPA period*), for all car purchasers as well as separately based on whether the purchase was through the program or not. Table 2 shows that the share of individuals with IQ above 5 is similar across both samples, as is the average age and the share of men that lives in urban areas and that is single. We do not find large differences in education or number of children either. Men who purchased cars but did not participate in the ROPA scheme have higher average income and more outstanding debt than others. This difference might arise if, for instance, high-income individuals were more likely to purchase larger cars that have CO2 emissions above the limit to qualify for the ROPA bonus.

Note that participation in the program is far from universal even among those who purchased a qualifying car, which is the very fact that motivates our analysis. Indeed, 46% of individuals who did not participate in the scheme did in fact purchase a car that would have qualified for the subsidy. Individuals might purchase eligible cars but not participate in the ROPA scheme because they might not own a clunker that they could trade in. Moreover, even if they owned a clunker, its value might have been above the scrappage bonus. Out of all cars purchased during the ROPA period, about 13% were purchased under the ROPA scheme.

The last set of registry-based variables we describe relate to the personal financial situation, which we use to capture the possibility that individuals face financial constraints. Table 3 reports the average household leverage ratio by IQ bins in Panel A and the share of aggregate income by IQ bins in Panel B. Panel A of Table 3 shows little variation in household leverage ratios by IQ. Low-IQ men display a ratio of 82%, which is slightly higher than the ratio for all other bins up to a normalized IQ of 7. High-IQ men have slightly higher leverage ratios (0.93). In Panel B, we see the share of

income that accrues to the individual bins. Later in our empirical analysis, we will often split the sample into low and high IQ, with the latter defined as having a normalized IQ of 6 or higher. Note this implies low-IQ men make up 49.2% of total income and are therefore a large share of aggregate income in the economy.

III Cognitive Abilities and the Reaction to Fiscal Policy

We start our analysis by studying individuals' reaction to a cash for clunkers program, which is a measure of traditional fiscal policy that incentivizes households' durable spending via intertemporal substitution (Mian and Sufi, 2012; Green et al., 2020). Cash for clunkers programs consist of a government subsidy provided to individuals who trade in their existing cars and purchase new cars. Governments typically impose conditions on the characteristics of car models that can be traded in and of those that can be purchased under the program, which vary across programs. The main aim of these measures is to stimulate aggregate demand in times of low economic growth by incentivizing households to move forward their durable spending. We add to these papers by using micro data from the universe of all cars in Finland and observing the identify of individuals that actually participated in the program. Moreover, our focus is not an evaluation of the program per se but to study possible heterogeneity in the take up by levels of cognitive abilities.

Although the effects of this program on economic incentives seem obvious, awareness of the program, understanding of its functioning, and the ability to navigate through the bureaucratic steps required to claim the bonus are likely to vary systematically by cognitive abilities, which motivates our analysis. For instance, in order to obtain the subsidy, Finns who were informed about the program through the media, car dealers, or other sources, needed to verify that the car was registered under the name of the person who asked for the subsidy; organize the scrapping procedure through a facility registered with the government; fill and issue a "Certificate of Destruction" form (please find a sample form in the Online Appendix) to multiple Finnish government offices; and obtain a statement issued by the party in charge of scrapping the vehicle, among other steps.

The program we study, ROPA, was announced by the government agency Traficom in December 2014 and ran until December 2015. ROPA was the first car scrappage scheme ever implemented in Finland. The program consisted of a EUR 1,500 subsidy for every car older than ten years registered in Finland at the time of the purchase with carbon-dioxide (CO₂) emissions above 120 grams per kilometer (clunker) that was traded in for the purchase of a new car with CO₂ emissions below the same threshold. Because of these eligibility criteria, not all new cars that were purchased during the ROPA period qualified for the program. At the end of the program, Traficom estimated that about 60% of the new car sales during the program period would have not happened absent the program.¹² The program was discussed in Finnish traditional and social media channels.

Because only consumers who owned an eligible clunker could participate in the program, in Figure 2 we consider the raw-data distribution of car ownership and clunker ownership as of December 2014. Two stylized facts emerge. First, car ownership is rather homogeneous across the distribution of IQ (Panel A): the ratio of men in each of the 9 IQ categories who owned a car at the onset of the program varied between 75% and 80% and we detect no obvious patterns. We then compute the average fraction of men in each IQ group who at the onset of the program owned a car that qualified as a clunker under the ROPA scheme (Panel B). Here, we detect a clear monotonic pattern by IQ: men in lower IQ groups were systematically more likely to own a qualifying clunker than higher-IQ men.

Cars qualified as clunkers based on their emission levels, which suggests that, despite owning cars at similar rates, lower-IQ men might have been more likely to own old and/or higher-emission cars because of taste, financial ability to purchase more advanced cars, or other reasons. This fact underscores the importance of observing and controlling for detailed information on individuals' income, debt, debt capacity, and other demographics in our multivariate analysis. It also compels us to propose an analysis of the take-up of the program among agents who purchased eligible cars and hence, whose taste for low emission cars is the same. Otherwise, one might worry that low-IQ men might dislike low emission cars and for this reason do not take part in the program.

¹²These figures and estimates are self-reported by the Traficom agency, which designed and oversaw the program. We do not have access to independent data to assess these figures.

At the same time, Panel B of Figure 2 suggests that the share of lower-IQ men who had the opportunity to take part in the program was higher than the corresponding share of high-IQ men. Absent a differential scope for financial constraints and income across the IQ distribution—which is what we document below—if anything we should observe a higher likelihood to participate in the program among low-IQ men than among high-IQ men. The raw data instead document the opposite pattern: when we limit the sample to men who purchased a car during the ROPA period in Panel C, and hence for whom financial constraints or income was not an issue hindering a car purchase, only about 10% of men in the lower-IQ bins purchased an eligible car and asked for the subsidy, whereas more than 40% of those with the highest IQ levels did so.

A. Program Take-up Among Eligible-Car Purchasers

The raw-data evidence in Figure 1 in the Introduction shows that, relative to the two-year period before the program announcement, the purchases of eligible cars by high-IQ men during the ROPA period increased about twice as much as the increase for low-IQ men. This difference in purchase propensities did not arise, instead, for non-eligible cars, which is direct evidence that differential economic shocks across IQ levels and hence different propensities to purchase cars over time do not explain the patterns for eligible-car. We also see in Panel B that a slight substitution from the purchase of non-eligible cars to eligible cars within the sample of men that owned clunkers occurred during this period.

Although relevant for motivational purposes, the raw-data evidence in Figure 1 might be explained by characteristics that correlate with cognitive abilities and predict a differential uptake of the program. For instance, low-IQ men might have a distaste for low-emission cars and for this reason do not purchase them despite the economic incentive provided by the subsidy. Or, characteristics that vary systematically with IQ, such as income and the binding of financial constraints, might explain these patterns. In the rest of this section, we propose a set of multivariate cross-sectional and panel-level analyses to corroborate our interpretation that cognitive abilities are a characteristic that helps explain heterogeneous program uptake in the population.

Our first analysis is purely cross-sectional and focuses on the subsample of Finnish

men who purchased an eligible car during the ROPA period. The aim of this test is to exclude that potential systematic differences in the demand for eligible cars across levels of IQ drive any results. For instance, if low-IQ men were more likely to not believe in climate change or were against environmentally-friendly policies, they might be less willing to purchase an eligible car irrespective of the ROPA program. This analysis dismisses this type of concern, because the sample of men who purchased an eligible car only includes individuals who have a taste for such a car. We estimate the following linear specification:

$$ROPA_i = \alpha + \beta High\ IQ_i \times Clunker_i + \zeta High\ IQ_i + \gamma Clunker_i + X_i' \delta + \eta_s + \epsilon_i, \quad (1)$$

where $ROPA_i$ is a dummy that equals 1 if eligible-car purchaser i participated in the ROPA scheme, that is, traded in a clunker and received the subsidy, and zero if he purchased an eligible car without participating in the scheme; $Clunker_i$ is a dummy that equals 1 if individual i owned a clunker in December 2014—just before the announcement of the ROPA scheme; $High\ IQ$ is a dummy that equals 1 for men who have a standardized value of IQ between 6 and 9, and zero otherwise. Pre-announcement demographic controls as of December 2014 (X_i) include age, age², marital status, the logarithm of annual income, employment status, number of children, urban versus rural residence, a college-degree dummy, and a dummy that equals 1 if the respondent lives in the capital region, Helsinki; η_s is a full set of district fixed effects. Districts are the finest administrative partitions in the EU classification (NUTS 3) and constitute 19 areas in Finland. They can be considered similar to US counties. For consistency with the subsequent analyses that include a time component, we cluster standard errors at the individual level, which in this cross-sectional specification is equivalent to estimating Huber-White standard errors.¹³

Columns (1) to (3) of Table 4 report the coefficient estimates. The raw data (column (1)) reveal that about 25% of those who purchased an eligible car during the ROPA period owned a clunker as of December 2014, but this share is 5.5 percentage-point (pp) higher, that is, more than 20% higher, for men at the top of the IQ distribution. This

¹³Table A.1 in the Online Appendix shows that statistical inference is similar when we cluster standard errors at the municipality level to allow for correlation in the residuals at the local level. In fact, standard error estimates are less conservative when clustering at the municipality level relative to the specification in the main text.

difference is sizable also because the unconditional likelihood of purchasing an eligible car using the ROPA scheme equals 23.68%. Note also that men at the top of the IQ distribution were slightly more likely (2.8 pp) to purchase an eligible car using the ROPA scheme even if they didn't own a clunker as of December 2014. This sample includes, for instance, individuals who acquired a car that qualified as a clunker after December 2014 and traded it in for an eligible new car by December 2015, which unfortunately we do not observe directly because we only have end-of-year snapshots of the car ownership data. When we add demographic controls (column (2)) and restrict the variation within districts (column (3)), the sizes and statistical significance of the coefficient estimates barely change.

A.1 Cognitive Abilities or Financial Constraints?

Taking advantage of the ROPA subsidy requires that agents have sufficient financial resources or debt capacity to finance the remainder of the cost of the new car. Financially-constrained agents might thus be unable to purchase a car even if interested in the program. If low-IQ men were more likely to be financially constrained or had lower debt capacity than high-IQ men, heterogeneous financial constraints could explain the patterns we have documented so far.

We dismiss a differential role of financial constraints by IQ in three ways. In this subsection, we study subsamples of Finnish men who are likely unconstrained, irrespective of their IQ; later, we also propose falsification tests that consider the purchase of non-eligible cars during the ROPA scheme period, for which financial constraints would bind, too; and, we study survey-based self-reported assessments of whether it is a good time for representative consumers to purchase a car during the ROPA period, irrespective of personally binding financial constraints and other shocks respondents face while answering the survey.

We start with subsample analysis based on financial constraints. In Table 5, we split the sample of eligible car purchasers during the ROPA period into groups that capture men who are unlikely to be financially constrained (Panel A) and those who are more likely to be constrained (Panel B).

We propose two proxies for binding financial constraints. First, we split the sample based on debt-to-income ratios at the end of 2019. The rationale for this proxy is that men who have a high debt-to-income ratio might find it harder to finance the purchase of a new car, even after factoring in the subsidy, whereas those who have a low debt-to-income ratio could obtain a car loan more easily. In principle, men with low debt-to-income ratios might be completely shut off lending markets and for this reason have no debt outstanding, for instance because their income is low. This is why we also consider income levels as a second proxy for binding financial constraints.

In columns (1) to (3) of each panel of Table 5, we estimate equation (1) separately for men whose debt-to-income ratio is below the median of the overall population (unconstrained) and those for whom the ratio is above the population median. Because the split is based on the overall population median, the two subsamples do not have the same size.

We find that virtually the whole baseline effect is driven by the subsample of high-IQ and low-IQ men who have the debt capacity to finance their car purchases (Panel A), whereas we detect no mediating role of cognitive abilities, either economically or statistically, among men who are likely to face financial constraints (Panel B). These results are barely consistent with the possibility that the higher take-up of the ROPA subsidy by high-IQ men is due to the fact that low-IQ men face financial constraints and high-IQ men do not.

We then move on to our second, less direct proxy for financial constraints—income. Intuitively, higher-income households might be less likely to face financial constraints, although this proxy misclassifies high-income households who have large amounts of debt outstanding and lower-income households without debt. Another caveat is that, by construction, car purchasers are more represented among higher-income consumers than lower income ones. By splitting the sample above and below the median by income in the population, the subsample of below-median consumers who purchase a car will be smaller than its above-median counterpart.

Despite these caveats, columns (4) to (6) of Table 5 provide results that are consistent with our interpretation: the difference in the likelihood that high-IQ and low-IQ men who

purchase an eligible car use the ROPA subsidy is larger in the subsample of unconstrained high- and low-IQ men (Panel A). The difference is instead statistically insignificant (but nonnegligible in size) when we compare high-IQ and low-IQ men who are below the population median by income (Panel B).

B. Intertemporal Substitution of Eligible-Car Purchases Around Program Implementation

The second multivariate analysis we propose aims to assess if cognitive abilities are relevant for the theoretical transmission mechanism of a fiscal policy program such as cash for clunkers, that is, intertemporal substitution of durable spending (Mian and Sufi (2012)). Under this mechanism, we should observe a substantial increase in households' spending on subsidized goods while the program is implemented.

Note that we do not have a clear prediction about the level of spending on eligible cars *after* the end of the program. On the one hand, car purchases might drop after the program, because agents who would have bought a car after the program period anticipated their purchase. By contrast, if the program was successful, the income of some agents in the economy, such as workers in the car sector, would have increased during the program period. These individuals might have been unable to purchase a car during the program, but might do so after the program due to this positive income shock. Moreover, the program might make all households aware of properties of eligible cars, such as the efficiency of low-emission cars, and hence might increase households' relative demand for such cars irrespective of whether the subsidy was discontinued. These arguments are consistent with what we observe in Figure 1 in the Introduction, in which the level of purchases of low-emission cars dropped after the end of the program but stayed higher than before the program was announced for both high- and low-IQ consumers.

For the multivariate analysis, we consider an individual-month panel that includes all consumers in our sample rather than only those who purchased eligible cars. The sample period for the monthly panel is from July 2014 to January 2016. We estimate

OLS specifications of the following form:

$$\begin{aligned}
\textit{Eligible Car}_{i,t} = & \alpha + \beta_1 \textit{High IQ}_i \times \textit{Clunker}_{i,t-1} \times \textit{ROPA}_t + \beta_2 \textit{High IQ}_i \times \textit{Clunker}_{i,t-1} \\
& + \beta_3 \textit{High IQ}_i \times \textit{ROPA}_t + \beta_4 \textit{Clunker}_{i,t-1} \times \textit{ROPA}_t + \zeta \textit{High IQ}_i \\
& + \gamma \textit{Clunker}_{i,t-1} + \nu \textit{ROPA}_t + X'_{i,t} \delta + \eta_t + \eta_s + \eta_i + \epsilon_{i,t},
\end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

where $\textit{Eligible Car}_{i,t}$ is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if individual i purchased an eligible car in month t ; \textit{ROPA}_t is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 during the ROPA period (July 2015 to January 2016) and zero before the ROPA program was announced (i.e., July 2014 to January 2015); η_t is a full set of year-month fixed effects; η_s is a full set of district fixed effects; η_i is a full set of individual fixed effects. We cluster standard errors at the individual level.

Table 6 reports the results. As expected, the unconditional likelihood that any individual purchases an eligible car in any month within and outside the program period is low. For example, the average monthly likelihood of purchasing an eligible car outside of the ROPA period is only 0.32%. This low likelihood is consistent with the fact that households typically purchase a new car only once every few years.

Several coefficients are of interest to our analysis. First, across the distribution by cognitive abilities, those who own a clunker are less likely to purchase a new eligible car outside the ROPA period. If anything, high-IQ men are less likely to purchase eligible cars outside the ROPA period if they already own a clunker, as we can see by comparing the estimated coefficients attached to the variables $\textit{Clunker}$ and $\textit{High IQ} \times \textit{Clunker}$. High-IQ men who own clunkers are thus not more likely to purchase eligible cars than other men in normal times, *ceteris paribus*.

Moreover, Table 6 shows that high-IQ individuals are more likely to participate in the ROPA program if they own a clunker—a result that aligns with the cross-sectional evidence in the previous section. In column (1), for instance, agents below the top of the IQ distribution who owned a clunker before ROPA are about 50% more likely to purchase an eligible car during the ROPA period relative to other times ($\textit{Clunker} \times \textit{ROPA}$), but the size of this effect more than doubles for high-IQ men (sum of $\textit{High IQ} \times \textit{Clunker} \times \textit{ROPA}$

and $Clunker \times ROPA$). The difference in the reactions by the two groups are similar once we absorb individual-level observables: High-IQ men who own a clunker are almost twice as likely to purchase eligible cars during the ROPA period than other clunker owners (columns (2)-(3)).

Finally, column (4) only exploits within-individual variation over time by adding a full set of individual fixed effects, which we can do in this sample that includes several monthly observations for the same individual over time. This specification dismisses a potential role for time-invariant unobserved determinants of the timing of eligible-car purchases. And, again, we find that high-IQ men are more likely than others to purchase eligible cars during the ROPA period if they own a clunker relative to when the program is not active.

Even in this time-series analysis, one might worry about financial constraints binding differently across the IQ distribution. We therefore assess the results separately for individuals who are likely to be financially constrained and other individuals. In the Online Appendix, we find that men who are below the median of the population in terms of debt-to-income ratios (Table A.2) and those above the median based on income (Table A.3) drive the intertemporal substitution results. Men who are likely to be financially constrained display no differential likelihood of substituting purchases intertemporally based on IQ (see Tables A.4 and A.5 of the Online Appendix).

C. Falsification Test

The ROPA program allows us to design a natural falsification test: We can assess if individuals across the IQ distribution were also differentially likely to purchase non-eligible new cars during the ROPA period, which would suggest that unobserved shocks that affected men across the IQ distribution differently could explain our results.

The right panel of Figure 1 in the Introduction performs this falsification test in the raw data. In Table A.6 of the Online Appendix, we implement the test in a multivariate setting. We estimate the same specifications as in Table 6, but replace the outcome variable with a dummy that equals 1 if the individual purchased a non-eligible car. We find no differential likelihood of purchasing new non-eligible cars during the ROPA period

across the IQ distribution, which corroborates the results in Figure 1.

D. Is a Demand Channel Plausible? Evidence from Purchasing Plans

The results so far suggest that high-IQ men are more likely to take part in the cash for clunkers program—they are more likely to pull forward their purchase of new eligible cars when a monetary incentive is available and they qualify for it. Our results rule out a role for differential financial constraints and potential unobserved shocks that would make high-IQ men purchase more cars of all types during the ROPA period.

The possibility that high-IQ men are more aware of the program and/or understand better its functioning and the bureaucratic steps needed to obtain the subsidy appears a plausible remaining explanations for our results, but the observational data do not allow a direct test of this channel. We thus move on to analyze our survey-based data in which respondents were asked directly about the incentives to purchase cars and other vehicles.

In each month, we observe, for a representative cross section of Finns, whether they think it is a good or bad time “for people” to purchase cars (see question text in section II.D.). The framing of this question aims to capture respondents’ assessments based on the general economic situation for a representative Finnish household rather than based on their own personal economic and financial outlook.

We compare this assessment about the timing of purchasing cars after the program was announced relative to before and across the IQ distribution by estimating the following specification:

$$\begin{aligned} \textit{Good Time to Purchase Car}_{i,t} = & \alpha + \beta \textit{High IQ}_{i,t} \times \textit{ROPA}_t \\ & + \zeta \textit{High IQ}_{i,t} + \gamma \textit{ROPA}_t + X'_{i,t} \delta + \eta_t + \epsilon_{i,t}, \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

where *Good Time to Purchase Car*_{*i,t*} is a dummy that equals 1 if respondent *i* in month *t* says it is a very good or good time to purchase a car, and zero otherwise; *ROPA*_{*t*} is a dummy that equals 1 in the months after Traficom announced the cash for clunkers program, and zero in the months before the announcement; η_t is a full set of month

fixed effects; and all other variables are defined as above, including the controls. If our hypothesis is true, we should observe that after the announcement of the ROPA program high-IQ men are more likely to state it is a good time to purchase cars relative to other men.¹⁴

This setting also allows natural falsification tests, because the survey asks respondents not only about the timing of purchasing cars but also about the timing of purchasing non-car vehicles as well as other durable goods, such as electronic items and furniture. None of these alternative durables were subsidized under any program. We can therefore dismiss directly that high-IQ men's assessment of whether it is a good timing to purchase cars is driven by systematic differences in beliefs about current and future macroeconomic conditions across the IQ distribution.

Table 7 reports the results for estimating equation (3). Columns (1)-(4) consider respondents' assessment of purchasing a car over the 6 months and the 12 months subsequent to the survey month. High-IQ men are about 4 to 5 percentage points more likely than low-IQ men to think it is a good time to purchase cars after the announcement of the ROPA program relative to before. This effect amounts to between 22% and 27% of the average assessment that it is a good time to purchase cars in the sample (18%). And, the estimated effect is similar if we absorb the set of demographic characteristics and other economic expectations we observe.

In Table 7, we also report the results for the survey falsification tests. In columns (5)-(6), we consider the same respondents' assessment about purchasing non-car vehicles. Consistent with our interpretation of the baseline result, we fail to detect any differences in the stated beliefs about purchasing non-car vehicles after the ROPA program was announced relative to before by IQ. The estimated coefficients are not only statistically but also economically insignificant. Similarly, in columns (7)-(8), we do not detect any differential assessment for the purchase of other durable goods.

Overall, the results in Table 7 provide more direct evidence that high-IQ men react more than others to a measure of fiscal policy such as a cash for clunkers program because this measure changes their beliefs about the optimal timing of purchasing

¹⁴We only have access to the survey data until March 2015. Results are virtually identical when we restrict the pre-announcement period to the one or two years before the announcement.

cars. Consistently, in the observational data, high-IQ men who can participate in the program—they have a clunker and are interested in purchasing an eligible car—do so more often than other men who could similarly participate if they wanted.

IV Cognitive Abilities and the Reaction to Monetary Policy

We move on to assess how individuals with different levels of cognitive abilities react to monetary policy interventions. The most common measure of conventional monetary policy is the management of short-term interest rates in an attempt to stabilize households' consumption and durable-good spending: Central banks often lower nominal interest rates during crises to stimulate consumption through loans. Instead, they increase nominal interest rates in times of sustained growth and inflationary pressure to avoid overheating by reducing households' incentives to take out credit.

In this section, we study individuals' propensity to take out loans as well as actual debt choices around (endogenous) changes in nominal interest rates. Above and beyond financial constraints, which we discuss below, agents below the top of the distribution by cognitive abilities might be less aware of the policy-rate changes and/or might be less likely to understand the implications of these changes for their own economic incentives.

Our setting allows us to bring this conjecture to the data. The time period our survey data cover includes two substantial (endogenous) decreases and increases in short-term nominal interest rates before the 2008-2009 financial crisis. The red dashed lines in Figure 3 depict the ECB beginning-of-quarter deposit facility rates over time.¹⁵ On May 31, 2001, the ECB lowered its deposit facility rate from 3.75% to 3.50% (right y-axis) and continued lowering the rate until it reached a trough of 1.00% on June 30, 2003. Recessionary pressure in France and Germany mainly drove these cuts. In times of lower interest rates, financing conditions become more favorable and individuals have an incentive to borrow

¹⁵Other short-term policy rates such as the rate on the main refinancing operations move in parallel to the deposit facility rate. We do not extend the analysis beyond the start of the Global Financial Crisis and the Great Recession, because policy rates dropped dramatically and stayed unchanged and close to zero throughout the rest of our sample period.

more, *ceteris paribus*. In our setting, we can control directly for individual expectations regarding future income and employment status, which absorbs the effects of potentially concurrent recessionary pressures that motivated the ECB to cut rates on households' willingness to borrow. The ECB kept the deposit facility rate stable from June 30, 2003, until June 30, 2005, when it started to tighten monetary policy and increase rates until the end of 2006.

To assess agents' reactions to such changes in policy rates across the IQ distribution, we first focus on survey-based beliefs about the optimal time to borrow, for which respondents have to answer in terms of what average Finnish households should do rather than about their own personal financial outlook or binding financial constraints. We then move on to analyze the actual changes in household debt around changes in policy rates using registry data.

A. Cognitive Abilities and Borrowing Plans Around Interest-rate Changes

Starting with the raw data, Panel A and Panel B of Figure 3 compare the average sensitivity of beliefs about the optimal timing to take out loans (*propensity* to take out loans) over time for high-IQ men and other men (solid blue lines) against the ECB policy rate (dashed red lines). For this propensity, respondents can pick a number between 1 and 4, where 4 means they think it is a very good time to borrow and 1 means they think it is a really bad time to borrow. The propensity to take out loans is the average of these four values. A number closer to 4 means that, on average, respondents are more likely to think that it is a good time to borrow.

During the period 2001-2003, while the ECB gradually reduced short-term rates, high-IQ men increased their propensity to take out loans, with a peak at 3.1 exactly when the deposit facility rate reached its lowest point for the 6-year period we consider. During the same period, low-IQ men's propensity to borrow also increased but more moderately. Ultimately, the increase in high-IQ men's propensity to borrow (0.6) in the raw data was 100% higher than the increase of low-IQ men's propensity to borrow over

the same period (0.3).

We detect this higher sensitivity of high-IQ men’s borrowing propensity also when policy rates move in the opposite direction: High-IQ men reduce their propensity to borrow from 3.1 at the end of June 2005 to 2.6 in the third quarter of 2006. By contrast, low-IQ men do not change their propensity to borrow over the same period, despite the concurrent and steady increase in interest rates.

Although interesting, the raw-data variation might mask systematic heterogeneity by cognitive abilities that in turn could explain the differential evolution of propensities by IQ. For instance, low-IQ men might be more affected by the positive economic shock that led the ECB to increase policy rates throughout 2006 and for this reason might have had a higher propensity to borrow over that period.¹⁶

To assess the relevance of these endogeneity concerns, we perform the analysis in a multivariate setting by estimating specifications of the following type:¹⁷

$$Loan_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta High\ IQ_{i,t} \times \Delta Rate_t + \zeta High\ IQ_{i,t} + \gamma \Delta Rate_{i,t} + X'_{i,t} \delta + \eta_t + \epsilon_{i,t}, \quad (4)$$

where $Loan_{i,t}$ is a dummy variable that equals 1 if respondent i in month t said it was a good or very good time to take out a loan, and zero otherwise; $High\ IQ_{i,t}$ is a dummy that equals 1 when the standardized IQ score of individual i is 6 or above; $\Delta Rate_{i,t}$ is the annual change in the marginal facility lending rate set by the ECB in the twelve months before respondent i was interviewed; and X is the same vector of individual characteristics we used in the car-purchase analysis.

Note that we use the annual rate change before the survey date because we do not observe survey respondents more than once and hence we cannot study the effect of changes in rates on contemporaneous changes in the propensity to take out loans using individual fixed effects.

Table 8 reports the results for estimating equation (4) for the period from January

¹⁶This alternative explanation also requires that low-IQ men do not follow the survey instructions and answer the question based on their own personal outlook rather than based on what an average Finnish household should do.

¹⁷We report estimates of a linear probability model (OLS), but marginal effects from using non-linear probit and logit models, available upon request, are economically and statistically very similar.

2001 to March 2015. We consider the full time period we have available rather than the limited time period in the motivational evidence of Figure 3, but our estimated effects are larger if we end the sample before the start of the 2008-2009 Financial Crisis. In column (1), we find that high-IQ men are 5.3% more likely to state it is a good or very good time to take out loans relative to other men unconditionally. Note also that low-IQ men, on average, think that times of rate increases are times in which it is a better time to take out loans, likely indicating the endogenous nature of these monetary policy tightenings in good times. At the same time, though, high-IQ men are 2.6% less likely to state it is a good time to borrow for a one-percentage-point increase in policy rates, relative to low-IQ men. Results are similar if we control for demographic and local characteristics in column (2), if we add year-month fixed effects to control for aggregate shocks in column (3), and if we also absorb individual level expectations regarding the aggregate Finnish economy and personal economic outlooks in column (4).

Overall, high-IQ men appear to recognize more than low-IQ men that higher interest rates reduce the convenience of borrowing above and beyond business-cycle considerations.

B. Cognitive Abilities and Borrowed Amounts

Despite different survey answers, both high- and low-IQ men might adjust their *actual* borrowing choices in similar ways around changes in interest rates. For instance, financial advisers or peers might contact prospective borrowers and suggest that they adjust their debt exposure based on the dynamics of interest rates. Even individuals that did not understand monetary policy or were unaware of its interventions might thus change their actual debt choices in line with policy.

To assess this possibility, we consider actual leverage choices based on registry data. For any debtholder in Finland, we observe the amount of total debt outstanding at the end of the fiscal year. Contrary to the survey data, the registry data is a panel—we observe end-of-year debt outstanding for the same individual over time. This feature allows us to estimate the relationship between IQ and the sensitivity to interest rates while absorbing time-invariant characteristics across individuals, which we cannot do in the survey sample.

Building on the panel nature of the registry sample, we estimate the following pooled

OLS specification:

$$\begin{aligned}
 Debt\ Outcome_{i,t} = & \alpha + \beta High\ IQ_i \times Rate_t + \zeta High\ IQ_i \\
 & + \gamma Rate_t + X'_{i,t} \delta + \eta_t + \eta_i + \epsilon_{i,t},
 \end{aligned} \tag{5}$$

where $Debt\ Outcome_{i,t}$ is, based on the specification, either the end-of-year total debt balance of individual i in year t , a dummy that equals 1 if the individual took out a new loan in year t , or a dummy that equals 1 if the individual paid back in full at least one existing loan in year t ; $Rate_t$ is the average level of the marginal lending facility rate set by the ECB in year t ; η_i is a full set of individual fixed effects; and all other variables are defined as above.

For the case of actual debt values, because we observe the same individual at different points in time, we can estimate the relationship between changes in interest rates and contemporaneous changes in debt outcomes by adding individual fixed effects to our empirical specification in levels.

In columns (1)-(3) of Table 9, the outcome variable is the level of debt outstanding for individual i at the end of year t . In column (1), the coefficient attached to $Rate_t$ shows that low-IQ men have lower debt outstanding in the years in which the average marginal lending rate is higher. This negative association, though, is stronger for high-IQ men, who on average have $1,168/4,496 = 26\%$ lower debt outstanding when the marginal lending rate is higher by 100 basis points.

Columns (2)-(3) of Table 9 repeat the analysis when absorbing the effect of common business-cycle shocks (year fixed effects) as well as time-invariant systematic differences across individuals (individual fixed effects). Even in the last specification, we detect a substantially larger drop in the debt balances of those at the top of the IQ distribution—\$615 Euros for each 100 basis-point increase in policy rates.

In addition to debt levels, which capture the intensive margin of households' debt adjustment, we consider the extensive margin of adjustment by constructing two dummy variables for whether individuals in our sample took out a new loan during year t or paid back in full any existing loans during the same period. We report the linear probability

model estimates when these dummies are the outcome variable in columns (4)-(9) of Table 9.

Even at the extensive margin, we find that high-IQ men react more than others to changes in policy rates. They are about 22% less likely to take out a new loan for a 100-basis point increase in the marginal lending rate (0.008/0.035, column (4)). At the same time, high-IQ men are 26% more likely to pay down at least one existing loan in full relative to low-IQ men (0.009/0.034, column (7)). The size of the estimates is stable if we restrict the variation within years and within individuals.

C. Cognitive Abilities or Different Pass-Through of Rate Changes by IQ?

The results on the differential sensitivity to policy rate changes by IQ might in fact be explained by the possibility that rate changes are passed through differentially to the borrowing rates of high- and low-IQ borrowers. For example, banks might systematically change interest rates differently for low-IQ men relative to high-IQ men because of different credit risk across the two groups.

We can assess this possibility directly, because we observe the annual total interest individuals pay on their debt from the tax registry data. We can thus compute individual-level average interest rates by dividing the yearly interest paid by each individual in the registry data by the average of their beginning- and end-of-year debt balances.

Figure 4 plots these average interest rates for different types of debt by IQ. Panel A only considers outstanding mortgage debt, Panel B focuses on student loans, and Panel C considers the overall amount of debt outstanding and overall amount of financial interest paid, irrespective of the type of debt.

Across all types of debt, average interest rates in the raw data are quite similar across the IQ distribution. The rates are almost identical for student loans. For mortgages and total debt, we find a slightly lower average rate for high-IQ men, but the differences are small at each point in time. Crucially, beyond the levels, we do not detect any differential changes in the pricing of loans by IQ as policy rates change, which is direct evidence

against the concern of a differential pass through of policy rates by IQ.

V Implications for Macroeconomic Models

We complete this inquiry by discussing the implications of our empirical evidence for macroeconomic theory. Because our results point to substantial heterogeneity across agents, we focus on the classes of models that allow for heterogeneous agents and deviations from the full information rational expectations (FIRE) paradigm, which have recently taken center stage in macroeconomics (Kaplan et al., 2018).

A. Sticky and Noisy Information Models

Over the last 20 years, theorists have proposed a set of deviations from the standard New Keynesian model to account for the delayed peak response of inflation to monetary shocks. On the one hand, Mankiw and Reis (2002) show that a model with slow diffusion of information through the economy produces this feature (*sticky-information model*). They rationalize the slow diffusion of information with the costs of gathering information and reoptimizing choices. On the other hand, Woodford (2003) takes the route of relaxing the assumption of common knowledge and allows decision makers to have limited capacity to pay attention to all available information (Sims (2003)). Agents thus perceive the current aggregate state at each point in time but with an error (*noisy information model*).¹⁸

Empirical evidence supports the implications and predictions of models incorporating information rigidities. For instance, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012, 2015) provide empirical evidence in support of the role of information rigidities using data from professional forecasters. Bordalo et al. (2020) focus on macroeconomic forecasts for individual forecasters and document pervasive overreaction to news. Also, Carroll (2003) develops an epidemiological model of expectations formation in which households gather their information about the macroeconomy from news media but do not pay attention to macro news constantly. He tests the model empirically on the Michigan Survey of

¹⁸Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2009) build on the noisy information model and allow firms to decide to which information they pay attention subject to a cognitive constraint.

Consumers and shows that agents update information about inflation and unemployment about once a year.

The results in our paper have relevant implications for the microfoundation of these models with information-rigidities. Our finding that agents below the top of the distribution by IQ seem either unaware of fiscal or monetary policy announcements or unable to map this information into optimal decision-making suggests that cognitive abilities might be a microfoundation for the costs of gathering information and reoptimizing choices in sticky-information models. Similarly, cognitive abilities can microfound the heterogeneity in the capacity to pay attention to all available information by consumers and firms in noisy information models. So far, these models do not allow for heterogeneity across agents but our findings suggest an important role for such heterogeneity and motivate theoretical advances in this direction. Specifically, our results inform advances on the development of heterogeneous information rigidity models in which agent heterogeneity can be microfounded through differences in cognitive abilities.

B. Models with Bounded Rationality

Another strand of macroeconomic theory has emerged recently in response to the “forward guidance puzzle”—the fact that promises about future interest rates during a liquidity trap appear to have a small impact on agents’ expectations, which goes against the prediction of the standard New Keynesian model (e.g., see Giannoni et al. (2015)).

To explain this puzzle, Woodford (2019) questions that agents can form fully state-contingent intertemporal plans ad infinitum. He assumes that agents do not choose the optimal plan based on backward induction but rather start from the current situation and plan forward for a finite number of steps. Gabaix (2020), instead, models an agent that displays partial myopia towards distant and atypical events resulting in *cognitive discounting*, which also solves the forward-guidance puzzle. Farhi and Werning (2019) introduce bounded rationality in the form of level-k thinking and market incompleteness with occasionally binding financial constraints, whereas Angeletos and Lian (2018) relax the assumption that agents have common knowledge about future policies and fundamentals as well as about others’ reaction to such policies.

Our empirical results have fewer implications for this class of models for at least two reasons. First, in terms of monetary policy, we study agents' reaction to conventional changes in policy rates outside of a liquidity trap, which does not map into the liquidity-trap setting and forward guidance puzzle these models aim to explain. Second, we provide evidence of heterogeneity in the reaction to a simple subsidy program for the purchase of durable goods, which does not require agents to solve a problem with infinite planning horizons. Instead, in the models discussed above, despite different assumptions regarding the form of bounded rationality, agents' limited planning horizons play a crucial role.

In contrast to the models discussed above, Laibson et al. (2020) have implications for the aggregate demand effects of fiscal transfers. They introduce present bias and naivete (Laibson (1997)) in a model with liquid and illiquid assets. The authors show that present bias increases the aggregate demand effects of fiscal stimulus payments. In their model, interest rate cuts can also increase the cash-out refinancing of mortgages if the agent does not procrastinate in her refinancing choices. Our results might have implications in terms of the microfoundation of agent heterogeneity in procrastination in an heterogeneous-agent model inspired by Laibson et al. (2020), although the relationship between cognitive abilities and procrastination should have a different sign than that between cognitive abilities and present bias, given that we find that agents with higher cognitive abilities are more likely to react to policy changes and at the same time, conditional on reacting, they react by more.

C. Models with Consumption Commitments

Another set of models that predict a muted effect of fiscal policies on agents' choices is based on consumption commitments and previously-optimized consumption plans (e.g., see Grossman and Laroque (1990) and Chetty and Szeidl (2007)).

The decisions to purchase and consume certain types of goods, and especially large durable goods, might require agents to think and plan ahead for several periods. The cognitive costs of making and adjusting these consumption plans as incentives change might be larger for low- than for high-IQ agents.

Our results thus call for extensions of consumption-commitments models from

representative- to heterogeneous-agent models, in which agents differ based on the cognitive costs they face to update and reoptimize their consumption plans.

Ultimately, we see our empirical results as a motivation for the advancement of heterogeneous-agent macroeconomic models that feature a role for the costs of gathering and processing economic information and/or reoptimizing consumption plans and procrastination in explaining consumers' consumption, saving, and borrowing choices. Our results point towards heterogeneous cognitive abilities as a potentially relevant source of heterogeneity in the extent of such costs across consumers.

VI Conclusion

We argue that heterogeneous cognitive abilities represent *human frictions* to the transmission of various forms of economic policy—high-IQ individuals react more in line with policy makers' predictions when measures of fiscal policy and monetary policy are implemented relative to other individuals.

Specifically, after absorbing a rich set of determinants of economic decision-making such as income, formal education levels, economic expectations, financial constraints, and other demographics, high-IQ individuals are more likely to pull forward their durable spending in response to changing economic incentives due to government subsidies. Moreover, high-IQ individuals are twice as responsive as others to interest-rate changes when forming borrowing plans and in actual debt choices.

Human frictions might limit central banks' and government's ability to stabilize household demand both in recessions and expansions, a possibility that our results suggest and future research should investigate further both theoretically and empirically.

Moreover, our results suggest that, due to human frictions, economic policies might result in unintended redistributive effects from low-IQ agents to high-IQ agents, because high-IQ agents take more advantage of the subsidies and incentives policy measures create. This redistribution could be interpreted as a form of undue discrimination of low-IQ individuals on the part of policymakers to the extent that cognitive abilities are a characteristic individuals can barely manipulate. Future empirical and theoretical

research should delve into the unintended redistributive effects of economic policies based on individuals' cognitive abilities.

Future research should also study which types of communication tools policymakers could use to reduce the effects of human frictions by reaching out to all households rather than just those with higher cognitive abilities (see D'Acunto et al. (2021, 2020); Coibion et al. (2021)). To this aim, the use of robo-advising FinTech tools for saving, consumption, and borrowing choices, which are salient and can reach economic agents in their daily lives through electronic devices (D'Acunto and Rossi (2021)), might represent a fruitful channel of transmission of policy communication.

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
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
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Figure 2: **Clunker Ownership and ROPA Purchase by IQ**


Panel A. Ownership of Car in December 2014 by IQ



Panel B. Ownership of Clunker in December 2014 by IQ




Panel C. Purchase under ROPA Scheme by IQ




Panel A plots the propensity to own any car in December 2014 by IQ. Panel B plots the propensity to own a clunker in December 2014 by IQ. Panel C plots the propensity to purchase an eligible car under the ROPA scheme conditional on purchasing any car during the ROPA period by IQ. We use the universe of car registrations in Finland to calculate these statistics and the actual participation in the ROPA scheme from the Finnish car agency. IQ is the standardized test score from the Finnish Defence Forces. IQ obtains integer values between 1 and 9.

Figure 3: ECB Deposit Facility Rate and Propensity to Borrow by IQ

Panel A. Borrowing: High-IQ Men




Panel B. Borrowing: Low-IQ




Panel A and Panel B of this figure plot the cross-sectional mean of whether individuals think it is a good time to take out a loan in Finland (solid blue line) for high-IQ and low-IQ men against the beginning-of-quarter ECB Deposit Facility Rate from quarter 1 2001 to quarter 4 of 2006 (red dashed line). Individuals can answer that now is a “very good time for people to borrow” (4), a “pretty good time for people to borrow” (3), a “pretty bad time for people to borrow” (2), or a “really bad time for people to borrow” (1) to the question, “If you think about the general economic situation in Finland, then do you think that at this time it is ...” High-IQ men are all men for whom normalized IQ is larger than 5. We measure normalized IQ using data from the official military entrance exam in Finland. IQ is the standardized test score from the military entrance exam test for all men in Finland. IQ obtains integer values between 1 and 9 with 9 being the highest score. We use the confidential micro data underlying the official European Commission consumer confidence survey to measure the propensity to take out a loan. The sample period is January 2001 to December 2006.

Figure 4: Average Interest Rates by Type of Debt: High-IQ and Low-IQ Borrowers

Panel A. Average Yearly Interest Rate on Outstanding Mortgages



Panel B. Average Yearly Interest Rate on Student Loans



Panel C. Average Yearly Interest Rate on Overall Debt Outstanding



This Figure plots the average yearly interest rate on overall outstanding debt across three types of debt, separately for high-IQ borrowers (solid blue line) and low-IQ borrowers (dashed red line). Panel A considers mortgage debt, Panel B considers student loans, and Panel C considers the overall amount of debt outstanding, irrespective of type. High-IQ men are all men for whom normalized IQ is larger than 5. We measure normalized IQ using data from the official military entrance exam in Finland. IQ is the standardized test score from the military entrance exam test for all men in Finland. IQ obtains integer values between 1 and 9 with 9 being the highest score.⁴⁰ The interest and debt balance data are from Statistics Finland, which is available from December 2002 to December 2017.

Table 1: **Descriptive Statistics: Survey Sample**

This table reports descriptive statistics for the variables we use in the paper. We use the confidential micro data underlying the official European Commission consumer confidence survey to construct these variables. High IQ equals 1 if normalized IQ is larger than 5. We measure normalized IQ using data from the official military entrance exam in Finland. IQ is the standardized test score from the military entrance exam test for all men in Finland. IQ obtains integer values between 1 and 9 with 9 being the highest score. The sample period is January 2001 to March 2015.

Statistic	Inflation Perception	Inflation Expectation	Total Debt	High IQ	Age	Income
Nobs	27,544	27,566	27,828	27,856	27,856	27,856
Mean	3.00	2.47	38,510	0.50	31	22,516
Std	4.63	3.76	53,734	0.50	7	14,247
p1	-5.00	-5.00	0	0	19	900
p10	0.00	0.00	0	0	21	6,800
p25	0.00	0.00	0	0	25	13,100
p50	2.00	2.00	14,400	0	30	21,000
p75	5.00	3.50	62,200	1	36	28,850
p90	7.00	5.00	102,200	1	40	38,200
p99	20.00	15.00	242,400	1	46	74,200
Single	no yes	38.75% 61.25%	Urban		no yes	64.59% 35.41%
Unemployed	no yes	94.11% 5.89%	Helsinki		no yes	72.28% 27.72%
Kids	no yes	22.43% 77.57%	College		no yes	66.06% 33.94%
Durables	Good time Neutral Bad time	50.84% 28.69% 20.47%	Loan		Good time Bad time	70.71% 29.29%

Table 2: **Descriptive Statistics: Cash for Clunkers (ROPA) Sample**

This table reports descriptive statistics for the variables in the ROPA analysis. Clunker is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if individual i owned a clunker in December 2014 before the announcement of the ROPA scheme. We measure normalized IQ using data from the official military entrance exam in Finland. IQ is the standardized test score from the military entrance exam test for all men in Finland. IQ obtains integer values between 1 and 9 with 9 being the highest score. High IQ $_i$ equals 1 if normalized IQ is larger than 5. The car purchase and ownership data come from the official Finnish car registry data discussed in Section II. The sample period is July 2015 to January 2016.

	Car Purchaser	ROPA $_i=1$	ROPA $_i=0$	Δ
High IQ	0.76	0.80	0.76	0.05***
Clunker	0.26	0.55	0.22	0.34***
Eligible Car	0.53	1.00	0.46	0.54***
Age	43.40	42.02	43.60	-1.59***
Income	57,509	51,565	58,378	-6,813***
Debt	92,118	83,596	93,384	-9,787***
Single	0.73	0.70	0.74	-0.04**
Unemployed	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.00
Kids	0.73	0.73	0.73	0.00
Urban	0.90	0.89	0.90	-0.01
Helsinki	0.40	0.37	0.40	-0.03*
College	0.40	0.39	0.41	-0.01
Observations	11,934	1,522	10,412	11,934

Table 3: IQ, Income, and Total Debt

This table reports the household leverage ratio by bins of IQ in Panel A and the share of income in total income in Panel B. IQ is the standardized test score from the military entrance exam test for all men in Finland. IQ obtains integer values between 1 and 9 with 9 being the highest score. Income and debt data come from the registry of Statistics Finland. The sample period is January 2001 to March 2015.

IQ	1 (Lowest)	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9 (Highest)
Panel A. Total Debt / Taxable Income by IQ									
	0.82	0.77	0.76	0.75	0.78	0.80	0.81	0.87	0.93
Panel B. Income Share by IQ									
	1.86%	4.52%	6.28%	15.38%	21.16%	17.79%	16.11%	8.83%	8.07%

Table 4: **Cognitive Abilities and Car Purchases under Cash-for-Clunkers Program**

This table reports the coefficient estimates from the following OLS regression:

$$ROPA_i = \alpha + \beta High\ IQ_i \times Clunker_i + \zeta High\ IQ_i + \gamma Clunker_i + X_i' \delta + \eta_s + \epsilon_i,$$

where $ROPA_i$ is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if individual i purchased an eligible car through the ROPA scheme, and zero if he purchased an eligible car outside the ROPA scheme when the scheme was available. $High\ IQ_i$ equals 1 if normalized IQ is larger than 5. We measure normalized IQ using data from the official military entrance exam in Finland. IQ is the standardized test score from the military entrance exam test for all men in Finland. IQ obtains integer values between 1 and 9 with 9 being the highest score. $Clunker_i$ is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if individual i owned a clunker in December 2014, i.e. just before the announcement of the ROPA scheme. Demographic controls measured as of December 2014 (X_i) include age, age², marital status, log of income, employment status, number of children, urban versus rural residence, college dummy, and a dummy that equals 1 if the respondent lives in the capital region, Helsinki; η_s is a full set of district fixed effects. We cluster standard errors at the individual level. The car purchase and ownership data come from the official Finnish car registry data discussed in Section II. The sample period is July 2015 to January 2016.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
High IQ × Clunker	5.53** (2.58)	6.12** (2.59)	5.91** (2.59)
High IQ	2.88*** (1.11)	4.46*** (1.18)	4.45*** (1.18)
Clunker	24.65*** (2.22)	23.50*** (2.24)	23.78*** (2.24)
Constant	12.59*** (0.95)	96.68*** (14.29)	95.70*** (14.29)
Nobs	7,588	7,534	7,534
Controls		X	X
District FE			X
R2	0.101	0.109	0.114

Table 5: **Cognitive Abilities and Car Purchases under Cash-for-Clunkers Program: Constrained vs. Unconstrained Agents**

This table reports the coefficient estimates from the following OLS regression:

$$ROPA_i = \alpha + \beta High\ IQ_i \times Clunker_i + \zeta High\ IQ_i + \gamma Clunker_i + X_i' \delta + \eta_s + \epsilon_i,$$

where $ROPA_i$ is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if individual i purchased an eligible car through the ROPA scheme, and zero if he purchased an eligible car outside the scheme when the scheme was active. $High\ IQ_i$ equals 1 if normalized IQ is larger than 5. We measure normalized IQ using data from the official military entrance exam in Finland. IQ is the standardized test score from the military entrance exam test for all men in Finland. IQ obtains integer values between 1 and 9 with 9 being the highest score. $Clunker_i$ is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if individual i owned a clunker in December 2014, i.e. just before the announcement of the ROPA scheme. Demographic controls measured as of December 2014 (X_i) include age, age², marital status, log of income, employment status, number of children, urban versus rural residence, college dummy, and a dummy that equals 1 if the respondent lives in the capital region, Helsinki; η_s is a full set of district fixed effects. Panel A reports results for unconstrained men and Panel B reports results for constrained men. Columns (1) to (3) split the sample by the median debt-to-income ratio and columns (4) to (6) split the sample by the median income in the overall sample. We cluster standard errors at the individual level. The car purchase and ownership data come from the official Finnish car registry data discussed in Section II. The sample period is July 2015 to January 2016.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A. Unconstrained						
	Below-median Debt-to-Income			Above-median Income		
High IQ × Clunker	10.52** (4.27)	11.23*** (4.24)	10.34** (4.24)	6.45*** (2.35)	6.64*** (2.32)	6.45** (2.75)
High IQ	1.47 (1.91)	3.62* (2.08)	3.79* (2.08)	3.15*** (1.13)	4.62*** (1.28)	4.56*** (1.23)
Clunker	21.52*** (3.68)	19.72*** (3.68)	20.25*** (3.67)	23.33*** (1.99)	22.57*** (1.95)	22.81*** (2.39)
Constant	12.93*** (1.66)	132.19*** (25.07)	135.30*** (25.15)	12.12*** (0.94)	85.98*** (20.50)	86.49*** (17.97)
Nobs	2,683	2,680	2,680	6,997	6,988	6,988
Controls		X	X		X	X
District			X			X
R2	0.111	0.123	0.132	0.098	0.104	0.109
Panel B. Constrained						
	Above-median Debt-to-Income			Below-median Income		
High IQ × Clunker	1.59 (3.75)	2.04 (3.76)	1.67 (3.77)	4.69 (8.23)	4.69 (8.23)	4.07 (9.79)
High IQ	4.40*** (1.59)	5.41*** (1.66)	5.56*** (1.66)	2.82 (4.51)	1.03 (4.47)	-0.77 (5.50)
Clunker	27.07*** (3.20)	26.27*** (3.24)	26.78*** (3.25)	29.98*** (6.38)	28.60*** (6.46)	33.26*** (7.54)
Constant	11.94*** (1.35)	74.51*** (22.22)	73.70*** (22.26)	17.27*** (3.62)	118.08*** (40.26)	128.96*** (47.04)
Nobs	3,585	3,578	3,578	551	546	478
Controls		X	X		X	X
District			X			X
R2	0.095	0.100	0.106	0.119	0.166	0.323

Table 6: **Purchase of Eligible Cars During Program by IQ**

This table reports the coefficient estimates from the following OLS regression:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Eligible Car}_{i,t} = & \alpha + \beta_1 \text{High IQ}_i \times \text{Clunker}_{i,t-1} \times \text{ROPA}_t + \beta_2 \text{High IQ}_i \times \text{Clunker}_{i,t-1} \\ & + \beta_3 \text{High IQ}_i \times \text{ROPA}_t + \beta_4 \text{Clunker}_{i,t-1} \times \text{ROPA}_t + \zeta \text{High IQ}_i \\ & + \gamma \text{Clunker}_{i,t-1} + \nu \text{ROPA}_t + X'_{i,t} \delta + \eta_t + \eta_s + \eta_i + \epsilon_{i,t}, \end{aligned}$$

where $\text{Eligible Car}_{i,t}$ is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if individual i purchased an eligible car in month t . High IQ_i equals 1 if normalized IQ is larger than 5. ROPA_t is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 during the ROPA period (July 2015 to January 2016) and zero otherwise (i.e., July 2014 to January 2015). We measure normalized IQ using data from the official military entrance exam in Finland. IQ is the standardized test score from the military entrance exam test for all men in Finland. IQ obtains integer values between 1 and 9 with 9 being the highest score. Demographic controls (X) include age, age^2 , marital status, log of income, employment status, number of children, urban versus rural classification, college dummy, and a dummy that equals 1 if the respondent lives in Helsinki; η_t is full sets of year-month fixed effects; η_s is full sets of location fixed effects; η_i is full sets of individual fixed effects. We cluster standard errors at the individual level. The car purchase and ownership data come from the official Finnish car registry data discussed in Section II. The sample period is July 2014 to January 2015 for the pre period and July 2015 to January 2016 for the ROPA period.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
High IQ \times Clunker \times ROPA _{<i>t</i>}	0.10*** (0.03)	0.10*** (0.03)	0.10*** (0.03)	0.10*** (0.03)
High IQ \times Clunker	-0.09*** (0.02)	-0.08*** (0.02)	-0.08*** (0.02)	
High IQ \times ROPA _{<i>t</i>}	0.04 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
Clunker \times ROPA _{<i>t</i>}	0.09*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)
High IQ	0.13*** (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)	
Clunker	-0.20*** (0.01)	-0.21*** (0.02)	-0.20*** (0.02)	
ROPA _{<i>t</i>}	0.04** (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)
Constant	0.25*** (0.01)	-0.76*** (0.07)	-0.73*** (0.07)	1.47* (0.79)
Nobs	1,573,190	1,521,209	1,521,209	1,521,209
Controls		X	X	X
District FE			X	X
Individ FE				X
R2	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.507

Table 7: Willingness to Purchase Cars After Cash for Clunkers Announcement

This table reports the coefficient estimates from the following specification:

$$\text{Willingness Purchase Car}_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta \text{High IQ}_i \times \text{Post Announcement} + \gamma \text{Post Announcement} + \zeta \text{High IQ}_i + X'_{i,t} \delta + \epsilon_{i,t},$$

where Willingness Purchase $\text{Car}_{i,t}$ is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the respondent answers it is a good time to purchase a car, and zero otherwise. High IQ_i equals 1 if normalized IQ is larger than 5. Post Announcement is a dummy variable that equals 1 in the months after the announcement of the cash for clunkers program by the government agency Traficom (December 2014), and zero in the months before the announcement. We estimate this specification with a linear probability model (OLS). We use the confidential micro data underlying the official European Commission consumer confidence survey to construct these variables. We measure normalized IQ using data from the official military entrance exam in Finland. IQ is the standardized test score from the military entrance exam test for all men in Finland. IQ obtains integer values between 1 and 9 with 9 being the highest score. Demographic controls are age, age², marital status, log of income, employment status, number of children, urban versus rural classification, college dummy, and a dummy that equals 1 if the respondent lives in Helsinki. We cluster standard errors at the individual level. The sample period is August 2013 to March 2015.

	Want Purchase Car Within 6 months (1)	(2)	Want Purchase Car Within 1 year (3)	(4)	Want Purchase Non-car Vehicle (5)	(6)	Want Purchase Other Durables (7)	(8)
High IQ × Post Announcement	0.05** (0.02)	0.043* (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)
High IQ	-0.04 (0.01)	-0.03** (0.02)	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.03** (0.02)	0.03* (0.01)	0.03* (0.02)	0.05*** (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)
Post Announcement	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)
Nobs	5,634	4,906	5,625	4,899	5,654	4,920	5,657	4,922
Controls		X		X		X		X
Expectations		X		X		X		X

Table 8: **Propensity to Borrow Around Changes in Policy Rates**

This table reports the coefficient estimates from the following specification:

$$Loan_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta High\ IQ_i \times \Delta Rate_t + \zeta High\ IQ_i + \gamma \Delta Rate_t + X'_{i,t} \delta + \eta_t + \eta_i \epsilon_{i,t},$$

where $Loan_{i,t}$ is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the respondent answers it is a good time for people to take out a loan, and zero otherwise. $High\ IQ_i$ equals 1 if normalized IQ is larger than 5. $\Delta Rate_t$ is the annual change in the marginal lending facility rate set by the ECB in twelve months before the survey wave. We estimate this specification with a linear probability model (OLS). We use the confidential micro data underlying the official European Commission consumer confidence survey to construct these variables. We measure normalized IQ using data from the official military entrance exam in Finland. IQ is the standardized test score from the military entrance exam test for all men in Finland. IQ obtains integer values between 1 and 9 with 9 being the highest score. Demographic controls (X) are age, age², marital status, log of income, employment status, number of children, urban versus rural classification, college dummy, and a dummy that equals 1 if the respondent lives in Helsinki. η_t is a full set of year-month fixed effects. The sample period is January 2001 to March 2015.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
High IQ \times $\Delta Rate$	-0.026** (0.012)	-0.033*** (0.012)	-0.028** (0.011)	-0.025** (0.011)
High IQ	0.053*** (0.005)	0.036*** (0.005)	0.034*** (0.005)	0.029*** (0.005)
$\Delta Rate$	0.036*** (0.008)	0.036*** (0.008)		
Nobs	37,145	34,858	34,858	34,858
Controls		X	X	X
Year-Month FE			X	X
Expectations				X
R2	0.004	0.025	0.097	0.115

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 9: Actual Debt Outcomes Around Changes in Policy Rates

This table reports the coefficient estimates from the following pooled OLS regression based on a panel of individual-year observations:

$$\text{Debt Outcome}_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta \text{High IQ}_i \times \text{Rate}_t + \zeta \text{High IQ}_i + \gamma \text{Rate}_t + X'_{i,t} \delta + \eta_t + \eta_i \epsilon_{i,t},$$

where $\text{Debt Outcome}_{i,t}$ is the end-of-year total debt balance of individual i in year t in columns (1)-(3); a dummy variable that equals 1 if the individual took out a new loan in year t in columns (4)-(6); a dummy variable that equals 1 if the individual paid down at least one existing loan in year t . High IQ_i equals 1 if normalized IQ is larger than 5. Rate_t is the average level of the marginal lending facility rate set by the ECB in year t . We measure normalized IQ using data from the official military entrance exam in Finland. IQ is the standardized test score from the military entrance exam test for all men in Finland. IQ obtains integer values between 1 and 9 with 9 being the highest score. Demographic controls (X) are age, age², marital status, log of income, employment status, number of children, urban versus rural classification, college dummy, and a dummy that equals 1 if the respondent lives in Helsinki; η_t and η_i are full sets of year and individual fixed effects. The debt outcomes information is obtained from the Finnish registry data discussed in Section II. The data set is a full balanced panel in which we observe outcomes for any debt holder in Finland at the end of each year. This structure allows restricting the variation within individual in columns (3), (6), and (9). We cluster standard errors at the individual level. The sample period is December 2000 to December 2013.

	Debt Balance			Take New Loan			Pay Down Loans		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
High $\text{IQ} \times \text{Rate}$	-1,168.1*** (341.0)	-1,143.9*** (341.2)	-614.9* (326.2)	-0.008*** (0.002)	-0.008*** (0.002)	-0.007*** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)
High IQ	6,331.8*** (1,144.3)	7,534.8*** (1,136.5)		-0.004 (0.004)	-0.006 (0.004)		0.002 (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)	
Rate				0.035*** (0.002)			-0.034*** (0.002)		
Nobs	254,480	254,480	254,480	213,473	213,473	213,473	213,473	213,473	213,473
Controls	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Year FE		X	X		X	X		X	X
Individ FE			X			X			X

Online Appendix: Human Frictions in the Transmission of Economic Policy

Francesco D'Acunto, Daniel Hoang, Maritta Paloviita, and Michael Weber

Not for Publication

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Ajoneuvon tiedot Fordonsguppgifter Vehicle particulars	Rek.tunnus Reg.tecken Reg. number	Järj.nro Ord.nr Serial No.	Valmistenumero Tillverkningsnummer Vehicle identification number
	Ajoneuvoluokka Fordonskategori Vehicle category		Merkki ja malli Märke och modell Make and model
	Ajoneuvon kansallisuustunnus Fordonets nationalitetsbeteckning Distinguishing national registration sign		

Ajoneuvon luovuttajan tiedot Uppgifter om fordonets överlätare Vehicle deliverer's details	Sukunimi Efternamn Last name	Henkilötunnus Personbeteckning Identity number
	Etunimi Förnamn First name	Kansallisuus Nationalitet Nationality
	Lähiosoite Näradress Address	
	Postinumero ja -toimipaikka Postnummer och -anstalt Postal number and post office	
	<p>Vakuutan, että minulla on oikeus luovuttaa ajoneuvo romutettavaksi. Jag intyger, att jag har rätt att överläta fordonet till skrotning. I affirm that I have the right to hand over this vehicle to a collection facility to be destroyed.</p> <p>Ajoneuvon luovuttajan allekirjoitus ja nimenselvennys Underskrift och namnförtydligande av fordonets överlätare Signature and name clarification of the deliverer of the vehicle</p>	

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Vastaanotto- pisteen tiedot Mottagnings- ställets uppgifter Collection facility particulars	Yrityksen nimi Företagets namn Company name	Y-tunnus FO-nummer Company identification number
	Lähiosoite Näradress Address	
	Postinumero ja -toimipaikka Postnummer och -anstalt Postal number and post office	
	<p>Olemme vastaanottaneet jätelain (1072/1993) mukaisesti romuajoneuvon romutettavaksi. Vi har mottagit skrotfordon enligt avfallslagen (1072/1993) till skrotning. We have received this end-of life vehicle to treatment according to the waste act (1072/1993).</p> <p>Ajoneuvon rekisterikilvet Fordonets registerskyltar Vehicle number plates</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> on palautettu vastaanotto-pisteeseen. <input type="checkbox"/> ei ole palautettu. <input type="checkbox"/> har returnerats till mottagningsstället. <input type="checkbox"/> har inte returnerats. <input type="checkbox"/> have been returned to collection facility. <input type="checkbox"/> have not been returned.</p> <p>Ajoneuvon rekisteröintitodistus on liitteenä. Ajoneuvon lunastuspäätös on liitteenä. Ajoneuvon siirtopäätös on liitteenä. Fordonets registreringsbevis bifogas. Fordonets inlösningsbevis bifogas. Fordonets flyttningsbevis bifogas. Vehicle registration certificate enclosed. Vehicle redemption certificate enclosed. Vehicle removal certificate enclosed.</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Kyllä Ja Yes <input type="checkbox"/> Kyllä Ja Yes <input type="checkbox"/> Kyllä Ja Yes</p>	
	<p>Romutustodistus annettu (pvm) Skrotningsintyg beviljat (datum) Certificate of destruction issued (date)</p>	<p>Luovuttajan henkilöllisyys tarkastettu (hetun 4 viim. merkkiä) Överlätarens identitet kontrollerad (personbet. 4 sista märken) Identity of the deliverer verified (id-number's last 4 characters)</p>
	Vastaanotto-pisteen allekirjoitus, nimenselvennys ja leima Mottagningsställets underskrift, namnförtydligande och stämpel Signature, name clarification and stamp of collection facility	<p>Poiston päivittäjä Murskaamo/Käsittelijän nimi</p> <p>Liitteet kpl</p>

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B140 - 2/2015

Lupaviran- omainen Tillstånds- myndighet Licenced by	Lupaviranomaisen nimi Tillståndsmyndighetens namn Name of the licensing authority
	Lähiosoite Näradress Address
	Postinumero ja -toimipaikka Postnummer och -anstalt Postal number and post office

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Romutustodistus on annettu romuajoneuvoista annetun Euroopan parlamentin ja neuvoston direktiivin (2000/53/EY) ja jätelain (1072/1993) nojalla.
Skrotningsintyget är beviljat med stöd av Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv (2000/53/EG) och avfallslagen (1072/1993).

This certificate of destruction has been issued on the basis of the directive 2000/53/EC of the European parliament and of the council and on the basis of the amendment of the waste act (1072/1993).

Table A.1: **Cognitive Abilities and Car Purchases under Cash-for-Clunkers Program (Robustness Clustering)**

This table reports the coefficient estimates from the following OLS regression:

$$ROPA_i = \alpha + \beta High\ IQ_i \times Clunker_i + \zeta High\ IQ_i + \gamma Clunker_i + X_i' \delta + \eta_s + \epsilon_i,$$

where $ROPA_i$ is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if individual i purchased an eligible car through the ROPA scheme, and zero if he purchased an eligible car outside the ROPA scheme when the scheme was available. $High\ IQ_i$ equals 1 if normalized IQ is larger than 5. $Clunker_{i,t-1}$ is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if individual i owned a clunker in December 2014 before the announcement of the ROPA scheme. We measure normalized IQ using data from the official military entrance exam in Finland. IQ is the standardized test score from the military entrance exam test for all men in Finland. IQ obtains integer values between 1 and 9 with 9 being the highest score. $Clunker_i$ is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if individual i owned a clunker in December 2014, i.e. just before the announcement of the ROPA scheme. Demographic controls measured as of December 2019 (X_i) include age, age^2 , marital status, log of income, employment status, number of children, urban versus rural residence, college dummy, and a dummy that equals 1 if the respondent lives in the capital region, Helsinki; η_s is a full set of district fixed effects. We cluster standard errors at the municipality level to allow for correlation of unknown form across the decisions of agents that live in the same cities. The car purchase and ownership data come from the official Finnish car registry data discussed in Section II. The sample period is July 2015 to January 2016.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
High IQ \times Clunker	5.53** (2.31)	6.12*** (2.25)	5.91*** (2.26)
High IQ	2.88*** (1.02)	4.46*** (1.16)	4.45*** (1.16)
Clunker	24.65*** (2.00)	23.50*** (1.91)	23.78*** (1.93)
Constant	12.59*** (0.85)	96.68*** (15.17)	95.70*** (14.82)
Nobs	7,588	7,534	7,534
Controls		X	X
District			X
R2	0.101	0.109	0.114

Table A.2: **Purchases of Eligible Cars by IQ: Unconstrained by Debt to Income**

This table reports the coefficient estimates from the following OLS regression:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Eligible Car}_{i,t} = & \alpha + \beta_1 \text{High IQ}_i \times \text{Clunker}_{i,t-1} \times \text{ROPA}_t + \beta_2 \text{High IQ}_i \times \text{Clunker}_{i,t-1} \\ & + \beta_3 \text{High IQ}_i \times \text{ROPA}_t + \beta_4 \text{Clunker}_{i,t-1} \times \text{ROPA}_t + \zeta \text{High IQ}_i \\ & + \gamma \text{Clunker}_{i,t-1} + \nu \text{ROPA}_t + X'_{i,t} \delta + \eta_t + \eta_l + \eta_i + \epsilon_{i,t}, \end{aligned}$$

where $\text{Eligible Car}_{i,t}$ is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if individual i purchased an eligible car. High IQ_i equals 1 if normalized IQ is larger than 5. $\text{Clunker}_{i,t-1}$ is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if individual i owned a clunker in December 2014 before the announcement of the ROPA scheme. ROPA_t is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 during the ROPA period (July 2015 to January 2016) and zero during July 2014 to January 2015 and July 2016 to January 2017. We measure normalized IQ using data from the official military entrance exam in Finland. IQ is the standardized test score from the military entrance exam test for all men in Finland. IQ obtains integer values between 1 and 9 with 9 being the highest score. Demographic controls (X) include age, age^2 , marital status, log of income, employment status, number of children, urban versus rural classification, college dummy, and a dummy that equals 1 if the respondent lives in Helsinki; η_t is full sets of year-month fixed effects; η_l is full sets of location fixed effects; η_i is full sets of individual fixed effects. We only keep the sample of Finnish men below the median debt to income ratio. We cluster standard errors at the individual level. The car purchase and ownership data come from the official Finnish car registry data discussed in Section II. The sample period is July 2014 to January 2017.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
High IQ \times Clunker \times ROPA _t	0.15** (0.06)	0.15** (0.06)	0.15** (0.06)	0.16** (0.07)
High IQ \times Clunker	-0.10*** (0.04)	-0.08** (0.04)	-0.08** (0.04)	
High IQ \times ROPA _t	0.00 (0.05)	0.00 (0.05)	0.00 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.06)
Clunker \times ROPA _t	0.11** (0.05)	0.11** (0.05)	0.11** (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)
High IQ	0.16*** (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	
Clunker	-0.25*** (0.03)	-0.24*** (0.03)	-0.24*** (0.03)	
ROPA _t	0.07* (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)	0.06 (0.06)
Constant	0.30*** (0.03)	-1.06*** (0.15)	-1.01*** (0.15)	3.09* (1.69)
Nobs	533,435	529,928	529,928	529,928
Controls		X	X	X
District FE			X	X
Individ FE				X
R2	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.592

Table A.3: **Purchases of Eligible Cars by IQ: Unconstrained by Income**

This table reports the coefficient estimates from the following OLS regression:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Eligible Car}_{i,t} = & \alpha + \beta_1 \text{High IQ}_i \times \text{Clunker}_{i,t-1} \times \text{ROPA}_t + \beta_2 \text{High IQ}_i \times \text{Clunker}_{i,t-1} \\ & + \beta_3 \text{High IQ}_i \times \text{ROPA}_t + \beta_4 \text{Clunker}_{i,t-1} \times \text{ROPA}_t + \zeta \text{High IQ}_i \\ & + \gamma \text{Clunker}_{i,t-1} + \nu \text{ROPA}_t + X'_{i,t} \delta + \eta_t + \eta_l + \eta_i + \epsilon_{i,t}, \end{aligned}$$

where $\text{Eligible Car}_{i,t}$ is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if individual i purchased an eligible car. High IQ_i equals 1 if normalized IQ is larger than 5. $\text{Clunker}_{i,t-1}$ is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if individual i owned a clunker in December 2014 before the announcement of the ROPA scheme. ROPA_t is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 during the ROPA period (July 2015 to January 2016) and zero during July 2014 to January 2015 and July 2016 to January 2017. We measure normalized IQ using data from the official military entrance exam in Finland. IQ is the standardized test score from the military entrance exam test for all men in Finland. IQ obtains integer values between 1 and 9 with 9 being the highest score. Demographic controls (X) include age, age^2 , marital status, log of income, employment status, number of children, urban versus rural classification, college dummy, and a dummy that equals 1 if the respondent lives in Helsinki; η_t is full sets of year-month fixed effects; η_l is full sets of location fixed effects; η_i is full sets of individual fixed effects. We only keep the sample of Finnish men above the median income. We cluster standard errors at the individual level. The car purchase and ownership data come from the official Finnish car registry data discussed in Section II. The sample period is July 2014 to January 2017.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
High IQ \times Clunker \times ROPA _{<i>t</i>}	0.17*** (0.06)	0.17*** (0.06)	0.17*** (0.06)	0.19*** (0.06)
High IQ \times Clunker	-0.08** (0.04)	-0.07* (0.04)	-0.07* (0.04)	
High IQ \times ROPA _{<i>t</i>}	0.03 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)
Clunker \times ROPA _{<i>t</i>}	0.10** (0.05)	0.10** (0.05)	0.10** (0.05)	0.09* (0.05)
High IQ	0.14*** (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)	
Clunker	-0.34*** (0.03)	-0.31*** (0.03)	-0.31*** (0.03)	
ROPA _{<i>t</i>}	0.08** (0.04)	0.07* (0.04)	0.07* (0.04)	0.06 (0.05)
Constant	0.42*** (0.03)	-1.18*** (0.34)	-1.14*** (0.34)	-1.72 (2.14)
Nobs	787,979	785,031	785,031	785,031
Controls		X	X	X
District FE			X	X
Individ FE				X
R2	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.533

Table A.4: **Purchases of Eligible Cars by IQ: Constrained by Debt to Income**

This table reports the coefficient estimates from the following OLS regression:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Eligible Car}_{i,t} = & \alpha + \beta_1 \text{High IQ}_i \times \text{Clunker}_{i,t-1} \times \text{ROPA}_t + \beta_2 \text{High IQ}_i \times \text{Clunker}_{i,t-1} \\ & + \beta_3 \text{High IQ}_i \times \text{ROPA}_t + \beta_4 \text{Clunker}_{i,t-1} \times \text{ROPA}_t + \zeta \text{High IQ}_i \\ & + \gamma \text{Clunker}_{i,t-1} + \nu \text{ROPA}_t + X'_{i,t} \delta + \eta_t + \eta_l + \eta_i + \epsilon_{i,t}, \end{aligned}$$

where $\text{Eligible Car}_{i,t}$ is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if individual i purchased an eligible car. High IQ_i equals 1 if normalized IQ is larger than 5. $\text{Clunker}_{i,t-1}$ is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if individual i owned a clunker in December 2014 before the announcement of the ROPA scheme. ROPA_t is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 during the ROPA period (July 2015 to January 2016) and zero during July 2014 to January 2015 and July 2016 to January 2017. We measure normalized IQ using data from the official military entrance exam in Finland. IQ is the standardized test score from the military entrance exam test for all men in Finland. IQ obtains integer values between 1 and 9 with 9 being the highest score. Demographic controls (X) include age, age², marital status, log of income, employment status, number of children, urban versus rural classification, college dummy, and a dummy that equals 1 if the respondent lives in Helsinki; η_t is full sets of year-month fixed effects; η_l is full sets of location fixed effects; η_i is full sets of individual fixed effects. We only keep the sample of Finnish men above the median debt to income ratio. We cluster standard errors at the individual level. The car purchase and ownership data come from the official Finnish car registry data discussed in Section II. The sample period is July 2014 to January 2017.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
High IQ \times Clunker \times ROPA _t	0.09 (0.06)	0.08 (0.06)	0.08 (0.06)	0.10 (0.07)
High IQ \times Clunker	-0.09** (0.04)	-0.07** (0.04)	-0.08** (0.04)	
High IQ \times ROPA _t	0.06 (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)	0.05 (0.05)
Clunker \times ROPA _t	0.06 (0.05)	0.07 (0.05)	0.07 (0.05)	0.05 (0.05)
High IQ	0.12*** (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	
Clunker	-0.24*** (0.03)	-0.21*** (0.03)	-0.20*** (0.03)	
ROPA _t	0.08** (0.04)	0.07* (0.04)	0.07* (0.04)	0.08 (0.05)
Constant	0.31*** (0.03)	-0.74*** (0.16)	-0.70*** (0.16)	-0.79 (1.78)
Nobs	541,367	539,128	539,128	539,128
Controls		X	X	X
District FE			X	X
Individ FE				X
R2	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.566

Table A.5: **Purchases of Eligible Cars by IQ: Constrained by Income**

This table reports the coefficient estimates from the following OLS regression:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Eligible Car}_{i,t} = & \alpha + \beta_1 \text{High IQ}_i \times \text{Clunker}_{i,t-1} \times \text{ROPA}_t + \beta_2 \text{High IQ}_i \times \text{Clunker}_{i,t-1} \\ & + \beta_3 \text{High IQ}_i \times \text{ROPA}_t + \beta_4 \text{Clunker}_{i,t-1} \times \text{ROPA}_t + \zeta \text{High IQ}_i \\ & + \gamma \text{Clunker}_{i,t-1} + \nu \text{ROPA}_t + X'_{i,t} \delta + \eta_t + \eta_l + \eta_i + \epsilon_{i,t}, \end{aligned}$$

where *Eligible Car*_{*i,t*} is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if individual *i* purchased an eligible car. *High IQ*_{*i*} equals 1 if normalized IQ is larger than 5. *Clunker*_{*i,t-1*} is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if individual *i* owned a clunker in December 2014 before the announcement of the ROPA scheme. *ROPA*_{*t*} is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 during the ROPA period (July 2015 to January 2016) and zero during July 2014 to January 2015 and July 2016 to January 2017. We measure normalized IQ using data from the official military entrance exam in Finland. IQ is the standardized test score from the military entrance exam test for all men in Finland. IQ obtains integer values between 1 and 9 with 9 being the highest score. Demographic controls (*X*) include age, age², marital status, log of income, employment status, number of children, urban versus rural classification, college dummy, and a dummy that equals 1 if the respondent lives in Helsinki; η_t is full sets of year-month fixed effects; η_l is full sets of location fixed effects; η_i is full sets of individual fixed effects. We only keep the sample of Finnish men below the median income. We cluster standard errors at the individual level. The car purchase and ownership data come from the official Finnish car registry data discussed in Section II. The sample period is July 2014 to January 2017.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
High IQ × Clunker × ROPA _{<i>t</i>}	0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)
High IQ × Clunker	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	
High IQ × ROPA _{<i>t</i>}	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
Clunker × ROPA _{<i>t</i>}	0.09*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.03)
High IQ	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	
Clunker	-0.11*** (0.01)	-0.12*** (0.02)	-0.12*** (0.02)	
ROPA _{<i>t</i>}	0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.02 (0.03)
Constant	0.15*** (0.01)	-0.37*** (0.06)	-0.36*** (0.06)	1.22* (0.72)
Nobs	749,199	736,178	736,178	736,178
Controls		X	X	X
District FE			X	X
Individ FE				X
R2	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.579

Table A.6: **Falsification: Purchases of Non-Eligible Cars by IQ**

This table reports the coefficient estimates from the following OLS regression:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Non-Eligible Car}_{i,t} = & \alpha + \beta_1 \text{High IQ}_i \times \text{Clunker}_{i,t-1} \times \text{ROPA}_t + \beta_2 \text{High IQ}_i \times \text{Clunker}_{i,t-1} \\ & + \beta_3 \text{High IQ}_i \times \text{ROPA}_t + \beta_4 \text{Clunker}_{i,t-1} \times \text{ROPA}_t + \zeta \text{High IQ}_i \\ & + \gamma \text{Clunker}_{i,t-1} + \nu \text{ROPA}_t + X'_{i,t} \delta + \eta_t + \eta_l + \eta_i + \epsilon_{i,t}, \end{aligned}$$

where *Non-Eligible Car*_{*i,t*} is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if individual *i* purchased a non-eligible car. *High IQ*_{*i*} equals 1 if normalized IQ is larger than 5. *Clunker*_{*i,t-1*} is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if individual *i* owned a clunker in December 2014 before the announcement of the ROPA scheme. *ROPA*_{*t*} is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 during the ROPA period (July 2015 to January 2016) and zero during July 2014 to January 2015 and July 2016 to January 2017. We measure normalized IQ using data from the official military entrance exam in Finland. IQ is the standardized test score from the military entrance exam test for all men in Finland. IQ obtains integer values between 1 and 9 with 9 being the highest score. Demographic controls (*X*) include age, age², marital status, log of income, employment status, number of children, urban versus rural classification, college dummy, and a dummy that equals 1 if the respondent lives in Helsinki; η_t is full sets of year-month fixed effects; η_l is full sets of location fixed effects; η_i is full sets of individual fixed effects. We cluster standard errors at the individual level. The car purchase and ownership data come from the official Finnish car registry data discussed in Section II. The sample period is July 2014 to January 2017.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
High IQ × Clunker × ROPA _{<i>t</i>}	−0.01 (0.03)	−0.02 (0.03)	−0.02 (0.03)	−0.02 (0.03)
High IQ × Clunker	−0.05** (0.02)	−0.04* (0.02)	−0.04* (0.02)	
High IQ × ROPA _{<i>t</i>}	0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)
Clunker × ROPA _{<i>t</i>}	0.05** (0.02)	0.06** (0.02)	0.06** (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)
High IQ	0.10*** (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	
Clunker	−0.23*** (0.02)	−0.25*** (0.02)	−0.25*** (0.02)	
ROPA _{<i>t</i>}	−0.01 (0.02)	−0.03 (0.02)	−0.03 (0.02)	−0.06** (0.03)
Constant	0.29*** (0.01)	−0.77*** (0.07)	−0.77*** (0.07)	−1.35* (0.73)
Nobs	1,573,190	1,521,209	1,521,209	1,521,209
Controls		X	X	X
District FE			X	X
Individ FE				X
R2	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.505