Human Frictions in the Transmission of Economic Policy?

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Summary

- This paper studies relationship between the cognitive abilities and households' reaction to fiscal and monetary policies.
- Use rich administrative data from Finland including both cognitive ability, durable goods consumption, and debt.
- Explore reaction to both fiscal policy and monetary policy
- Results:
 - High IQ individuals are twice as likely to take up "cash-for-clunker" car scrappage scheme in Finland
 - For an increase in interest rate, high IQ individuals are less likely to take out a new loan and more likely to pay down existing loan

Overall Comments

- Important question:
 - Study the human frictions about how fiscal policy and monetary policy pass through households
- Link individual level cognitive ability data with individual level demographics, consumption behavior and debt data
- Comprehensive analysis about both fiscal and monetary policy with various datasets

Contribution

- Understanding fiscal and monetary policy transmission through households is important
- However, there are many frictions.
- Financial frictions: there are interest rate rigidity due to
 - Financial contract (Di Maggio et al. 2017)
 - Financial intermediaries (Wang et al. 2018; Daniel et al. 2021)

Contribution

- Human frictions:
 - Bounded rationality: level-k (Farhi and Werning 2017)
 - Limited attention
 - Hyperbolic discounting: procrastination
 - Financial literacy
- This paper:
 - Document a new dimension of human frictions to explain the non-response behavior to policy
 - cognitive ability—IQ

Interpretation: Fiscal policy

- Preference for cars
 - Already control for many factors and still observe the effect from IQ.
- Suggestions:
 - Can you find the buyers who buy the eligible cars outside the programs so they did not claim the subsidy?
 - If yes, this is "leaving money on the table"
 - You can analyze the relationship between IQ and claim the subsidy in the sample who buy eligible cars
- Opportunity cost of time
 - Do High IQ people manage time more or less efficiently?
- Suggestion: use income to proxy opportunity cost of time and analyze the heterogeneity of program take-up

Interpretation: Alternative frictions

- Is it an independent friction or correlated with other frictions?
 - Limited attention
 - Hyperbolic discounting: procrastination
 - Financial literacy
 - Peer effects: "Ranking high in these tests provides access to high-quality training and to elite social networks"
- Can we link IQ to these frictions so we can reduce dimension, unifying a few factors

Interpretations: monetary policy

- What does low reaction to monetary policy mean?
- Is it low reaction in the overall balance sheet or react in other channels?
- The paper currently focus on liability side of household balance sheet
- In theory, after interest rate drops, individuals might
 - Increase consumption: intertemporal substitution
 - Increase risky investment: portfolio rebalance (Kaplan et al. 2018; Daniel et al. 2021; Agarwal et al. 2022)













Source: Agarwal et al. 2022

Interpretation: monetary policy

- Are high IQ individuals more like to hold stocks?
- Yes: Cole 2009; Grinblatt et al. 2011
- Are high IQ people more likely to conduct portfolio rebalance after interest rate change?
- Probably. Depends on the direction, it might under or overestimate the non-reaction effect.

Suggestion 1

Can you analyze reaction to monetary policy

- Similar to Table 5
- Use a figure with deciles of financial constraint

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)				
	Panel A. Unconstrained									
	Below-1	median Debt	-to-Income	Abo	Above-median Income					
High IQ \times Clunker	10.52^{**}	11.23***	10.34^{**}	6.45***	6.64^{***}	6.45**				
	(4.27)	(4.24)	(4.24)	(2.35)	(2.32)	(2.75)				
High IQ	1.47	3.62^{*}	3.79^{*}	3.15^{***}	4.62***	4.56^{***}				
	(1.91)	(2.08)	(2.08)	(1.13)	(1.28)	(1.23)				
Clunker	21.52***	19.72***	20.25***	23.33***	22.57***	22.81***				
	(3.68)	(3.68)	(3.67)	(1.99)	(1.95)	(2.39)				
Constant	12.93***	132.19***	135.30***	12.12***	85.98***	86.49***				
	(1.66)	(25.07)	(25.15)	(0.94)	(20.50)	(17.97)				
Nobs	2,683	2,680	2,680	6,997	6,988	6,988				
Controls		Х	X		Х	X				
District R2	0 111	0.123	A 0.132	0.098	0 104	0.109				
102										
	Panel B. Constrained									
	Above-1	median Debt	-to-Income	Below-median Income						
High IQ \times Clunker	1.59	2.04	1.67	4.69	4.69	4.07				
	(3.75)	(3.76)	(3.77)	(8.23)	(8.23)	(9.79)				
High IQ	4.40***	5.41^{***}	5.56^{***}	2.82	1.03	-0.77				
	(1.59)	(1.66)	(1.66)	(4.51)	(4.47)	(5.50)				
Clunker	27.07***	26.27***	26.78***	29.98***	28.60***	33.26***				
	(3.20)	(3.24)	(3.25)	(6.38)	(6.46)	(7.54)				
Constant	11.94***	74.51***	73.70***	17.27***	118.08***	128.96***				
	(1.35)	(22.22)	(22.26)	(3.62)	(40.26)	(47.04)				
	0 505	0 550	0 500		5.40	150				
Nobs	3,585	3,578 V	3,578 V	551	546 V	478 V				
District		Λ	X		Λ	X				
District			Х			Х				

Suggestion 2: check portfolio rebalance

- Use tax data from the Finnish Tax Administration to infer risky assets
- Any questions in Consumer Climate Survey of Statistics Finland about investment plan?



Panel B: Return to components of financial wealth

Source: Fagereng et al. 2020

Specification

 $ROPA_i = \alpha + \beta High \ IQ_i \times Clunker_i + \zeta High \ IQ_i + \gamma Clunker_i + X'_i\delta + \eta_s + \epsilon_i,$

- High IQ equals 1 if normalized IQ is larger than 5.
- Suggestions: also show the result in non-parametric regression so we can see clearly the relationship over full distribution of IQ.
- Similar to Figure 2 but show the coefficients



Table 5

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)			
	Panel A. Unconstrained								
	Below-r	nedian Debt	-to-Income	Ab	Above-median Income				
High IQ \times Clunker	10.52^{**} (4.27)	11.23^{***} (4.24)	10.34^{**} (4.24)	6.45^{***} (2.35)	6.64^{***} (2.32)	6.45^{**} (2.75)			
High IQ	1.47 (1.91)	3.62^{*} (2.08)	3.79^{*} (2.08)	3.15^{***} (1.13)	4.62^{***} (1.28)	4.56^{***} (1.23)			
Clunker	21.52*** (3.68)	19.72^{***} (3.68)	20.25^{***} (3.67)	23.33*** (1.99)	22.57^{***} (1.95)	22.81^{***} (2.39)			
Constant	$\frac{12.93^{***}}{(1.66)}$	$\frac{132.19^{***}}{(25.07)}$	135.30^{***} (25.15)	12.12^{***} (0.94)	85.98^{***} (20.50)	86.49*** (17.97)			
Nobs Controls District R2	2,683	2,680 X	2,680 X X 0.132	6,997	6,988 X 0 104	6,988 X X 0 109			
112	Panel B. Constrained								
	Above-median Debt-to-Income Below-median Income								
High IQ \times Clunker	1.59 (3.75)	2.04 (3.76)	1.67 (3.77)	4.69 (8.23)	4.69 (8.23)	4.07 (9.79)			
High IQ	4.40^{***} (1.59)	5.41^{***} (1.66)	5.56^{***} (1.66)	2.82 (4.51)	1.03 (4.47)	-0.77 (5.50)			
Clunker	27.07^{***} (3.20)	26.27*** (3.24)	26.78^{***} (3.25)	29.98*** (6.38)	28.60^{***} (6.46)	33.26^{***} (7.54)			
Constant	$\frac{11.94^{***}}{(1.35)}$	74.51*** (22.22)	73.70^{***} (22.26)	17.27^{***} (3.62)	$118.08^{***} \\ (40.26)$	128.96^{***} (47.04)			
Nobs Controls District	3,585	3,578 X	3,578 X X	551	546 X	478 X X			





Deciles of financial constraint/financial literacy

Minor comments

- Any asymmetric effect?
 - Split the sample to see the effect of interest rate increase and interest rate decrease (Baugh et al. 2021 on asymmetric effects on consumption)
- Any information about industry, such as self employed
 - Underlining income risk might be correlated with IQ and borrowing behavior
 - Finance industry also suggests high financial literacy
- Any consumption data?

Implications

- Communications (D'Acunto et al. 2021, 2020; Coibion et al. 2021).
- Personalized recommendations: provided by banks, FinTech, or government?
- Contract and policy design: similar to the idea of ARM, auto refinance

Summary

- Important paper
- Link individual level cognitive ability data with individual level demographics, consumption behavior and debt data
- More analysis on monetary policy and asset side response