Political Voice and (Mortgage) Market Participation: Evidence from Minority Disenfranchisement

Seongjin Park, Arkodipta Sarkar, and Nishant Vats

by Hyun-Soo Choi (KAIST)

Summary of the Paper

Dilution of Section 5 of the Voting Right Act in 2013 as a shock to political voice of Black American

- Significant decline in mortgage origination.
- Potential factors: Lower income, Elevated uncertainty, Fear of rejection, Migration
 - As a result of significant drop in mortgage application without a change in rejection rate: not Lower Income
 - But the application to Black lenders increase in contrast to others.: not *Elevated uncertainty*
 - No significant outflow of population: not Migration
 - Suggesting the self-selection out of the mortgage market due to fear of rejection (discrimination).
- Hamper the home ownership and wealth accumulation, resulting a wealth inequality.

Discussion #1. Compositional Change in Housing

	Table 4: Geographic Regression Di	scontinuity: Mortgage Market	Outcome and the Shelby ruling
--	-----------------------------------	------------------------------	-------------------------------

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Origination		Application		Denial
	LN(Amount)	Ln(Number)	LN(Amount)	LN(Number)	Rate
Black x Treat x Post	-0.1466***	-0.0828***	-0.1261***	-0.0695***	0.0004
	(0.0322)	(0.0251)	(0.0313)	(0.0246)	(0.0054)
Census Tract x Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Census Tract x Race FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County Pair x Race x Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
2D Local Linear Polynomial	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R ²	0.8634	0.8868	0.8619	0.8864	0.4180
# Obs	346,825	346,825	346,825	346,825	346,825


- Reduction in origination > Reduction in application.
- (1): -0.14466/2.409=-0.061; (2): -0.0828/2.092=-0.039
- Average size of mortgage loan declines.
- Considering that the home price in the US was increasing around the time, the mortgage was possibly made to different type of homes: cheaper or smaller.
- Due to fear of rejection, did borrowers ask smaller mortgage amounts per home?



Discussion #2. Growth of Nonbank as an Omitted Factor

Kim, Laufer, Pence (2018): Growth of Nonbanks


Figure 1. Percentage of All U.S. Mortgages Originated by Nonbanks, 2001–16



Sources: Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data; authors' calculations.

Discussion #2. Growth of Nonbank as an Omitted Factor

Gete and Reher (2019): Behavior of Nonbanks around 2013



Discussion #2. Growth of Nonbank as an Omitted Factor

Characteristics of Nonbank Originations


- Originate-to-distribute model
- Cheaper houses
- Concentrate on minority areas

Basis for no discrimination from supply side: no difference in rejection rate

- What if banks reject more in the treated counties,
- while nonbanks aggressively serve them with much lower rejection rate.
- We may observe that rejection rate does not change in aggregate while banks discriminate minorities.
- Potential challenge to isolating the "fear of rejection" channel Results by lender type would be helpful: Banks, Nonbanks, and FinTech lenders.

Discussion #3. Another Concern for Some Common Factor

Is there reduction in application and origination for White borrowers?



Discussion #4. Other Comments

Consequence of Constrained Optimization

- Bank lenders cater Black borrowers after the shock.
- If the loan terms were competitive,
- Blacks would borrow from the Black lenders even before.
- Not only the reduction in mortgage availability, but also the loan term can be affected due to the constrained optimization.

Interconnecting two seemingly contradicting stories

- Magnitude of the effect is stable over the income distribution
- More cash purchase and less purchase with mortgages
- Does the substituted cash purchase mostly happens in high income group? Effects can be even stronger in high income group.

Conclusion

- Interesting idea and well-executed paper.
- I really enjoyed reading it and learned a lot.