

DISCUSSION OF  
“THE ELUSIVE GAINS FROM NATIONALLY ORIENTED  
MONETARY POLICY”  
BY  
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# SUMMARY

## This paper

- ▶ **solves** for optimal cooperative and non-cooperative MP in an open NK model
- ▶ **finds** that non-coordinated policy can be much worse than coordinated policy

## Approach

- ▶ a dynamic stochastic model with two countries and two goods
- ▶ some analytical formulas + numeric solution + many robustness checks

A very interesting paper on an important question!

## Discussion

1. Overview
2. Comments

## MODEL

1. **Households**: infinitely lived households with log utility and habits
2. **Goods**: home and foreign (both traded)
3. **Production**:  $Y_t^H = A_t^H L_t^H$ ,  $Y_t^F = A_t^F L_t^F$
4. **Prices**: goods prices and wages are sticky as in Calvo
5. **Monetary policy**: non-cooperative optimum, cooperative optimum, IT
6. **Fiscal policy**: monopolistic subsidies
7. **International asset markets**: Incomplete, complete, autarky

## MAIN RESULTS


Inter-temporal and intra-temporal elasticity of substitution = 1 (Cole-Obstfeld, 1991)

$$U_i^{\text{coop}} = U_i^{\text{non-coop}}$$

Inter-temporal and intra-temporal elasticity of substitution  $\neq 1$

$$U_i^{\text{coop}} > U_i^{\text{non-coop}} \text{ and (potentially) } U_i^{\text{coop}} \gg U_i^{\text{non-coop}}$$

## MAIN RESULT: ILLUSTRATION



**Question:** where are the bounds on the costs of the business cycles?


# UNDERSTANDING MAIN RESULT

## Distortions

1. Sticky prices  $\Rightarrow$  **Aggregate demand externality**: Keynes
2. Incomplete markets  $\Rightarrow$   
**non-welfare neutral pecuniary externality**: Greenwald-Stiglitz 1986
3. Monopoly power over domestically produced goods  $\Rightarrow$   
**terms of trade manipulation**: Mill 1844; Bagwell-Staiger 1999
4. Monopoly power over bonds  $\Rightarrow$   
**inter-temporal terms of trade manipulation** Costinot-Lorenzoni-Werning 2014

Spillovers due to 2, 3, 4

# COMMENT 1: WHICH SPILLOVER IS THE MOST IMPORTANT?



- Incompleteness is important but not crucial
- Autarky exercise is informative but it restricts current account
- **Proposal: a continuum of countries each producing a differentiated good**
  - + **Comment 1b**: not all countries are big to influence world interest rate

## COMMENT 2: SIZE OF THE COORDINATION BENEFIT

### Relative costs

- Benefits of coordination similar or larger to costs of business cycles

### Absolute costs



- Costs of business cycles are small: 0.2% of equivalent consumption variation
- Is the model an appropriate benchmark?

### Bigger costs of business cycles

- ▶ Large shocks (disasters)
- ▶ Persistent shocks (long-run risks)
- ▶ Heterogenous households (HANK)



## COMMENT 3: BENEFITS OF FINANCIAL INTEGRATION



Is financial integration detrimental under non-cooperative monetary policy?

## COMMENT 4: WHY DO COUNTRIES USE IT?

Why do countries not coordinate?

- This paper: Deviation from a coordination is profitable

Also this paper

- Inflation targeting is very close to cooperative solution
- Why do countries not deviate from inflation targeting?
- Or maybe they do?

## COMMENT 5: CORRELATED SHOCKS

What are the benefits of coordination under correlated shocks?

- Global financial crisis
- COVID
- A current rise in inflation around the world

## CONCLUSION

- ▶ A very interesting and relevant paper!
- ▶ Comments: disentangle spillovers, absolute size, fin. integration, why IT?