Schweizerisches Institut für Banken und Finanzen





Birth order and fund manager's trading behavior: Role of sibling rivalry

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Introduction

- There exists little understanding of the potential impact of family domain experiences on adult labor market outcomes
 - family is often perceived as the most important and enduring of all social groupings (Smith, 2009)
- Over a century of research on family structure effects on personality and outcomes
- Pre-employment experiences are important determinants of managerial decision-making

In this paper, we:

- (i) exploit the variation in fund managers' familial background
- (ii) investigate the **role of family domain experiences** on managerial behavior
- (iii) establish a link between manager birth order and risk attitudes (sensation seeking)

Results in a nutshell (I/II)

- Risk-taking tendencies established in childhood continue into the adult labor market, such that manager birth order is positively related to risk-taking
 - the later a manager is born in the sibling hierarchy, greater investment risk she undertakes, without being compensated with higher returns
 - birth order is positively related to a fund's total risk, idiosyncratic risk, and active risk
- Sibling rivalry for parental resources is the key mechanism behind the birth order effects on risk taking
 - moderators of the relationship between manager birth order and risk-taking are:
 - age spacing
 - limited parental financial resources
 - limited parental attention
 - the more sibling rivalry is present during childhood, the more birth order-related niche differentiation behaviors become engrained

Results in a nutshell (II/II)

- Long-lived effects of birth order shape the trading behavior of fund managers. Laterborn managers tend to:
 - have more extreme investment style positions, which converges into large factor bets that generate large volatility
 - trade more frequently
 - hold more in lottery stocks
- The incremental risk-taking by later-born managers extends beyond portfolio management
 - they are also more likely to report violations of expected standards of managerial conduct
- Greater incremental risk taking of later-born managers does not result in better performance
- Our findings are consistent with the predictions from evolutionary psychology theory that later-born individuals are more rebellious, daring, and untraditional and essentially are sensation seekers

Evolutionary theory. A case of birth order (I/II)

- Alfred Adler (1927) is the first to suggest that **personality differences are related to birth order**
- Numerous studies focusing on testing birth order effects on common personality traits and subsequent outcomes (Sulloway, 1995; Paulhus, Trapnell, and Chen, 1999; Healey and Ellis, 2007; etc)
- Birth order influences an individual's propensity to take risks across contexts, such that laterborn individuals (relative to firstborns) have been associated with:
 - relatively risky adolescent behaviors (Averett, Argys, and Rees, 2011)
 - internal sensation novelty seeking behavior (Eisenman, Grossman, and Goldstein, 1980)
 - experiencing greater enjoyment during risk taking behavior (Claxton, 1994)
 - greater desire to have more sexual partners (Michalski and Shackelford, 2002)
 - tendency to participate in risky sports (Sulloway and Zweigenhaft, 2010)
 - engaging in self-employment (Black, Grönqvist and Öckert, 2018)
- Overwhelming support for suggesting that laterborns are more risk-oriented, engage in dangerous activities and are associated more with sensation seeking behavior than firstborns.

Evolutionary theory. A case of birth order (II/II)

• To elucidate the birth order-induced differences in personalities and outcomes evolutionary theory has been proposed (Sulloway, 1995; 1996)

Building blocks:

- I. This theory views family as a set of niches with limited parental resources
- II. This causes **siblings** to **compete** for the most resource-rich niche
- III. Growing up subject to such competitive dynamics influences the **development of siblings'** personalities, particularly risk tolerance and sensation seeking inclinations.
- IV. Later-born managers develop a more pronounced propensity to take risks and eventually become more risk tolerant than first-born children (Sulloway, 2001; Sulloway and Zweigenhaft, 2010; and Brown and Grable, 2015)
- Birth order-induced behavioral tendencies are long-lived and are even observed in samples of individuals in their 90s (Jefferson, Herbst, and McCrae, 1998).



Relation to prior literature (I/II)

Determinants of later life economic outcomes	Family size	 Old consensus: Family size has negative effect on child outcomes, like educational attainment and future earnings (Leibowitz, 1974; Blake, 1986; Hanushek, 1992; Sandefur and Wells, 1999; etc) Quantity-quality trade-off: finite parental resources exist, and each additional sibling dilutes resources available in the family (Becker and Lewis 1973; Blake 1981; Downey, 1995)
Ū.		
f later lif		 New consensus: family size effects are confounded with those of the birth order (Black, Devereux, and Salvanes, 2005, QJE)
Determinants of	Birth order	 Important role of birth order in explaining the differences across a range of outcomes including performance in cognitive exams, wages, and employment, with children of higher birth orders being associated with worse outcomes (Kantarevic and Mechoulan, 2006; Conley and Glauber, 2006; Black, Grönqvist and Öckert, 2018; etc)

Our paper is the first to investigate the effects of birth order in a large sample of real-world data from a professional business setting

Relation to prior literature (II/II)

Nature vs Nurture		ate on the relative importance of environmental factors as the origins of differences in investment • (Barnea, Cronqvist, and Siegel, 2010, JFE; Cronqvist, Siegel, and Yu, 2015, JFE)
mutual fund and risk	Childhood events	 Growing up in a wealthy family (Chuprinin and Sosyura, 2018, RFS) Being relatively older in the kindergarten (Bai, Ma, Mullally, and Solomon, 2019, JFE) Living through early-life family disruption (Betzer, Limbach, Rau, and Schürmann, 2021, JBF)
Determinants of mu performance and	Later life events	 Attending selective educational institutions (Chevalier and Ellison, 1999, JF; Li, Zhang, and Zhao, 2011, JFQA) Starting career during a recession (Schoar and Zuo, 2017, RFS) Living through the market downturns (Malmendier and Nagel, 2011, QJE) Marriage (Roussanov and Savor, 2014, MS) Being exposed to natural disasters (Bernile, Bhagwat, and Rau, 2016, JF) Having prior professional experience (Dittmar and Duchin, 2016, RFS; Cici, Gehde-Trapp, Goericke, & Kempf, 2018, RFS)

Our setting is unique in several respects

- Observable, measurable, and multidimensional actions of mutual fund managers. We capture risk choices in terms of
 - portfolio composition
 - trading decisions
 - return volatility
 - violations of professional business conduct
- Fund managers are likely to be solely responsible for these risk choices for their funds
- Fund managers are a relatively homogenous group of individuals and allows for comparable counterfactuals

The distribution is very similar to that of the	Panel A: Distribution of	birth order and family size	(0 + -1:11)	E	ly size
- The distribution is very similar to that of the		Birth order	Birth order $(2 + \text{children})$		
United States population in recent decades.		Frequency	Percentage	Frequency	Percentage
	1	304	40	102	12
The distribution is also similar to other	2	261	34	277	31
	3	113	15	236	27
studies that use data on developed countries	4	48	6	141	16
(Black, Devereux, and Salvanes, 2005, QJE)	5+	34	4	126	14
	Total	760	100	882	100
Thus, it is unlikely that firms select managers					
based on these characteristics					

Dataset

	Domestic U.Sequity open-end Morningstar universe (5,509 funds)
Fund Data	Intersection between Morningstar & CRSP (4,450 funds)
	TR Holdings
	Solo-managers for at least 12 full months 1,905 managers (94.54% of all managers) that run 2,122 funds (95.46% of all funds)
Managan	
Manager Data	Morningstar and/or Bloomberg executive profile available
	Comprehensive cross-database search: Morningstar, Bloomberg, fund
	websites, LinkedIn, Marquis Who's Who, FINRA, Ancestry.com,

Detailed family background profiles found for 1,403 (ca. 70%) managing 1,767 (ca. 80%)

Identifying managers' family background information

I. Name, Education, Career & Age

- Source: Morningstar and Bloomberg
- Data: Name, education & career
- Source: University alumni publications & yearbooks
- Data: Education
- Source: Nelson's Directory
- Data: Career & age
- Source: FINRA
- Data: Career & name
- Source: Other (e.g. LexisNexis, Linkedin, SEC fund filings)
- Data: Name, education, career & age

2. Family Background

- Source: Ancestry.com, Intelius.com, etc.
- Data: Date of birth, pot. relatives, income, addresses
- Source: Obituaries and Death records.
- Data: Parents and siblings, various information

3. Family Details

 Source: United States Federal Census up to 1940
 Data: 41 standardized household attributes

Family background: Birth records (an example)

Manager's full name + date of birth state birth record identify parents




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Family background: Death records (main sources)

Manager's full name + relative's full name ➡ state death record ➡ obituaries



Family background: Census records

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Sample composition and summary statistics

Fund managers' personal and f				
Variable	Mean	Median	Std. Dev.	N of obs.
Manager's personal characteristics				
Age	48.38	47.45	9.79	13644
Manager female $(0/1)$	0.07	0	0.26	16783
Industry tenure (years)	11.41	8.17	12.12	16783
Fund tenure (years)	6.59	4.67	6.44	16783
Marital status $(0/1)$	0.96	1	0.18	11882
Graduate degree $(0/1)$	0.69	1	0.46	15729
Manager's family background				
Birth order $(2 + \text{children})$	1.97	2.00	1.10	7112
Laterborn $(0/1)$	0.52	1	0.50	8432
Family size	2.91	3.00	1.49	8370
Age gap	3.65	3.00	2.02	5355
Father's year of Birth	1921.40	1923	15.17	10611
Father's age at Birth	31.56	30.92	6.55	10368
Mother's year of Birth	1923.63	1925	14.08	8609
Mother's age at Birth	28.65	28.33	4.86	8441
Parents' college degree $(0/1)$	0.63	1	0.48	7910
Parents' graduate degree $(0/1)$	0.23	0	0.42	7910
Father's military service $(0/1)$	0.77	1	0.42	8041
Father at war during childhood $(0/1)$	0.19	0	0.39	6103
Parents executive job $(0/1)$	0.17	0	0.38	8811
Parents low paid job $(0/1)$	0.17	0	0.38	8811
Parents' monthly income (\$)	2244.88	1800.00	1733.71	2307
Fund risk and performance cha	racteristics			
Total risk, %	16.20	14.58	7.62	16783
Idiosyncratic risk, %	3.97	3.34	2.62	16783
Active risk, %	18.23	16.35	8.93	16325
Gross 4-factor alpha, %	0.48	0.34	9.24	16783
Net 4-factor alpha, %	-0.62	-0.69	9.28	16783

- Median solo-manager is 47 years old, served at the fund for almost 5 years and has industry experience of 8 years
- Average birth order by fund style category is around 2 for all style categories
- Later-born managers have similar length of tenure compared to earlier-born individual

Average fund has total risk of 16% p.a.,

 Average fund delivers negative net alpha of -0.62

The effect of birth order on managerial risk-taking

Variable				Tot	al risk												
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)									
Birth order	0.371***	0.476**	0.358***	0.312^{*}													
Laterborn	(2.99)	(2.19)	(2.99)	(1.87)	0.836***	0.742***	0.802***	0.510**	Reg	ression re	sults: Idio	syncratic r	isk				
Laterborn					(2.82)	(2.72)	(3.02)	(2.39)	Variable				Idiosync	eratic risk			
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Seg. & Year		No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Birth order	0.154***	0.170**	0.144***	0.144***				
Fund & Year		Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No		(3.05)	(2.55)	(2.86)	(2.60)				
Seg. x Year	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	Laterborn	()	()	()	()	0.255**	0.320**	0.249**	0.316*
Firm x Year	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes						(2.00)	(2.73)	(2.01)	(2.17)
									Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Reg	gression re	sults: Acti	ve risk						Seg. & Year	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No
Variable				Acti	ve risk				Fund & Year	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	Seg. x Year	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No
Birth order	0.650***	0.826***	0.670***	0.549**	1				Firm x Year	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
	(3.02)	(3.49)	(3.31)	(2.02)													
Laterborn					1.129***	1.307^{**}	1.067^{***}	1.650^{**}									
					(2.75)	(2.24)	(2.71)	(2.51)									
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes						• F	und cont	rols (lago	red)∙
Seg. & Year	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No									500).
Fund & Year		Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No								d size	
Seg. x Year	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No							Fun	d family :	size
Firm x Year	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes							Fun	d ago	

Turnover ratio
Expense ratio
Fund flows

Manager age

Fund tenure

Industry tenure

Manager controls:

Gender

- Birth order is a manager's rank by age among siblings, while Laterborn is a dummy
- Birth order is positively related to a fund's total risk, idiosyncratic risk, and active risk.
- Neither time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity at the segment or fund firm level, nor timevarying heterogeneous trends drive these results

Controlling for family size

Variable	Tota	l risk	Idiosyncr	atic risk	Active risk		
Panel A: Controlling for family size	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
Birth order	0.329**	0.290**	0.120**	0.111*	0.641**	0.625***	
	(2.02)	(2.10)	(1.96)	(1.85)	(2.44)	(2.67)	
Family size	-0.014	0.133	0.025	0.072	-0.138	0.04	
	(-0.09)	(1.32)	(0.43)	(1.29)	(-0.83)	(0.39)	

Controlling for demographics

- Negligible effect of family size in contrast to the predominant role of birth order among other family background characteristics
- family size effects are confounded with those of the birth order (Black, Devereux, and Salvanes, 2005, QJE)

Tota	l risk	Idiosyncr	atic risk	Active risk		
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
0.295**	0.297*	0.126**	0.115*	0.719***	0.774***	
(2.30)	(1.93)	(2.03)	(1.66)	(2.87)	(2.96)	
	-0.003		0.107		-0.078	
	(-0.02)		(0.26)		(-0.77)	
	(1) 0.295**	0.295** 0.297* (2.30) (1.93) -0.003	(1) (2) (3) 0.295** 0.297* 0.126** (2.30) (1.93) (2.03) -0.003 -0.003	$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$

- Demographic controls:
 - Family size (next slide)
 - mother's age
 - father's age
 - parental education
 - parental employment
 - parental household wealth

Additional results and robustness checks

Adding additional controls	 Bereavement effects (Liu, Shu, Sulaeman, and Yeung, 2020) Marital status (Roussanov and Savor, 2014) Relative age (Bai, Ma, Mullally, and Solomon, 2018) Depression babies (Malmendier and Nagel, 2011) Educational degree and university selectiveness Cultural origin effects State of birth effects
Alternative estimation window and methods	 Rolling window of 24 months (minimum 20 observations) Rolling window 36 months (minimum 30 observations) Fama and MacBeth (1973)
Alternative measure and sample	 Alternative birth order specification (including one-child families) Placebo test using a subset of index funds

- No evidence that family gender composition affects the results. No evidence that supports role-assimilation theory
- No interaction effects between birth order and indicators for growing up with gender-diverse siblings or having younger/older sister/brother

Our findings support Sulloway's (1996) perspective that birth order effect stems from sibling competition

Mechanism: Age gap and birth order effects

r	Total risk	Idiosyncratic risk	Active risk
Birth order	0.694***	0.278***	1.183***
	(2.88)	(3.02)	(2.66)
Birth order x Age gap	-0.132**	-0.042**	-0.221***
	(-2.31)	(-1.96)	(-2.70)
Age gap	-0.334**	-0.205***	-0.156
	(-2.47)	(-3.90)	(-1.09)

Age spacing between siblings may cause less dilution of parental resources, resulting in a less competition for resource-rich niches (Sulloway 1999; 2001)

- Age spacing negatively influences the relationship between manager birth order and risk taking
- Age spacing is measured by the number of full years to the closest sibling based on their birthdates. In total, 552 managers (870 funds)

Sibling rivalry – is the key mechanism behind the birth order effects

Mechanism: Limited parental resources (I/II)

Parental **financial resources** and birth order effects

_	Tota	al risk	Idiosyna	eratic risk	Active	Active risk	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
Birth order	0.156	0.192	0.238***	0.081**	0.441	0.357	
	(0.71)	(1.30)	(3.01)	(2.43)	(1.52)	(1.63)	
Birth order x Low income	1.201***		0.404***		1.957***		
	(3.01)		(3.60)		(2.84)		
Birth order x Low-paid parents		0.798**		0.250***		1.442**	
		(2.09)		(3.62)		(2.33)	
Low income	-1.968*** (-2.52)		-0.470* (-1.89)		-2.928** (-2.45)		
Low-paid father	(2.52)	-0.649	(1.05)	0.245	(-2.+2)	-1.586	
		(-0.84)		(1.54)		(-1.57)	

 Growing up in the presence of financial constraints positively moderates the relationship between birth order and risk taking

On the contrary, managers-descendants of wealthy families show almost no evidence that laterborn mutual fund managers take on more risk relative to their first-born counterparts

Parents' income is based on 1940 census records (median split). In total, 234 managers (356 funds). Parent's employment information is from obituaries. In total, 867 managers (1,274 funds)

Mechanism: Limited parental resources (II/II)

Limited **parental attention** and birth order effects

	Total risk		Idiosyn	ncratic risk	Active risk		
_	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
Birth order	0.169	0.110	0.154*	0.062	0.660**	0.438	
	(0.95)	(0.56)	(1.75)	(0.76)	(2.21)	(1.39)	
Birth order x Both work	1.109***		0.309**		0.905**	· · ·	
	(3.57)		(2.06)		(1.98)		
Birth order x Father war		0.776**		0.346***		1.573**	
		(2.34)		(2.25)		(2.00)	
Both work	-1.807***		-0.445		-1.609*		
	(-2.65)		(-1.30)		(-1.79)		
Father war	. /	-2.132***		-1.117***		-3.001**	
		(-3.05)		(-3.44)		(-2.40)	

 Birth order effects are stronger among managers that grew up in families with limited parental attention

 Managers who grew up in a less constrained environment display less pronounced propensity to take risks

Father's military service records are from Department of Veteran Affairs and US military registries. In total, 827 managers (1,203 funds). Parent's employment information is from obituaries. In total, 416 managers (603 funds)

Additional evidence on risk taking: Trading Behavior

Styl	e Extremity							
	Market		Size		Value		Momentum	
Birth order	0.043^{***} (2.94)	0.033^{*} (1.88)	0.039^{***} (2.59)	0.041^{**} (2.02)	0.044^{***} (3.16)	0.040^{**} (2.37)	0.038^{**} (2.10)	0.049^{**} (2.06)
Family size		0.017 (0.98)		$-0.002 \ (-0.14)$		0.006 (0.31)	-	-0.018 (-1.00)
Mea	sures of turn	nover and	lottery hold	lings				
	Turnover		MAX5		MAX5 top		LTRY	
Birth order	0.140^{*} (1.85)	0.140^{**} (1.97)	0.082^{**} (2.43)	0.068^{*} (1.98)	0.087^{***} (2.71)	0.071^{**} (2.15)	1.277^{**} (2.16)	1.131^{*} (1.90)
Family size		$\begin{array}{c} 0.001 \\ (0.04) \end{array}$		0.024^{*} (1.72)		$\begin{array}{c} 0.026\\ (1.59) \end{array}$		$\begin{array}{c} 0.233 \\ (0.91) \end{array}$

Later-born managers behave in ways that are consistent with greater risk tolerance, such that they:

- are more likely to take extreme style bets
- trade more frequently
- hold more lottery stocks

Additional evidence on risk taking: Managerial violations

	Dependent Variable:						
	Violations	Regulatory	Customer disputes	Number of violations	Fines paid (USD)		
Birth order	0.547***	0.174	0.791***	0.057**	14677.43***		
	(2.89)	(0.68)	(3.44)	(2.49)	(3.51)		
Manager controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Pseudo/Adj. R-squared	0.12	0.09	0.15	0.03	0.03		
Managers	303	303	303	303	303		

• Non-pecuniary risk-taking extend beyond mutual fund portfolio management

Relative to first-born individuals, later-born managers, all else equal, are more likely to:

- have records of past violations
- lose disputes with customers
- have greater number of violations
- end up paying more in total fines and compensations

Data on managerial violations is from FINRA BrokerCheck. In total, we have collected data for 303 fund managers *No manager in our sample has criminal records

Performance and birth order

Variable	Sharpe ratio			Information ratio			
Birth order	(1) -0.056*** (-3.88)	(2) -0.053*** (-3.95)	(3) -0.013 (-0.53)	(4) -0.068*** (-4.23)	(5) -0.058*** (-3.88)	(6) -0.040*** (-1.82)	
Fund controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Manager controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Segment FE Year FE	Yes Yes	No No	No No	Yes Yes	No No	No No	
Segment FE x Year FE	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	
Fund firm FE x Year FE Adj. R-squared N of funds	No 0.7 1,009	No 0.76 1,009	Yes 0.79 775	No 0.12 1,009	No 0.32 1,009	Yes 0.29 775	
Observations	6,316	6,264	4,038	6,316	6,264	4,038	

- Greater incremental risk taking of later-born managers **does not** result in better performance
- Being born by one birth order rank younger reduces average annualized Sharpe ratio and information ratio by 0.06 and 0.07, respectively

Later-born managers exhibit behavioral patterns that are associated with sensation seeking

Results Summary

- Birth order is positively related to sensation seeking
 - Managerial sensation seeking behavior is intricately linked to birth order
 - The later a manager is born in the sibling hierarchy, greater investment risk she undertakes, without being compensated with higher returns
- Sibling rivalry for parental resources is the key mechanism behind the birth order effects
 - The more sibling rivalry is present during childhood, the more birth order-related niche differentiation behaviors become engrained
- Long-lived effects of birth order shape the trading behavior of fund managers
 - Later-born managers exhibit trading patterns that are associated with sensation seeking, e.g. take extreme style bets, hold more lottery stocks, and trade more frequently.
- The incremental risk-taking by later-born managers extends beyond portfolio management

Thank you for your attention!