
# Monetary Tightening, Bank Fragility and Implications

Bank failures, 2001-23




ABFER Annual Conference: Academic Luncheon Keynote
May 22, 2023

### Banking 101

What
Happened to
SVB?

#### Bank failures, 2001-23



### A story in 3 parts...







WHAT'S A BANK? IT'S ABOUT "TIME"

WHAT BLEW UP?

#### What's a bank?

#### <u>Liabilities</u> <u>Assets</u> Cash 15 **Deposits** 185 25 Gov't Bonds + 85 **MBS Equity** <u>15</u> "capital" Total \$200 <u>75</u> Loans \$200 **Total**

#### What's a bank?

#### <u>Assets</u>

Cash	15
Gov't Bonds	25
MBS	85
<u>Loans</u>	<u>75</u>
Total	\$200



#### <u>Liabilities</u>

Deposits 185 Pay 1.0%
+
Equity 15
Total \$200

$$\frac{4-1.85=2.15}{15}$$
 =14% roe


# It's about "time"...




<u>Asse</u>	<u>ts</u>	Duration (yrs)	<u>Liabilities</u>	Duration (yrs)
Cash	15	0.0	Deposits 185 + Equity 15 Total \$200	0.2
Gov't Bonds	25	4.0	Mismatch +	
MBS	85	6.0	Equity 15	
<u>Loans</u>	<u>75</u>	2.0	Total \$200	
Total	\$200	3.8		

### And timing...










### And timing...







#### Recent Monetary Tightening



### What blew up?

≈ \$22.8B loss



Asse	<u>ts</u>	Duration (yrs)		<u>Liabiliti</u>	<u>es</u>	Duration (yrs)
Cash	15	0.0		Deposits	185	0.2
Gov't Bonds	25	4.0		+		
MBS	85	6.0	Mark-to-Mkt	<b>Equity</b>	<u>15</u>	_
<u>Loans</u>	<u>75</u>	<u>2.0</u>	Loss of	Total	\$200	
Total	\$200	3.8	\$21B			
\$200 x	3.8 yrs	s x 3% /		\$185 x C	).2 yrs	x 4.8%


≈ \$1.8B gain

- 90%+ of SVBs deposits were uninsured (> \$250k)
- Closely connected (VC Networks) not "sleepy"



\$42 Billion in attempted withdrawals on March 9th

#### SVB Financial deposits, quarterly net change




SVB Shareholders and Creditors wiped out

FDIC extends coverage to uninsured deposits

Bank Term Funding Program:

Banks can borrow against assets at PAR value



Mitigates short-term "run risk" at other similar banks


But: Actual losses remain

⇒ future moral hazard

And Then?


# SVB: An Outlier?

#### Bank failures, 2001-23




#### Jiang, Matvos, Piskorski, Seru 3/13/23

Monetary Tightening and U.S. Bank Fragility in 2023: Mark-to-Market Losses and Uninsured Depositor Runs?




# Unrealized Losses




	Total	RMBS	Non-RMBS Security	Residential Mortgage	Other Loans
MTM Loss	2.2	1.0	0.3	0.6	0.3


## Hedging?



### Uninsured Leverage




# Hedging?




# Uninsured Leverage & Unrealized Losses

Flight risk v turbulence



### Equity/Assets




#### A Solvency Run...


- ☐ When interest rate increases sufficiently, a "solvency run" is possible
- ☐ Banks at a higher risk of solvency run:
  - Lower initial capitalization (Equity)
  - Higher uninsured leverage
  - More awake uninsured depositors

#### Where are self-fulfilling solvency runs possible?

#### Number of Insolvent Banks



#### Aggregate Assets of Insolvent Banks (in Trillions)





Liquidity

Fed report on SVB "liquidity" appears 320 times, "solvency" once!



Liquidity

Fed report on SVB "liquidity" appears 320 times, "solvency" once!



But liquidity issues addressed, and yet banks keep failing!

LOTS of liquid assets
Other liquidity interventions



Liquidity

Fed report on SVB "liquidity" appears 320 times, "solvency" once!



But liquidity issues addressed, and yet banks keep failing!

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
Other liquidity interventions




Bad management!

Board of directors and management failed to manage their risks


#### INCONSISTENT REGULATORS



#### Beyond SVB?



# Beyond SVB?



#### Now What?


Extended coverage to uninsured depositors

Bank Term Funding Program

Mitigates short term risk...

...but losses remain.

# S&L Crisis (1980s) "Gambling for Resurrection"



# What next in the short run?

"A market test"

#### Resolving the Banking Crisis

This Version: April 12, 2023 (with FAQs)
First Version: March 28, 2023
Link to Current Draft


Peter DeMarzo (Stanford), Erica Jiang (USC), Arvind Krishnamurthy (Stanford), Gregor Matvos (Northwestern), Tomasz Piskorski (Columbia), Amit Seru (Stanford and Hoover)

#### Summary

- 1. New economic conditions have led to insolvency concerns across the banking system.
- 2. There are too many banks in this situation to resolve with one-off solutions.
- 3. Government backstops and regulatory forbearance risk a repeat of the S&L crisis.
- Requiring banks to promptly raise equity capital will both reduce fragility and provide a needed market test to identify truly insolvent banks.
- 5. The amount of private capital needed is in the range of \$190 to \$400 billion.

# What next in the short run?

"A market test"



# What about the long run?

"Careful Regulations to address unprecedented and unanticipated risks?"

Interest Rate Risk

#### FINANCIAL TIMES

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Opinion Markets Insight

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# It is time to move to banking without subsidised deposits

Regulators cannot be expected to solve all financial stability problems


**AMIT SERU** 

+ Add to myFT

### What about the long run?

"Careful Regulations to and unanticipated risks?"


address unprecedented



**Interest Rate Risk** 

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#### Extra