Cyrus Aghamolla and Kevin Smith
"Strategic Complexity in Disclosure"

Discussed by Evgeny Petrov (HKUST)

ABFER, Singapore; May 25, 2023

Observation #1

Simplification of complex information can result in information loss.

Observation #2

Adding complexity can also result in information loss.

Observation #3

It's hard for unsophisticated recipients to understand whether complex information is informative or not.

Rooter: A Methodology for the Typical Unification of Access Points and Redundancy

Jeremy Stribling, Daniel Aguayo and Maxwell Krohn

ABSTRACT

Many physicists would agree that, had it not been for congestion control, the evaluation of web browsers might never have occurred. In fact, few hackers worldwide would disagree with the essential unification of voice-over-IP and public-private key pair. In order to solve this riddle, we confirm that SMPs can be made stochastic, cacheable, and interposable.

I. INTRODUCTION

Many scholars would agree that, had it not been for active networks, the simulation of Lamport clocks might never have

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. For starters, we motivate the need for fiber-optic cables. We place our work in context with the prior work in this area. To address this obstacle, we disprove that even though the much-tauted autonomous algorithm for the construction of digital-to-analog converters by Jones [10] is NP-complete, object-oriented languages can be made signed, decentralized, and signed. Along these same lines, to accomplish this mission, we concentrate our efforts on showing that the famous ubiquitous algorithm for the exploration of robots by Sato et al. runs in $\Omega((n + \log n))$ time [22]. In the end, we conclude.

Research Question

How do firms choose complexity in their mandatory disclosure. And how do investors react?

Model

- manager observes firm value $\tilde{y}$ and needs to communicate it to investors
- a proportion χ of investors are *sophisticated* and a proportion $1 - \chi$ are *unsophisticated*
- manager chooses the type of disclosure to maximize firm price, defined as the average expectation of investors

$$P = \chi \mathbb{E}_I[\tilde{y}] + (1 - \chi)\mathbb{E}_N[\tilde{y}]$$

Model

▶ With probability $(1 - \beta) > 0$, the manager has to choose from three types of disclosure:

- *Simple (Δ_S):* all investors observe y with probability ρ_S, and with probability $1 - \rho_S$ they don't observe anything.

- *Complex informative (Δ_C):* sophisticated investors observe y with probability 1; unsophisticated investors don't observe anything.

- *Complex uninformative (Δ_U):* sophisticated investors observe y with probability ρ_U, and with probability $1 - \rho_U$ they don't observe anything; unsophisticated investors don't observe anything.

▶ With probability $\beta > 0$ the manager has no discretion over the type of disclosure (issues Δ_i with probability $\omega_i \in (0, 1)$, where $i = S, C, U$).

▶ All investors understand whether disclosure is simple or complex, but only sophisticated investors understand whether complex disclosure is informative or not.

Model

▶ **Informativeness:** the chance a randomly picked investor understands disclosure.
  - complex informative $\Delta_C \underset{\text{inf}}{\succ}$ simple $\Delta_S \underset{\text{inf}}{\succ}$ complex uninformative Δ_U

▶ **Fairness:** the chance that two randomly picked investors have the same understanding of information
  - simple $\Delta_S \underset{\text{fair}}{\succ}$ complex uninformative $\Delta_U \underset{\text{fair}}{\succ}$ complex informative Δ_C

Complex informative disclosure is, by assumption, the most informative but the least fair.

Main Results

All equilibria exhibit the same pattern:

$$|\underbrace{-\ -\ -\ -\ -\ -\ -\ -\ -\ -}_{\text{complex uninformative } \Delta_U} T_L \underbrace{-\ -\ -}_{\text{simple } \Delta_S} T_H \underbrace{-\ -\ -\ -\ -\ -\ -\ -\ -\ -}_{\text{complex informative } \Delta_C}|$$

▶ Intuitive: the higher the signal is, the more informative the manager wants the disclosure to be to increase the price impact.

▶ Low signals are disclosed in a complex uninformative way to fool the unsophisticated investors and attenuate the price impact.

▶ Analogy: writing an academic paper.

Main Results

There exist two types of equilibria:

1. with positive reaction to complex disclosure and negative reaction to simple disclosure;

$$\underbrace{|----}_{\Delta_C}T_L\underbrace{----}_{\Delta_S}T_H\underbrace{----\mu-------------|}_{\Delta_C}$$

   • This equilibrium always exists.

2. with negative reaction to complex disclosure and positive reaction to simple disclosure.

$$\underbrace{|-----------}_{\Delta_C}T_L\underbrace{--\mu----}_{\Delta_S}T_H\underbrace{-------|}_{\Delta_C}$$

   • This equilibrium always exists when there are not so many sophisticated investors.

Other Results

- Empirical stylized fact: U-shape relationship between complexity and returns (proxy for manger's information) around 10-Q filing dates
- Numerical predictions and robustness checks

General comments

- very well-written
- important topic
- parsimonious interesting model
- empirical regularities and predictions
- mature, presented at the JAE conference last year
- I learned new things, and I am curious to learn more

What I have learned

I have learned about the effects of **informativeness** of complex disclosure.

▶ My previous intuition from Verrecchia (1990) and Titman and Trueman (1986) is confirmed: managers choose more informative disclosure for better news.

▶ However, more nuanced details about what the manager does when he trades off **informativeness** to sophisticated and unsophisticated investors to have a more favorable average investor's response.

▶ Simple/Complex disclosure can lead to a negative or positive response from an average investor.

What I have yet to learn – 1

What are the effects of **fairness** of complex disclosure?

▶ Complex disclosure is unfair.

▶ In equilibrium, the extreme news are disclosed through complex disclosure.

▶ This harms the potential unsophisticated buyers and sellers the most.

▶ Unsophisticated investors don't like trading a firm that does not level the playing field (Miller, 2010)

▶ Ex-ante managers should be willing to provide fair **and** informative disclosure even when it's costly.

What I have yet to learn – 2

What are the **clientele effects** of complex disclosure?

▶ The investor pool is not exogenous to firm disclosure.

▶ Managers adjust disclosure to attract or discourage particular investors.

▶ Is χ really a parameter?

What I have yet to learn – 3

What are the effects of different **attributes** of complex disclosure?

- ▶ There is a spectrum of choices between complexity and simplicity.
- ▶ Quantitative vs qualitative; readability; location; formating; tone.
- ▶ Narrative complexity vs structural complexity (Carlin, 2009).
    - Do unsophisticated investors fail to understand complex things or does it take them longer to understand?
- ▶ Differential costs of simple vs complex informative vs complex uninformative.

What I have yet to learn – 4

What are the effects of complexity on **other market participants**?

- ▶ Regulators?
- ▶ Competitors?
- ▶ Peers?
- ▶ Other stakeholders?
- ▶ Supply chain?
- ▶ Spillover effects?

What I have yet to learn – 5

I would like to learn more about the **price formation** process.

▶ Price in the model is the belief of the *average* investor:

$$P = \chi \mathbb{E}_I[\tilde{y}] + (1 - \chi)\mathbb{E}_N[\tilde{y}].$$

▶ The price is not set by the *average* investor's beliefs, it is set by the *marginal* investor's beliefs.

▶ Marginal investor is the one who is most likely to be the buyer or seller on the next trade.

▶ The paper does have an appendix with endogenous price formation, but a more elegant model would add contirbution.

Thank you for your attention!
Looking forward to reading the published version of the paper!