# Discussion of Cracking Down, Pricing Up: Housing Supply in the Wake of Mass Deportation

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# Summary of the Paper

This paper studies the effect of labor supply shortage on housing construction

- Exploit a natural experiment "Secure Communities"
  - US Immigration and Customs Enforcement program from 2008 to 2013
  - Deports undocumented illegal individuals
- Interpret this program as a negative shock to labor supply in production of new housing
  - DiD estimates show that declines in new housing and price increases
  - Key identification assumption
    - Removal of illegal residents hit the labor market of the construction sector negatively
    - Staggered roll-out of the program through 3000+ counties is exogenous to housing market condition otherwise

#### **Overall Comment**

- Great to have more papers working on new housing supply
  - Esp. not on regulations
- New housing supply is highly unequal
  - Wang, Supply Inequality in Segmented Housing Markets
  - Baumsnow and Duranton, Housing Supply and Housing Affordability
- Policies that target middle-income segments are rare, and have limited impacts
  - Krimmel and Wang, Upzoning with Strings Attached: Evidence from Seattle's Housing Affordability Mandate
  - Been, Ellen, and O'Regan, Supply Skepticism: Housing Supply and Affordability
- We know relatively less about market forces on housing supply
- Most focus is on regulations
- Developers' cost function, construction sector's market structure...

#### Comment 1: Direct Causality through Construction Workers

- ullet DiD event study established: onslaught of SC  $\Rightarrow$  post treated counties experienced
  - Non-citizen workers, LEFB workers, Hispanic workers, US-born workers in construction industry
  - Permits and new constructions completed declined
  - Price increased
- How many people are deported?
  - In particular, what is the percent of labor loss of the construction industry locally?
- How big of a negative shock this is to affect output (construction)?

# Comment 2: Chain of Causality/Mechanism

- Immigration enforcement  $\Rightarrow$  loss of labor force in construction sector  $\Rightarrow$  unable to substitute with other forms of inputs  $\Rightarrow$  developers choosing to scale back production
- Immigration enforcement ⇒ loss of labor force in all low-paying sectors of the economy, such as janitors, uber drivers, etc. ⇒ complementarity in production between low-skilled immigrants and higher-skilled citizens lead to a reduction in local employment rate of citizens ⇒ unable to substitute with other forms of inputs ⇒ developers choosing to scale back production

#### Comment 2: Incidence

With 3000+ counties with different pre-existing conditions, DiD masks useful variation

- How big is the incidence of the program on the labor force in construction industry?
  - versus janitors, uber drivers
- How big is the variation of incidence across counties?
  - ullet Depending on # workers needed & how popular one particular task could be locally
  - If lose 2 out of 20 workers working on installing granite counter tops in kitchen could cope
  - $\bullet$  OR if lose 2 workers working on installing A/C out of 20 maybe could cope in Boston
  - ullet OR if I lose 15 workers working on installing A/C out of 20 in Austin, definitely slows down finishing up projects

# Suggestions on Comments 1 and 2

How do firms adjust to negative labor supply shocks? What's the elasticity of labor cost on output?

- A toy model could be immensely useful to back out magnitudes of pass-through:
  - ↓ labor on ↑ cost, and then on ↓ output
- Which margin does it affect the most
  - Replace workers, substitute to become more capital intensive
    - Consistent with the findings that low-skilled workers decline, not high-skilled + wages of workers increased (mechanically)
  - Scale down and reduce output (i.e. manufacturing output, housing)
  - Less productive and pay lower wages
  - Exit or consolidation of surviving firms

# Suggestions on Comments 1 and 2 (cont'd)

#### Market structure of construction industries

- Regional vs. local construction firms
- Regional firms might be more able to borrow workforce from close-by counties

How segmented firms are and how specialized the contractors are

- Construction industry is highly segmented
- Flooring, A/C installation, roofing, granite counter-tops
- Where do we see as segments with illegal immigrants?

#### Comment 3: Heterogeneity

- A simple model with production function with high- and low-skilled labor
- Production-side could also differ on capital-intensive versus labor-intensive types of jobs
  - Renovations, installation of A/C units
- Counties differ in percent of LEFB workers in low-skilled labor pre-SC
  - Counties with more illegal immigrants before 2008 are hit more
  - Counties located in hot regions with most illegal immigrants dominate A/C installation before 2008 are hit more

#### Comment 4: Relevant Margins

- Which margins of the construction sector are most severely affected?
  - High pre-existing share of illegal immigrants + quintessential part of delivering product
  - ullet e.g. all A/C installations are done by illegal immigrants in Austin + impossible to deliver a home without A/C in Austin
    - $\Rightarrow$  negative supply
- Permits decline why would permitting be affected in your story?
  - ullet # new construction permits # housing starts
  - # housing starts -# housing completes
  - Permits for remodeling that uses more illegal workers
  - Permits from contractors that are localized versus those that span different regions

### Remodeling permits example, Seattle




Figure: Two remodeling permits on the same property

### Construction permit example, Seattle



Figure: New construction permit

#### Local vs regional contractors

E.g. Meritage Homes Corporation, a publicly traded real estate development company. 5th largest in the U.S.

A summary of Meritage's year-over-year results for certain key metrics follows (dollars in thousands):

	2024	2023	Change
Home Closing Units	15,611	13,976	11.7%
Home Closing Revenue	\$ 6,341,546	\$ 6,056,784	4.7%
Home Order Units	14,606	13,193	10.7%
Home Order Value	\$ 5,950,708	\$ 5,675,892	4.8%
Orders Pace (1)	4.3	4.0	7.5%
Quarterly Backlog Conversion Rate (2)	177.1 %	109.5 %	n/m
Home Closing Gross Margin	24.9 %	24.8 %	10 bps
Commissions and other selling costs and general and administrative expenses (as a percentage of home closing revenue)	10.1 %	10.2 %	(10) bps
Earnings Before Income Taxes	\$ 1,002,870	\$ 949,430	5.6%
Diluted Earnings per Common Share (3)	\$ 10.72	\$ 9.96	7.6%
3ook Value per Common Share (3)	\$ 71.49	\$ 63.31	12.9%
Dividends Declared and Paid per Common Share (3)	\$ 1.50	\$ 0.54	177.8%
Shares of Common Stock Repurchased	1,464,510	875,764	67.2%
Return On Assets (4)	13.2 %	14.6 %	(140) bps

<sup>(1)</sup> Calculated as number of net home orders per average active community per month.

The market for new homes was healthy in 2024 as the largest U.S. population cohorts of the millennial, Gen Z and bably boomer generations continue to need affordable, move-in-ready homes. While demand was stable, voltalle and elevated interest rates resulted in increased need interest rate resistance. For potential homeburgers, to help with monthly mortgage affordability, supply chain and labor market disruptions, shortages and other economic-related desiruptions. The transportation of the post of the pos

Figure: SEC Form DEF 14A of 2024

<sup>(2)</sup> Calculated as quarterly home closing units divided by beginning backlog. Most recent quarter (fourth quarter) is provided for each period. (3) Ser share a provider to have been retrieved to the control of the con

<sup>(3)</sup> Per share amounts have been retroactively adjusted to reflect the z-tor-1 stock split that was effective on January z, zu. (4) Calculated as net earnings divided by the average of five trailing quarters total assets, less cash and cash equivalents.

#### Regional exits?



#### NOTE 14 — OPERATING AND REPORTING SEGMENTS

We operate with two principal business segments: homebuilding and financial services. As defined in ASC 280-105/egment Reporting, we have twelve homebuilding operating segments. The homebuilding segments are engaged in the business of acquiring and developing land, contrige homes, marketing and selling those homes and providing warranty and customer services. We aggregate our homebuilding operating segments into reporting segments based on similar long-term economic characteristics and geographical proximity. Our three reportable homebuilding segments are as follows:



We define our segments based on the way in which internally reported financial information is regularly provided and reviewed by the CODM to analyze financial performance, make decisions, and allocate resources. Our CODM is the chief executive officer. The CODM's evaluation of the homebuilding segment performance is based on segment home closing revenue, home closing gross profit/(loss), bome closing gross margin, total gross profit/(loss), commissions and other sales costs, general and administrative costs incurred by or allocated to each segment, including impairments, and operating income/(loss). The CODM uses these performance metrics predominantly in the annual budget and forecasting process and considers budget-to-actual variances on a quarterly basis for these measures when making decisions about the allocation of operating and capital resources to each segment. The CODM also uses these data points to assess the performance of each segment by comparing the results of each segment with one another and in determining the compensation of certain employees. The CODM also reviews financial services sprofit/(loss) to evaluate the performance of the financial services related product offerings.

Effective January 1, 2025, we realigned our internal organizational structure and resources following continued growth and recent entry into new markets. As a result of the change in our organizational structure, the Tennessee homebuilding operating segment was reclassified from the East reporting segment to the Central reporting segment for the purpose of making

Figure: SEC Form 10Q of 2025Q1

#### Other comments

- Results in A5 look like an effect following recession from 2008 as SFRs are hit the most
- Alternative story to price increase: removal of disamenity value associated with immigration settlement and native flights
- Table 1 should report the LEFB/Hispanic share of construction labor
- "LEFB" should have been defined the first time it appeared on page 4