Annual Conference

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Sustainable and Green Finance

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May 2026

How do purpose-driven stakeholders induce reform? Using a multi-sided matching equilibrium, we show that whether they exit or engage depends on whether social harm scales with productivity. When harm is uncorrelated—an implicit assumption in most literature—purpose-driven stakeholders engage and...
Keywords: Impact, value-driven stakeholders, exit, and engagement
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Annual Conference

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Sustainable and Green Finance

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May 2026

Carbon risk is shaped not only by firms’ own emissions but also by their position in production networks. We develop a general-equilibrium asset-pricing framework with input–output linkages, carbon emissions, and aggregate regulatory risk, and derive a sufficient-statistic characterization of th...
Keywords: Carbon Risk Premium, Production Networks, Input–Output Linkages, Climate Policy, Network Exposure
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Annual Conference

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Sustainable and Green Finance

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May 2026

Trade liberalization generates economic gains, but production can impose environmental costs both domestically and across borders—raising the question of whether pollution costs discount trade benefits and how costs are distributed internationally. This paper develops a framework to quantify these...
Keywords: Agricultural Trade, Environmental Externalities, Transboundary Pollution
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Annual Conference

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Sustainable and Green Finance

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May 2026

This study examines whether firms strategically “clean up” emissions when investors are watching. Using daily facility-level satellite data from China, we find that manufacturing firms temporarily suppress pollution emissions specifically during investor site visits. The effect is most pronounce...
Keywords: Corporate site visits, ESG, Real activity management, Satellite data
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Annual Conference

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Sustainable and Green Finance

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May 2026

Third-party monitors are commonly deployed to mitigate agency problems in multi-layered organizations. Yet these third-party relationships may themselves be subject to agency concerns. We examine how third-party monitoring can be undermined by collusion between monitor and agent, in air pollution mo...
Keywords: Principal-Agent Problems, Delegated Monitoring, Local Capture, Information Disclosure, Political Economy
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